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The problems of post-nineteen sixties left-wing politics
are explored by analysing a hypothetical collective
memory of the left. This memory claims that the hegemony
over thought and practice held by Marxism has been broken
down since the nineteen sixties by many different non-
class based forms of oppression.
The nature of Marxism as one political movement among
other such movements is then explored and implications
for any movement that tries to base itself on unified and
universal values are outlined. It is argued that any
politics based on unified values will create oppression
because the values of such a politics will exclude the
values of some other group.
The possibility that politics can be based on difference
is then explored. The works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari and Jean-Francois Lyotard are examined as
examples of difference based political theories. It is
then concluded that, in general, difference is an
inadequate basis for liberatory politics because
difference based politics is only concerned to protect
the process of differentiation and so ignores the
particular values on which anti-oppression movements have
been based.
The possibility that difference and value based theories
and movements are actually part of the one debate and do
not follow each other in a linear progression is then
analysed. The difference/value debate is characterised as
consisting of paralysed motion because both difference
and value have important critiques of each other and
answers to those critiques, thereby creating a constant
motion between the two poles of difference and value
which yet never moves beyond these two poles.
A general understanding of emancipatory politics is then
proposed, called the ontology of emancipatory
collectives, which is not enmeshed in the
difference/value debate. It is argued that different
fundamental transformations of society can be carried out
by many different emancipatory collectives. Emancipatory
collectives are defined as collective action systems that
are unified by a common experience of oppression or
project of emancipation. A general definition of
oppression and emancipation is proposed as well as a
definition of the process by which collectives are
unified. It is also argued that emancipatory collectives
relate to each other according to a framework which has
the two poles of misunderstanding and assimilation.
Finally, the general vision of politics which arises from
the ontology of emancipatory collectives is outlined and
its two underlying principles, of perspectivism and
contextualism, are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: MEMORY AND THE LEFT.
The Left.
"This book should be taken as a strictly theoretical
endeavour. Theoretical, in that none of the
questions it poses can be said to have been answered
definitively or for all time...In fact, the book
proposes more questions than it will answer. The
only questions it will properly move to answer have,
I think, been answered already within the patterns
of...life. We need only give these patterns serious
scrutiny and draw certain permissible conclusions."
Amiri Baraka [Jones, 1963, 1]
For people attempting to change the nature of their
society a memory of their struggle performs several
functions. In one respect, a memory reminds activists of
how they came to the position they are in and so ensures
they will not repeat mistakes; in another, by remembering
a time when society was different, a memory tells
activists that change is possible. A memory of political
struggle is a base from which future activism can proceed
and so, ostensibly about the past, it can act in the
present and affect the future.
Two entities are implied by these observations; a
collective memory and a community of activists that holds
such a memory. Both of these entities are abstractions
which might be built from the material reality of
political activism because this reality exists in
individuals, texts and events rather than in concepts
like memory or community. No activist has ever
encountered 'the left' but all left-wing activists have
encountered members of Trotskyist Parties or the texts of
Marx. Accordingly, 'memory' and 'community' can be
understood as reifications of the really existing
networks of political activism.
A vision of political change can be expressed through
reifications such as 'collective memory' or 'community of
activists' because these concepts generalise the
experiences and beliefs of activists. Such a vision will
allow individuals caught in particular networks to raise
their heads and have a sense of their place in an overall
struggle. The reality of left-wing activism may be
reading an article on production, volunteering for
flyposting or marching in demonstrations but these
actions all gain a general meaning through reifications
which articulate a vision of political change.
These observations imply that the work of political
activists must relate with some consistency to the
reifications they endorse, because the meaning of their
actions are partially derived from and partially
legitimated by these reifications. Similarly, if
particular events heavily contradict a reification then
an adjustment may be needed in the overall political
vision. Political activism can thus be understood on two
inter-related levels, the general and the particular or
the reified and the material, and questions can be posed
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about the general level because of its effects on
activism.
Exploration of such questions also seems urgent for left-
wing activism, for political change since the nineteen-
sixties has been dislocating for leftists. [Hall, 1988:
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985] For example, the left's focus
has shifted from criticising the state to defending
sections of it, from a worker based radicalism to a
recognition of the decline of the working class and its
institutions and from the ideal of a single movement for
a better world to numerous movements each based on a
particular identity. Amid these difficulties have also
come constant calls for a renewal of the left, none of
which seem to produce the resurrection of a unified
overarching movement. [Guattari and Negri, 1985: Weir and
Wilson, 1984] The general collapse of communism, both
East and West, comes into this story not so much as a
crisis for the left but as another moment in a general
dislocation that has been in progress since the nineteen-
sixties.
The dislocation of the left does not, however, extend to
particular events or conflicts, as there have been
important political and social struggles relevant to the
left from the sixties to the present. SOS-Racisme in
France and the Anti-Poll Tax campaigns in the U.K. are
examples of powerful struggles that appear to be
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consistent with the left but which are also not
necessarily subsumed within the left. Another example of
such ambiguity is animal liberation struggles which offer
many of the signs of the left, such as grass-roots
organising and a concern for oppression and its human
sources, but which somehow do not easily fit with left-
wing priorities for human emancipation. The left's
problems lie not in left-wing struggles ceasing to exist
but in the nature of the 'left' that relates to political
struggles. What has become dislocated is the overall
vision of political change that the left embodies, not
the fact of ongoing political struggle.
It is therefore the general political vision of the left
which needs analysis because, however dynamic the realm
of activists, texts and theories might be, what unifies
sections of this realm as 'the left' seems fragmented and
uncertain. Accordingly, this thesis will try to both
analyse difficulties in the general vision of the left
and to advance a theory which addresses the difficulties
that are revealed. Initially, this proposal creates a
methodological problem because identifying the overall
political vision of the left is difficult, partly because
different segments of left activism may have different
visions and partly because it is difficult not to assume
the vision in advance of its analysis.
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It is clear that visions of the left differ between
movements and theories. The obvious method for studying
this diversity would be to develop an empirical summary
which outlines the common ground of all identifiable left
visions. However, such a method would involve assuming a
criteria for what can and cannot be included as left in
advance of investigating the left. Further, as has
already been noted, the left is not a real objective body
which empirical techniques can identify but is an
imaginary construct which refers to real bodies. It may
again be asked who has ever met the left, as opposed to
the texts of Marx or members of a demonstration. As it is
this imaginary that is fragmented, and so is under
discussion, empiricism provides a problematic basis for
analysis.1
An alternative to the empirical identification of the
Western left, that will be employed in this thesis, would
be to propose a version of the left's collective memory,
as an aspect of the left's overall vision, and then to
analyse this memory. In this way the left can be made the
direct object of investigation and instances of left-wing
activism can be examined, even though an empirically
1 Another objection to basing an analysis of the left on
the empirical identification of the left's history is
that the material accuracy of that history, or memory, is
a site of struggle in itself. That is, whatever makes up
the 'material' basis of the left's memory is itself
ordered by the conceptions of that memory and is not
independent of those conceptions. Accordingly, the nature
of the left or its history cannot be expected to be
defined by purely empirical means.
authoritative version of the left will not be asserted. A
danger of this method is that ideas thrown up by it will
appear decontextutalised because the memory will simply
be hypothesised and not empirically grounded. It may thus
appear as if ideas are all that matters, not why certain
ideas have become important to the left at certain times.
To fully answer this criticism would clearly require
turning back to empirical techniques, which is an
approach that has already been rejected. Instead, the
proposed method can be defended against the accusation of
decontextutalism by noting that its employment will mark
this thesis as essentially a theoretical work, in the
sense offered by Baraka in this chapter's epigraph.
Reinventing Revolution is not a sociology or a history of
the left but is an exploration of the left's political
philosophy. This does not mean that practices of the left
are ignored but rather that this thesis analyses ideas
about both theories and actions. Reinventing Revolution
is a theoretical work, but its theory concerns both
practices and ideas of the left.
Ultimately, the relevance of the following philosophical
exploration to left activism will result from the
relevance of the hypothesised collective memory. As has
been argued, the memory does not have to be completely
realistic or historically precise, however it must grasp
some features of the post-sixties left in order to give
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relevance to subsequent analysis. If the hypothesised
memory is appropriate then the analysis which follows it
will come to grips with the left's vision and will
develop both criticism of it and an alternative to it,
despite the fact that the hypothesis cannot encapsulate
all possible manifestations of the left. The memory is
not the actual body of the left, whose entrails need to
be examined, but a scalpel for opening up that body to
analysis.
The Left's Collective Memory.
A collective memory for the left will be articulated by
drawing out two common threads from African-American
activist Amiri Baraka's autobiography, The Autobiography
of Leroi Jones, Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary
Wainwright's late nineteen-seventies analysis of the
relationship between socialism and feminism, Beyond the
Fragments, and Paul Gilroy's late nineteen-eighties
investigation of the relationship between race, class and
nationalism in the U.K., There Ain't No Black in the
Union Jack. The memory can first be glimpsed in an event
in New York in the early nineteen sixties recounted by
Baraka.
"All I knew is that the Socialist Workers Party[SWP]
wanted to put a woman named Berta Greene on the MDC
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[Monroe Defence Committee2] and Richard Gibson was
always complaining about the SWP, and, particularly,
Berta Greene, as interfering obstructionists to the
work he was trying to do with Fair Play [for Cuba
Committee]. We met one day at my house on 14th
Street. Calvin, Virginia Hamilton, Archie and some
others, and SWP people gave us a check for a couple
of hundred dollars and wanted to talk about Berta's
being an officer on the committee. We went into
secret caucus and subsequently told them we didn't
want Berta on the committee. So SWP took their check
back. What was so wild was that some of us were
talking about how we didn't want white people on the
committee but we were all hooked up to white women
and the downtown Village [predominantly white]
society. Such were the contradictions of that period
of political organization." [Baraka, 1984. Brackets
added.]
The most obvious theme in Baraka's anecdote is the
exchange between the Socialist Workers Party and the
Monroe Defence Committee. The exchange is very simple
because the SWP, which can be viewed as a symbol of over
fifty years of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice, uses
money in an attempt to gain influence on the MDC, which
can be viewed as a symbol of activist groups which
defined themselves through a non-class based oppression.
"Somehow there has passed into Trotskyism...the
assumption that the manipulation of people is
justified by the supposedly superior knowledge which
the leaders of revolutionary groups presume to
possess of the end they believe they are pursuing."
[Rowbotham, 1979, 28]
Sheila Rowbotham was writing about the experiences of
British feminists but she also, inadvertently,
2 The Monroe Defence committee was set up 'to raise money
and put out propaganda' about the U.S.A. government's
attempt to frame black activist Rob Williams.
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interpreted Baraka's anecdote. Identified by both Baraka
and Rowbotham is a certain arrogance and self-belief that
characterises Trotskyist organization. Gilroy also notes
this certainty in relation to the politics of black
liberation in the U.K..
"It is important to recognize the difficulties which
attend the concept [of class] and to appreciate that
its use in the politics and history of Britain's
black settlers has often been economistic and
reductive, seeking to subordinate the
self-organization of blacks to the mythical
discipline of a unified working class and its
representative political institutions." [Gilroy,
1987, 18]
The thread connecting Baraka, Rowbotham and Gilroy is the
encounter and disillusionment with Marxism, particularly
Marxist-Leninism, by those involved in political
movements not based on class. These 'non-class' anti-
oppression movements shifted away from determining
political theories and actions by reference to class
analysis and so developed new political issues and
subjectivities. These new 'subjectivities' have thus had
to define themselves against the class-based subject of
Marxist-Leninism. Understood organisationally and
personally, this meant that the initial opposition for
women, black and other movements was often not men or
whites, but Marxist men and Marxist whites and their
organisations.
The first common thread across the three books can now be
generalised as the belief that the sixties, seventies and
eighties witnessed a process of disillusionment with
Marxist and particularly Marxist-Leninist theories and
organizations, because they dominated left thought at the
expense of movements developed from non-class based
oppressions. [Gilroy, 1987, 32-35: Rowbotham, 1979, 64-
65] A second common thread is offered by Baraka when he
wrote:
"Certainly the idea that oppressed people practising
and believing in the values of their oppressors
cannot free themselves is true and unchallengeable."
[Baraka, 1984, 253]
Baraka's statement means that political movements based
on class cannot lead groups whose theories and actions do
not centre on class, as this would mean understanding
women, black people, gays and lesbians and any other non-
class defined group as oppressed only when that
oppression could be related to society's class structure.
For groups asserting a non-class based oppression the
certainty of Marxist-Leninism that class theory defines
the nature of oppression is not only inaccurate for their
own experience and misdirects their political activism,
but is in itself repressive. Groups struggling within
oppressive social relations must accordingly define their
own sense of oppression as this is the only way that they
can define their own liberation. Without such self-
definitions groups would be left fighting their
oppression in terms defined by others and, effectively,
in western countries this would mean being led by the
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class-based left. For example, Gilroy notes of the black
community in Britain that:
"In some struggles, workers and shopkeepers have
created political solidarity in the name of 'race'
and community. In others, the action of black
workers may be linked in complex ways to those of
the black unemployed. It has been suggested, for
example, that the industrial action in which health
service workers confronted the government during the
autumn and winter of 1982-83 cannot be understood
unless the issue of its relationship to the urban
protests of summer 1981 is explained...The political
activities of black workers in the health service
are necessarily tied to those of their children in
the streets." [Gilroy, 1987, 19-20]
To define themselves through class theory blacks would
have to deny the specificity of their struggles as
blacks. The denial or trivialisation of such
specificities because they contradict class theory is
felt as continued repression, of essentially the same
type whether exerted by Marxist-Leninist groups in the
name of a unified working class or the Conservative Party
in the name of a unified nation.
A second common thread across the three books is
therefore the belief that movements of the oppressed must
define and retain their own sense of their subordination.
Specific oppressions demand both movements and self-
definitions relevant to that oppression and so leadership
must be refused to any group which claims to understand
all oppression with the one universal analysis. For many
of the groups that emerged in the sixties this meant that
a confrontation with Marxist-Leninism was inevitable.
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The assertion of a particular oppression does not,
however, mean that a movement must deny that other
subordinations exist, it merely demands that one movement
does not attempt to pass off its specificity as a
universal political view. [Gilroy, 1987, 157-160:
Wainwright, 1979, 3-4] Consequently, once a movement has
defined its specificity and guarded it with specific
organisations and specific theories, liberation may
require working with other groups. Accordingly, at a
theoretical level Marxism is not completely rejected, but
is merely removed from its position of dominance and
treated as one theory of one particular oppression
amongst other theories of oppression. In practical terms
this implies that the concepts of alliance, between anti-
oppression movements, and autonomy, of anti-oppression
movements from each other become key to an understanding
of the left's project of liberation. Wainwright made this
clear when she wrote:
"one problem is that of drawing up a common
programme of political and social change, meeting
the needs of all oppressed groups, and arguing for
it among each group. The other problem is gathering
together all the different sources of strength,
uniting the social power of the community with the
industrial power of those in production, and
pitching this popular power against the existing
state. This requires a strategy, based on the ideas
and experiences of each movement, and drawing from
the lessons of past struggles and from international
experiences. The solutions to these problems needs
more than just ad hoc contact between the different
movements. Neither is the merging of the movements
any solution; there are good reasons for each
movement preserving its autonomy, controlling its
own organization. For women, blacks, trade
unionists, gays, youth, and national minorities have
specific interests which may sometimes be
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antagonistic to each other... The solution lies in
bringing together all those involved in the
different movements and campaigns who agree on a
wider programme of socialist change" [Wainwright,
1979, 5-6]
There is a clear tension in Wainwright's statement
between the need to assert some sort of overarching
programme of socialist change, under which to unite
diverse movements, and the 'common sense' of such
movements maintaining their autonomy from each other. The
inherent contradictions of any organisation seeking to
achieve this combination of alliance and autonomy seem
enormous and it is perhaps no wonder that some have
rejected formal organization altogether.
"Taking on board C.L.R.James's important observation
that 'there is nothing more to organize' because
'organization as we have known it is at an end' it
is possible to comprehend how people can act
socially and cohesively without the structures
provided by formal organizations. Collective
identity spoken through 'race', community and
locality are, for all their spontaneity, powerful
means to coordinate action and create solidarity."
[Gilroy, 1987, 247]
Gilroy has not suggested an alternative overarching
organization but, instead, has argued that politics can
continue without such an organisation because it can be
organized around whatever unites a group of people as
'oppressed'. Race, community, or locality are merely
three possible bases for such anti-oppression movements.
From the two threads that have just been discussed a
collective memory for the left can now be hypothesised.
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It is that prior to the nineteen-sixties the major force
for revolutionary social change rested on the theoretical
and organisational basis of Marxism, particularly
Marxist-Leninism. Since the sixties this hegemony has
been broken by movements which were defined through
non-class based oppressions, for example gender, race,
sexuality and so on. This change did not necessarily
invalidate Marxism but simply removed its dominant status
and opened up left-wing politics to new and different
definitions of oppression. These non-class defined
movements are also based on the necessity of their own
autonomy and so, in order to free themselves, must define
their own sense of oppression from their own experiences.
Conseguently, the force for radical change which had
previously been united around Marxism has become
fragmented. Further, the arguments for self-definition
that were formed in the struggle to establish the
difference of non-class based movements from Marxism, can
in turn be employed within these movements. That is,
within feminism challenges can come from race, sexuality
or class, or within black liberation challenges can come
from feminism, sexuality, or class and so on. From one
movement united around Marxism the left has become many
movements each based on a particular oppression.
As already argued, whether this memory can be shown to be
historically accurate or not is irrelevant to this
thesis, for here the memory will be taken as a hypothesis
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and what is required from a hypothesis is a 'fine
capacity for discrimination'. [Lyotard, 1979, 7] This
discrimination already leads to the claim that the
socialist enterprise of one, united movement fighting the
great struggle for a better world has fallen to pieces;
as many pieces as there are forms of oppression.
Implications of the Collective Memory.
The hypothesised memory has two major implications which
will be explored. First, the memory claims that Marxism
was the framework for the left prior to the nineteen-
sixties but has since become just one political movement
amongst other left-wing movements. Two questions can be
asked of this claim: can Marxism be reformulated as one
anti-oppression movement amongst other such movements;
and, what would such a reformulation reveal about any
universal movement based on a single unified view of
society. Second, the memory implies that the eruption of
many different anti-oppression movements forms the new
field of left-wing politics. What does this mean and what
are its implications ? In particular, what consequences
can be drawn from the memory's claim that these movements
can interrupt each other, just as they have interrupted
Marxism ?
The significance of these two sets of questions will be
investigated in turn, problems that emerge from this
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investigation will be identified and, finally, a theory
which overcomes these problems will be outlined. A more
detailed summary of this path follows.
Whether Marxism can be a particular theory devoted to
analysing certain limited guestions will be analysed in
two phases in chapter two. First, a version of Marxist-
Leninism will be contrasted with a non-Leninist Marxism
in relation to both a theory of the production process
and a theory of political action. The comparison will
then be extended by specifying the Marxist definition of
oppression, which is exploitation through the extraction
of surplus-value. The second phase will be based on a
brief analysis of Jean Baudrillard's objections to
Marxism, which will reveal a distinction between the
particular orientation of Marxism and the belief that
Marxism's orientation is the only valid political
orientation. In concluding the discussion of Marxism it
will be noted that combining the non-Leninist Marxism
with the results of analysing Baudrillard will define a
Marxism that is also just one theory of oppression among
other such theories.
Chapter three will then consider consequences from this
analysis of Marxism for any political movement with
pretensions to universality. It will be noted that the
collective memory implies that any anti-oppression
movement can be considered a particular movement based on
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a particular unified orientation or set of values. That
is, just as Marxism can be considered the theory of
economic oppression, so feminism can be regarded as the
movement against women's oppression and black liberation
as the movement against the oppression suffered by black
people. It will then be argued that any claim to
political universality can be expected to be particular
because there are always differences to an orientation
which contradict that orientation's universality.
Consequently, any political vision that is based on a
unified value must include and valorise some social
groups and so must simultaneously exclude some other
groups. Anti-oppression movements that are based on a
unified orientation or value will thus oppress some
social group by excluding them. A left based on unified
values faces severe difficulties.
An alternative to basing political theories and movements
on unified orientations is suggested by the collective
memory's positing of many different forms of oppression
and the second major section of this thesis will explore
the possibility of a left politics based on difference.
This exploration will be conducted in three stages; an
examination of the theory of Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari in chapter four, an examination of the theory of
Jean-Francois Lyotard in chapter five, and a
consideration of problems in general for left-wing
theories of difference in chapter six.
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In their book Anti-Oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia
Deleuze and Guattari tried to develop a new theory of
liberation by reformulating psychoanalytic theory and
Marxism through a theory of desire as productive of
difference. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari
then generalised their theory of productive desire beyond
the constraints of either Marxism or psychoanalytic
theory. Deleuze and Guattari define the production of
differences as the process of creating something new and
their theory accordingly assesses different politics by
this standard. This means that their theory becomes
indifferent to any other characteristic of a political
movement but its ability to create differences.
Paradoxically, a focus on difference leads to
indifference to the nature of political movements. In
addition, Deleuze and Guattari's definition of difference
as the creation of something new leads to a functionalism
because they decide whether something is new or not
according to how it works in relation to the 'machine' it
is part of. Functionalism and an indifference to the
politics of movements, except where they promote or
prevent 'newness', are the results of Deleuze and
Guattari's theorisation of difference as a basis for
liberation.
Coming from a disillusionment with both Marxism and
theories of desire Jean-Francois Lyotard also made an
attempt to develop a general vision of difference. This
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vision is detailed in the trio of books, The Postmodern
Condition, Just Gaming, and The Differend and the central
points of all three books will be examined.
In The Postmodern Condition Lyotard argues that 'meta-
narratives', which legitimate Western discourses, have
broken down and as a result a multiplicity of equally
legitimate language games have become possible. He then
argues that the only legitimate form of politics is the
protection of anyone's right to play any language game.
In Just Gaming Lyotard argues that because an 'ought'
cannot be derived from an 'is', that is because there is
no connection between positing the true nature of society
and then attempting to achieve it, it is extremely
difficult to legitimate any form of justice. Lyotard then
argues that because of the is/ought disjunction politics
is no longer rational but has moved to the realm of
opinion. Finally, Lyotard argues that the only legitimate
political restriction is one which prevents any politics
that does not allow people to participate in language
games or does not allow the 'totality of practical and
reasonable beings' to exist.
In The Differend Lyotard develops a 'philosophy of
phrases or sentences' which argues that the only thing
which cannot be doubted is the phrase, as 'doubting-a-
phrase' is itself a phrase. He then asserts that phrases
are organised according to both heterogeneous phrase
regimens, which are analogous to the rules of a game, and
genres of discourse, which are analogous to the
strategies needed to play a game in a certain way. As
regimens are heterogeneous it will be impossible to
justify any one genre, and the way it links its phrases,
over any other genre and so Lyotard argues that the only
politics which can be restricted is one which prevents a
genre linking phrases. He then claims it is philosophy's
role to continually uncover such restrictions.
In criticism it will be argued that the result of
Lyotard's work, in all three books, is a similar
indifferentism to that found in Deleuze and Guattari.
Lyotard argues that within the right to play language
games, to preserve the totality of reasonable beings or
to link phrases into genres of discourse there is no
means of legitimating one form of politics over another
and the only forms of politics that can be opposed are
those that damage these rights. As with Deleuze and
Guattari, Lyotard places a process of making difference
at the centre of his politics and so makes the prevention
of differentiation the only politics that can be opposed.
It will also be argued that, unlike Deleuze and
Guattari's functionalism, Lyotard develops an idealist
version of difference because he privileges the right of
any phrase or sentence to link with any other phrase or
sentence, no matter what their context.
In chapter six an analysis of theories of difference in
general will complete the analysis of difference based
politics. It will be argued that theories of difference
necessarily come to take as their central principle the
process of making difference and that this results in a
political indifferentism which homogenises all different
forms of politics around the promotion of
differentiation. Difference theories become concerned
solely with defending the right to make difference and so
judge all political movements by that standard.
At this point it will be noted that the two major forms
of politics implied by the left's hypothesised memory
lead either to fragmentation of the left's overall vision
or indifference to the nature of political movements. It
will then be pointed out that neither value nor
difference exist in isolation from each other but in fact
constantly criticise each other. Value-based politics are
challenged by a range of different political movements
and difference-based politics fail to encapsulate the
particular values of movements. Accordingly, the third
major section of this thesis will pursue the possibility
of a left based on neither value nor difference. The
first step in this pursuit will be undertaken, in chapter
seven, by considering the two poles of difference and
value as part of the one debate.
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The confrontation of politics based on difference and
politics based on value will be characterised as a debate
in which both sides have a critique of each other and
answers to those critiques. Difference criticises value
for creating categorisations that exclude and offers the
principle of differentiation as the answer. In contrast,
value criticises difference for homogenising divergent
politic movements and can then offer some form of a
unified categorisation as the answer to difference's
problems. However, this return of values also returns
difference's original objection. In this way the
difference/value debate is both paralysed, in that it
never transcends itself, and always in motion, in that
both sides seem to offer opportunities for transcendence.
An extended example of this debate will be given in the
controversy within feminism over postmodernism.
Reactions to the difference/value debate, other than
participation, will be analysed as fragmentation, which
occurs when the left breaks down into increasingly small
groups, or disillusionment, which occurs when individuals
simply tire of the endlessness of the debate. Analysis of
the left's collective memory thus leads to the claim that
the left is enmeshed in paralysed motion or is dissolving
through fragmentation or disillusionment. A path beyond
the difference/value debate must therefore be opened up
in order to reconstruct the left.
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To open this path the preconceptions that underpin the
difference/value debate will be examined by asking the
question, 'what gives the accusations difference and
value make against each other force'. It will be argued
that all participants in the debate assume that truly
revolutionary being, that is the ability to create
fundamental social change, is possessed by a collective
that is constituted through practice. As this collective
is singular, difference and value have an object over
which they can struggle. What gives value and
difference's arguments against each other force, in the
context of the left, is thus a common interest in
constituting the revolutionary collective. It may seem
paradoxical to claim that difference seeks to constitute
one revolutionary collective but it is not, as difference
simply asserts that the unity of the revolutionary
collective will be constituted by a principle of
differentiation. A path beyond the difference/value
debate can then be opened by questioning the assumption
of one revolutionary collective.
The alternative vision of the left that will be
constructed will be called the ontology of emancipatory
collectives. In this ontology it will be assumed that
many collectives can effect fundamental social change,
rather than assuming there can only be one revolutionary
collective. The ontology of emancipatory collectives will
then be constructed from this premise in three parts: a
24
definition of the nature of emancipatory collectives will
be established in chapter eight, an analysis of inter-
collective relations will be conducted in chapter nine
and an assessment of the overall vision of the left that
the ontology of emancipatory collectives creates will be
given in chapter ten.
To define the nature of emancipatory collectives the work
of Alberto Melucci will be examined. Melucci defines 'new
social movements', which are those movements that have
erupted since the sixties such as feminism, ecology and
so on, as collective action systems that have no single
organisation or structure but which consist of networks
of individuals and formal and informal groups. Although
Melucci grasps the eclectic nature of new social
movements with this formulation it will be argued that he
fails to provide an understanding of what unites such
diverse elements into a single movement. Melucci's
analysis will then be extended by arguing that
emancipatory collectives can be viewed as collective
action systems that are united by their struggle for a
project of emancipation or against an experience of
oppression.
At a general and abstract level emancipation and
oppression will then be defined as a relationship between
at least two collectives in which at least one collective
enriches itself while simultaneously impoverishing at
least one other collective. The nature of 'enrich' and
'impoverish' will, however, only be defined beyond this
abstract meaning through the contextualised self-
definitions of collectives. The process of self-
definition will then be defined as a 'boot-strapping'
operation, as theorised by Barry Barnes, where individual
affirmations of a definition coalesce into a system which
is greater than the individuals who make it up.
Emancipatory collectives are thus defined as collective
action systems that are unified around an experience of
oppression or a project of emancipation which is self-
defined by members of the collective. The next topic that
will be analysed is the relations between emancipatory
collectives that constitute the 'space' of emancipatory
politics.
As collectives are based on their own self-definition of
oppression this self-definition will colour their view of
any other collective. A collective will thus be
influenced to either misunderstand another collective, by
not being able to grasp another collective's self-
definition, or assimilate with the other collective, by
adopting its self-definition. These two axes of influence
provide the framework within which inter-collective
relations develop and so forms the space of emancipatory
politics. The space of emancipatory politics is thus not
made up of a certain society, but rather by two axes
whose nature is determined by the definition of
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emancipatory collectives. The ontology of emancipatory
collectives' political space is made up of divergent
definitions of oppression and not by a unified vision of
society.
Finally, the overall political vision that the ontology
of emancipatory collectives creates will be examined. An
overall political vision is needed for two reasons.
First, it gives different emancipatory collectives a
framework within which they can develop inter-relations
with other collectives without having to give up their
own self-definition of oppression. Second, an overall
vision can distinguish oppressive and emancipatory
collectives which the ontology of emancipatory
collectives can do through the definition of oppression
proposed in chapter eight.
It will then be noted that the ontology of emancipatory
collectives relies on two principles. First, the belief
that there is no single revolutionary truth but many
truths of emancipation or oppression. A type of
revolutionary perspectivism is created in which different
forms of emancipation cannot be assumed to exist in the
same social field, but rather are viewed as different and
potentially contradictory perspectives on oppression.
Second, each actually existing form of emancipation or
oppression resides in a particular context and so must be
analysed in that context. The ontology of emancipatory
27
collectives assumes that emancipatory collectives all
exist in contexts and that these contexts are made up of
patterned relations between elements of collective action
systems. The outlining of these two principles completes
the exposition of the ontology of emancipatory
collectives.
The left's traditional concern for imbalances of power
between groups of people and the means to change such
imbalances is retained by the ontology of emancipatory
collectives without committing the left to either a
single universal struggle or an empty pluralism. In this
ontology liberation will no longer be strung between a
collapse into individualism through difference or the
fear of a totalitarianism based on value, but can be both
contextualised by the self-definition of a movement and
can transcend each movement by recognising each self-
definition as a perspective.
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CHAPTER 2: NEW SENSITIVE MARXISM.
Marxism and the Left's Collective Memory.
"beyond Marx ? But beyond which Marx ?" [Negri,
1979, 14]
The chief accusation levelled at Marxism in the left's
collective memory was not that it failed to deal with
developments in economics, but that it failed to deal
with developments in politics.
The memory asserted that Marxism misunderstood and often
opposed anti-oppression movements that did not define
themselves through a class based oppression. For example,
the memory implies that because Marxism concentrates on
economic oppression it will only be able to grasp women's
oppression when that oppression can be related to the
economy. Marxism will accordingly place the aspects of
feminism that it does grasp in a subordinate position to
the fundamental struggle between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. In general, the memory implies that Marxism
is blind to most non-class based oppressions and will
systematically misapprehend any of these oppressions that
it can see.
However, this criticism does not imply the rejection of
Marxism by anti-oppression movements but only its
restriction to political economy. If this restriction was
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put into place then Marxism would become a theory of one
political movement, that of the workers, among several
movements. Nonetheless, it should not be assumed that
Marxism is so flexible in theory and practice that it
will be a simple matter for it to become part of a
pluralist theory of social movements. After all,
'pluralist' is a famous and damning insult in Marxism.
In order to explore these aspects of the left's
collective memory in detail the possibility of a
particular or limited, rather than a universal, Marxism
needs to be analysed. To do this a critical version of
Marxist-Leninism will be delineated and then from this
Marxist-Leninism a non-Leninist form of Marxism will be
derived. Providing a complete definition of either of
these versions is neither possible nor necessary within
the present space. Instead, establishing possible
versions of both will create a basis on which an
exploration of universalism and particularism in Marxism
can be conducted. That exploration will proceed further
by examining Jean Baudrillard's general objection to all
forms of Marxism. Finally, the nature of a non-
universalist Marxism will be established by confronting
its Leninist and non-Leninist forms with the results of
the discussion of Baudrillard. The aim of this
investigation is not to rehabilitate Marxism by dealing
with any and all objections to it, but to establish the
possibility that Marxism can play the role the collective
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memory envisages for it, as one theory of oppression
among other such theories.
Lenin: 'on the basis of capitalism'.
In April nineteen eighteen the Bolshevik Party had won a
small breathing space for its Russian revolution by
concluding the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany and
ending Russia's part in the First World War.1 However,
the success of the Bolshevik transformation was still
uncertain. Under these circumstances Lenin wrote The
Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government, which outlined
his view that the Bolshevik revolution would only be
successful if it could successfully manage the economy.
Lenin argued that to do this the guidance of experts
would be needed, but he also noted this was an
unfortunate backward step for the Soviet Government as
the salaries needed to attract such experts contradicted
the revolutionary aim of evening out all salaries at the
'level of the wages of the average worker'. [Lenin,
1918b, 443: Smith, 1983] In contrast to this concern for
wage levels little criticism was made by Lenin of the
methods such experts might employ. On the contrary, the
1 In the following outline of Marxist-Leninism it is not
being assumed that Leninism is a single unified
discourse. Rather, one possible interpretation of
Marxist-Leninism, its technicist strand, is being
outlined. [Smith, 1983, 9-10] The account that follows
is heavily indebted to Colletti, 1969: Sayer, 1979:
Claudin-Urondo, 1975: Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer, 1978:
and Smith, 1983.
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capitalist science of scientific management was promoted.
Lenin wrote:
"The Taylor system, the last word of capitalism in
this respect, like all capitalist progress, is a
combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois
exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific
achievements in the field of analysing mechanical
motions during work, the elimination of superfluous
and awkward motions, the elaboration of correct
methods of work, the introduction of the best system
of accounting and control, etc....We must organise
in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor
system and systematically try it out and adapt it to
our own ends." [Lenin, 1918b, 448-449]
Lenin's endorsement of the science of Taylorism meant
developing work conditions under Bolshevism that were in
essence the same as those then developing in capitalist
countries. Lenin set the Bolshevik Revolution the task of
developing an industry modeled on capitalism, albeit
owned by communists. [Lenin, 1920, 494: Smith, 1983] In
this way Lenin separated the content of capitalist
industry from its control, which is a separation
Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer have termed the 'social
problematic' of Bolshevism. They describe succinctly how
the Bolsheviks:
"combine an economistic view of production and a
voluntaristic view of politics, and this combination
is a recurrent one. The economism inheres in the
notion of production as a set of necessary
techniques governed by ineluctable laws of
development, the voluntarism in the truncation of
politics to matters of State this original expunging
of the political from the productive entails."
[Corrigan et.al., 1978, 43]
The social problematic of Bolshevism is rooted in the
belief that the nature of the production process is
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politically neutral because it is determined by
technology. If the development of production is
technology-based and technology is politically neutral
then issues concerning the nature of production processes
become irrelevant. Politics thus revolves around control
of production and the nature of society outside of
production but not the content of production processes.
This view of the economy was derived from a particular
interpretation of Marx's concept of the 'forces of
production' developed prior to the Russian Revolution
chiefly in Friedrich Engels' and the Second International
Working Men's Association work.
The 'forces of production' can, at a simple level, be
taken as the totality of forces that produce material
objects of value to society and the Second International,
chiefly through Engels, developed a technicist view of
these forces. Technicism is based on the idea that
changes in the machinery of work will change the amount
and type of productive force that a society has at its
disposal. [Engels, 1880, 708]
"Then came the concentration of the means of
production and of the producers in large workshops
and manufactories, their transformation into actual
socialised means of production and socialised
producers... the products now produced socially were
not appropriated by those who had actually set in
motion the means of production and actually produced
the commodities, but by the capitalists. The means
of production and production itself, had become in
essence socialised. But they were subjected to a
form of appropriation which presupposes the private
production of individuals, under which, therefore,
everyone owns his own product and brings it to
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market.... The contradiction between socialised
production and capitalistic appropriation manifested
itself as the antagonism of proletariat and
bourgeoisie." [Engels, 1880, 703-705]
Engels argued that capitalism had 'socialised' both
productive forces and workers into the basis for a
socialist society and that, though capitalism developed
the forces of production, the content of these forces did
not affect their ability to underpin socialism. It is
capitalist control of the forces of production that made
society capitalist and not the nature of the forces of
production that capitalism created. Indeed, Engels
claimed that socialism and communism were made possible
by these expanded forces of production.
Engels' thus produced, in different words, the same split
between a technologically determined productive base for
society and the political control of those productive
forces, that Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer called the
'social problematic of Bolshevism'. The source for this
split between economic determinism and political
voluntarism is the belief that the nature of production
is politically neutral because it is technologically
determined and so can be used to underpin socialism.
In order to explore the Leninist interpretation of
productive forces further and to outline a non-Leninist
reading of Marx. However, it should first be noted that
Marx's texts are not being used here as an arbiter who
34
can finally settle a dispute but as a resource for the
construction of theories. Given their richness it should
not be surprising if the various texts of Marx can
legitimate several conflicting interpretations.
Accordingly, the aim here is to explore some of these
interpretations in order to investigate Marxism's
political vision, rather than to produce the finally
definitive version of Marx's thought from Marx's texts.
The Forces of Production
Marx described the starting point of his analysis of
society when he wrote that:
"The object before us, to begin with, material
production.
Individuals producing in society- hence socially
determined individual production- is, of course, the
point of departure." [Marx, 1939, 83]
But what does the 'of course' mean ? Why begin with
material production ? One of Marx's explanations was:
"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary
ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which
abstraction can only be made in the imagination.
They are the real individuals, their activity and
the material conditions under which they live, both
those which they find already existing and those
produced by their activity.... The first premise of
all human history is, of course, the existence of
living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be
established is the physical organisation of these
individuals and their consequent relation to the
rest of nature...The writing of history must always
set out from these natural bases and their
modification in the course of history through the
action of men." [Marx, 1932, 149-150]
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Marx both makes clear the basic question which his work
addresses and asserts that this question is the only
legitimate starting point for the writing of history.
That these are two separate claims needs to be noted and
will be returned to, but for the moment clarifying the
definition of the forces of production which follows from
Marx's statements will be pursued.
Marx can be summarised as assuming the existence of a
subject (humans) and an object (nature/materials) and
that society becomes possible when this subject works on
this object. History can be created by documenting and
analysing the changing relationships between and within
the subject and object. Historical materialism is thus
the study of the specific forms which human action on
nature takes in order to create humanity's subsistence.
In Marx's terms these historical forms are called a
society's mode of production and are constituted by its
specific arrangement of productive forces. [Poster, 1982]
Marx argued that a transhistorical concept of the mode of
production can be created because all societies through
all time must produce their subsistence in order to
survive. A generalised, asocial conception of production
is possible because, by definition, all societies
produce. [Sayer, 1979, 77-80] Marx's transcendental
conception of production can be represented by the
following model.
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Productive Forces: Model 1
Means of
Production








Productive labour, purposeful activity
Model 1 is derived from the two most direct comments on
the nature of the production process found in the
relevant chapter in Capital; Volume 1.
"The simple elements of the labour process are (1)
purposeful activity, that is work itself, (2) the
object on which that work is performed, and (3) the
instruments of that work." [Marx, 1867, 284]
"If we look at the whole process from the point of
view of its result, the product, it is plain that
both the instruments and the object of labour are
means of production and that the labour itself is
productive labour." [Marx, 1867, 287]
Model 1 represents the abstract form of production but it
can also represent a Leninist interpretation of
productive forces if labour is interpreted in a certain
way. Purposeful activity or productive labour must be
understood as the physical activity of an individual and
the organisation of labourers must be made subordinate to
the instruments of work. If this interpretation is
adopted then the instruments of work become the only
dynamic part of the means of production because labour
here refers to the pure physicality of the individual
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worker. Labour would thus be understood as a timeless
confrontation of the muscles, sweat and wit of a worker
with materials and instruments and so would be the same
across all societies. Materials are also asocial because
they are either timeless as raw materials, or are objects
that have been mediated by previous means of production
and to trace changes in already raw mediated materials to
previous means of production would either reveal them as
raw materials or generate an infinite regress. Understood
in this way the only dynamic component left in the means
of production is technology and so the means of
production would have to change through technological
change, which is of course the basis of the technicist
Leninism that has been outlined in this chapter.
Having developed a Leninist interpretation of productive
forces a non-Leninist interpretation can be explored by
outlining a second model of productive forces.












Model 2 introduces to Model 1 the idea that the social
relations of production are a separate productive force,
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One formulation of this idea by Marx can be found in The
German Ideology:
"The production of life, both of one's own in labour
and of fresh life in procreation now appears as a
double relationship: on the one hand as a natural,
on the other as a social relationship. By social we
understand the co-operation of several individuals,
no matter under what conditions, in what manner and
to what end. It follows from this that a certain
mode of production, or industrial stage, is always
combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or
social stage, and this mode of co-operation is
itself a 'productive force'". [Marx and Engels,
1932, 157]
Model 2 interprets Marx's statement graphically by adding
the social relations of production, or the mode of
cooperation, to the means of production as a force of
production separate from labour-power, materials or
technology. Marx noted that this separation is
characteristic of capitalism.
"Being independent of each other, the workers are
isolated. They enter into relations with the
capitalist, not with each other. Their co-operation
only begins with the labour process, but by then
they have ceased to belong to themselves. On
entering the labour process they are incorporated
into capital. As co-operators, as members of a
working organism, they merely form a particular mode
of existence of capital. Hence the productive power
developed by the worker socially is the productive
power of capital." [Marx, 1867, 451]
In this quote Marx separates individual and social labour
in the capitalist mode of production by arguing that
under capitalism workers are isolated and have only their
labour power, their muscles, sweat and wit, to sell.
However, when this individuality is purchased and set to
work en masse social relations are formed and the
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productive force of co-operation is unleashed, thereby
appearing to be an achievement of the organiser, who is
the capitalist. Marx outlined this process when he
continued the previous passage by writing:
"The socially productive power of labour develops as
a free gift to capital whenever the workers are
placed under certain conditions, and it is capital
which places them under these conditions. Because
this power costs capital nothing, while on the other
hand it is not developed by the worker until his
labour itself belongs to capital, it appears as a
power which capital possesses by nature- a
productive power inherent in capital." [Marx, 1867,
451 ]
Marx argues that the separation of individual workers
from the relations that organise them is specific to
capitalism and Model 2 is therefore one Marxist view of
capitalist production. Model 2 is also not a technicist
model because the social relations of production are a
dynamic contributor to change in production processes, as
will be argued in the next section, and so production has
a source for change other than technological change.
However, before moving on it should be noted that Models
1 and 2 have an important drawback as they fail to
represent any sense of social dynamism. For instance,
Marx's claim that by separating the labourer from the
social relations of production the capitalist will
benefit, by the appearance that the force created through
cooperation is the capitalist's creation, is not
presented in Model 2. This is because the Models do not
make clear who brings together the elements of production
and who may benefit. Despite such limitations the setting
out of the two models has graphically located a hyphen
between Marx and Lenin and shown where it can be cut.
The Social Relations of Production as a Materially
Productive Force.
A path to a non-Leninist and non-technicist Marxism has
been opened by the introduction of the social relations
of production but it needs to be explored further. This
can be done by outlining the nature of the social
relations of production.
The social relations of production exist because people
meet and organise in order to produce and so create in
that organisation a force for production. They are what
Marx called a society's mode of co-operation. In
capitalism this power of cooperation is separated from
individual workers and so can be considered a separate
materially productive force for production. For example,
the stuff of 'scientific management', that is how much
space each worker may have, where they stand, who they
will be able to communicate with and so on, should itself
be considered a productive force. The question can
therefore be posed, how do these social relations relate
to the production process as a whole ? This guestion can
be broadly answered by outlining two sorts of social
relations of production in those that are in-the-factory
and those that are in-society.
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First of all, there are social relations of production
that are physically close to the production process.
These are relations which occur in close proximity to the
production of a commodity and can in a sense 'see' the
object they help produce. They can be called the social
relations of production that are in-the-factory. Two
senses of these social relations can be outlined by
drawing a distinction between social relations which
organise workers and social relations embedded in the
physical environment of a work-place.
The way in which workers in a factory, or any production
process, are organised is a social relation of
production. The sub-division of work into certain
discrete stages needed to produce a commodity, the
conseguent organisation of those stages for optimum
production and the assigning of workers and worker tasks
to each stage is a matter, primarily, of implementing
prior conceptualisation and design. If this is correctly
done then such an operation should result in a production
process which can produce greater numbers of the relevant
commodity, even if all that has been altered is the
organisation of workers.
The second sort of social relations of production that
are in-the-factory are those that affect the physical
42
fabric of the production process.2 These social relations
take the form of buildings or any material constraints
that are part of a production process in which prior
designs and conceptions are embodied that will order a
process in a certain way. Within a factory or office a
worker will confront the four walls, the placement and
nature of tools, materials, and rest and work stations as
neutral objects when, in fact, they may have been
specifically designed to create a certain form of
production. As these social relations are embodied in
things they may be more or less obvious to an observer
depending on their nature. For example, the speed of a
production line confronts a worker as a disembodied,
mechanical fact but speeding up such a line will reveal
to the least observant worker that human conceptions are
part of the line. In contrast, the provision of small and
frequent places for lunch and rest breaks may appear to
be natural, when they have in fact been designed to
prevent large numbers of workers gathering together.
The social relations of production have so far been
analysed only to the extent that they directly impinge on
the process of production. However, the social relations
of production that exist beyond the factory wall can also
be given consideration. Marx wrote:
2 The following analysis of the second type of social
relations that are in-the-factory is drawn from work on
the labour process found in such publications as: Hales,
1980: Levidow and Young, 1981: Levidow and Young, 1985:
and Thompson, 1983.
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"Man himself is the basis of his material
production, as of any other production that he
carries on. All circumstances, therefore, which
affect man, the subject of production, more or less
modify all his functions and activities, and
therefore too his functions and activities as the
creator of material wealth...In this respect it can
in fact be shown that all human relations and
functions and in whatever from they may appear,
influence material production" [Marx, quoted in
Corrigan et.al., 1978, 4]
In this quote Marx argued that the social relations of
production, at their broadest, can be anything that
affects a person who participates in the labour process.
With this claim a host of social relations become
relevant to the production process. Legal, sexual, racial
and other relations, in fact all those relations that are
commonly included under the term 'civil society', can now
be theorised as being a force for production. The exact
nature of any particular connection between production
and civil society will need to be specified by analytical
and historical work but if Marx's comments are endorsed
then the definition of productive forces becomes open-
ended .
For example, workers gain most of the sustenance that
enables them to give the socially average amount of
labour to the production process from certain social
structures. Once such structure has been the nuclear
family. In white nuclear families relationships between
the members form a certain pattern: the worker is usually
male and controls the economic basis of the family; the
partner is usually female and acts as a 'reservoir of
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nurturance', physical and emotional, for both the worker
and their children, is economically dependent on the man
and provides free domestic labour; and, last, the
children are both dependent on their parents and are
under their control. [Barrett and Mcintosh, 19 82 ]3 If
this structure can be found in society as a general
pattern of the way male workers recreate their labour
power, then the structure can be regarded as a force of
production.
Changes in the structure of the nuclear family would thus
bring changes in production. For example, the
feminisation of clerical work that has been experienced
this century in the Western world means that the
structure of the nuclear family may be being altered
through the creation of an independent financial basis
for women and the need to reproduce a form of labour
power for women that is relevant to the work-place rather
than domestic labour. [Crompton and Jones, 1984] The
manner in which this is achieved affects the reproduction
of workers and so affects a force of production, whether
it occurs through a redivision of domestic labour between
men and women, a reassessment of the way children are
3 Barrett and Mcintosh's view holds good for white
British families but there are significant variations for
black British families. These will not be explored here
as this would make a short example overly complex but
they will be given greater space in chapter nine. See
Barrett and Mcintosh, 1985: Amos and Parma, 1984:
Ramazangolu, 1986: Kazi, 1986: Lees, 1986: and, Mirza,
1986.
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socialised or the imposition on women of the dual
responsibilities of mother and worker.
In summary, the social relations of production, as the
fourth element of the means of production in a capitalist
society, can be divided into two parts: those immediately
near to the process of production and those outside of
that process which chiefly concern the reproduction of
labour power. The social relations of production that are
in-the-factory can themselves be considered two part; the
organisation of workers by non-material relationships and
their organisation through material constraints. As noted
above in the distinction between Models 1 and 2 of
productive forces the positing of the social relations of
production as a materially productive force breaks with
Leninism by providing a source for change in production
processes other than technological change.
The State and Revolution
The Marxism that can be built around the introduction of
social relations into the means of production not only
contradicts the Marxist-Leninist understanding of
production but also implies a contradiction of Marxist-
Leninist theory of the state and revolution. An
examination of these differences will further develop the
Leninist and non-Leninist forms of Marxism.
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It has already been noted, in the discussion of Lenin's
and Engels' theories of the forces of production, how a
technicist understanding of these forces takes the
content of production out of society's control. The
separation of a politically neutral production process
from civil society means that, logically, political
action can only occur either in civil society or over the
control of production. The nature of civil society thus
becomes crucial for Leninists, as it is here that
political activity will chiefly be defined.
Civil society has several landmarks but for Leninists the
most significant is the state. Lenin defined the state in
this way.
"The state is a product and a manifestation of the
irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state
arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms
objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely,
the existence of the state proves that the class
antagonisms are irreconcilable....According to Marx,
the state is an organ of class rule, an organ for
the oppression of one class by another; it is the
creation of 'order', which legalises and perpetuates
this oppression by moderating the conflict between
classes." [Lenin, 1918a, 314-315]
Lenin argued that the state only exists if there is class
conflict because the state's role is to enforce the rule
of one class over another. Under capitalism the state
enforces the wishes of the bourgeoisie and is the
institutionalisation of the bourgeoisie's power, its
managing executive. This rule is exercised through a
standing army and the police, supported by a bureaucracy.
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The key political task when seeking to overthrow the
bourgeoisie is thus the confrontation with the state and
Lenin stresses this will occur in two stages.
First, the bourgeois or capitalist state will be smashed
in a violent confrontation with an armed and
revolutionary proletariat. Second, a proletarian state
will emerge which will dominate the remaining
bourgeoisie, this is the famous dictatorship of the
proletariat. The second stage is made necessary by two
factors. First, for Lenin, where there is class conflict
there will also be a state and, second, some elements of
the ruling class can be expected to survive the first
stage's violent confrontation. The combination of these
two factors means that there will be both class conflict
and a state after a proletarian revolution because there
will still be two classes. The initial change under the
dictatorship of the proletariat will simply be that
working people will control the state, not that the state
will be destroyed. The central task of the proletarian
state will then be the elimination of the former ruling
class and as this is progressively achieved the state
will wither away, because there will be no class conflict
to call a state into being as there will only be one
class. [Lenin, 1918a, 320-326] Lenin's is a simple theory
which clearly identifies the nature of the state and also
the primary targets of a proletarian revolution.
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Having specified the fundamentals of Lenin's theory of
the state and revolution a contrasting non-Leninist
account can be developed. An obvious hypothesis, in the
light of the non-Leninist theory of production that has
been proposed, would be that the state is heavily
involved in the management of the social relations of
production. Such a hypothesis would have to account for
the way the state may try to manage the place of women in
the family or racial discrimination in order to aid the
production of commodities. Consideration would also have
to be given to the state's role in social relations of
production that are in-the-factory. For example, in the
state's promotion of investment in production or its
involvement in wage bargaining.
Although these possibilities cannot be rigorously
developed here, as this would take this chapter too far
from its central aim, it is already clear that such a
non-Leninist theory of the state would offer a very
different form of revolution to Leninism. Instead of
seizing one organisation and then bending it to the
workers will, the non-Leninist Marxism would have to
contend with a diffuse array of social relations that are
managed in varying ways and degrees by different parts of
the state. Revolution for this Marxism would no longer be
a clear-cut operation of smashing but would involve
multiple conflicts in diverse areas of society. For
example, the complete internal reorganisation of
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factories and offices would have to be undertaken to
combat capitalist social relations of production, rather
than just their seizure and nationalisation. In addition,
all the various indirect social relations of production
would have to be considered and so revolutionary politics
would have to address the transformation of social
structures such as the nuclear family. The nature of
revolution would accordingly become blurred for a non-
Leninist Marxism compared, that is, to Lenin's clarity.
The blurring of revolution's nature reveals a difficulty
with the non-Leninist Marxism that is being proposed
because this Marxism may be unable to locate a structural
division between workers and employers under capitalism.
Instead, non-Leninist Marxism may see many sites of
oppression in the various social relations that affect
production because, having expanded the social relations
of production to cover all relations in society which
affect production, it is as if production has been
extended to cover all of society and the two have merged.
All the oppressions that can be identified as part of the
social relations of production would thus have an equal
claim as oppressive relations that need to be combatted
and eliminated. If any social relation that affects
production becomes a material force for production, then
the danger is that everything will be held to affect
production. Marxism will then become, in effect, a
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pluralist social theory with no means of valuing the
different claims of various oppressions.
To deal with this problem a re-examination of the Marxist
definition of exploitation is necessary. In exploring
this definition a principle must be sought which can
order social relations as central and peripheral in
relation to the subjugation of labour. If this cannot be
found then the non-Leninist Marxism appears to be barely
a form of Marxism at all.
Where Class Hatred Permeates Science
Italian theorist Toni Negri argued that in the Grundrisse
Marx established that:
"The theory of surplus value...becomes the dynamic
centre, the dynamic synthesis of Marx's thought, the
point where the objective analysis of capital and
the subjective analysis of class behaviour come
together, where class hatred permeates his science."
[Negri, 1979, 9]
Negri's claim is one of the most decisive formulations of
the Marxist belief that capitalist exploitation, or more
precisely the mechanism that orders the fundamental
exploitation of capitalist societies, is defined through
the theory of surplus value. This theory identifies why
the relationship between capitalists and workers consists
of a structural and necessary exploitation of workers by
capitalists if, that is, the capitalist wishes to
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succeed. At heart the idea is simple, for it is possible
to pay less for a labourer's work than the labourer can
produce.
Marx noted that between buying and selling there can be a
production process in which the capitalist can use his or
her money to create commodities by buying the various
components of the means of production in order to create
a production process. The capitalist must buy the means
of production as commodities in order to make more
commodities. Marx then noted that the value of the
commodity of labour that is bought by a capitalist can be
less than the value that is produced by that labour and
that a labourer's product can therefore exceed in value
the cost of hiring the labourer to produce it. When this
occurs new value, surplus value, is created and lands in
the lap of the person who set in train the production
process, the capitalist.4
The theory of surplus value identifies exploitation by
pointing out that the creation of new value derives from
workers but is taken by capitalists. Surplus value
appears to be the property of the capitalist because it
is a capitalist who sets in train the production process
4 This is a very simple version of the theory of surplus
value, which takes no account of complicated debates
concerning both the theory of value and surplus value and
arguments concerning the nature of 'exploitation'. See
Steedman, 1977: Steedman et.al. 1981: Clarke, 1980:
Rankin, 1987: Roberts, 1987: Carchedi 1977 & 1983.
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in which it is created but, in fact, new value derives
from paying workers less than the value they produce.
According to Marx, new value derives from the workers'
labour and not the capitalists' entrepreneurship.
Exploitation can then be defined as the 'theft' of
workers' products or as 'that capitalists appropriate
what they do not produce'. [Cohen, 1979]
The theory of surplus value can act as the dynamic centre
of a Marxist theory of work-place based oppression,
whether Leninist or non-Leninist, by acting as an
epistemological principle which organises the production
process around the specific exploitation that
characterises capitalist production. Marxism can then
order the many elements identified as relevant to
production by the social relations of production
according to their relevance to exploitation. An example
of this is the connection between the extraction of
greater relative surplus value and the social relations
of production.
The extraction of greater relative surplus value occurs
when either the hours of work remain the same, or even
shorten, and the intensity of work, or productivity
level, is increased or the value of labour power is
reduced. In the first case the capitalist obtains more
work for the same time and cost and in the second
procures the same work for the same time and less cost.
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This process is termed the real subsumption of labour and
it creates relative surplus value. Greater relative
surplus value can accordingly be achieved if workers
attain greater productivity levels for the same rate of
pay through, for example, developments in the social
relations of production. Changes can create work places
and methods that increase productivity, for instance
Fordism and the production line, or can attempt to manage
the identity of the worker to create a more productive
worker, for example by creating a healthier or better
trained worker. In the extraction of relative surplus-
value there is a direct connection between the social
relations of production and exploitation.
Further, this connection of social relations and the
extraction of relative surplus value allows the
contributions of the various social relations of
production to exploitation to be understood. For example,
it could be argued that providing an emotional haven for
children is of less immediate importance to production
than providing the male worker with food and so some of
the roles the woman plays in the nuclear family may be
more directly related to exploitation than others. On the
face of it, it is in this way possible to examine the
various social relations of production and to order them
according to their relevance to exploitation. If this
were done then the non-Leninist Marxism would be centered
around exploitation but would also include as forces for
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production all the various social relations of
production. The non-Leninist Marxism would thus be
centrally concerned with the division of society into
bourgeoisie and proletariat but would also take into
account the effect of the social relations of production
on that division.
Put this way the present version of a non-Leninist
Marxism is not a pluralist social theory, however it does
leave open some important questions. For instance, what
does it mean to say that feeding a worker is more
'important' or more 'directly related' to production than
looking after that worker's children ? The mechanism for
ordering the social relations of production still appears
to be unclear. Unfortunately, this and other questions
must be disregarded at present as they entail extending
this analysis beyond the task of establishing the
possibility of a non-Leninist Marxism, which the
connection of the social relations of production to
exploitation completes.5
Two different possible Marxisms have been established,
though both only in broad outline. In order to explore
the nature of universalism in Marxism and then to finally
5 Another important question is whether the theory of
surplus value can take the weight being asked of it. This
question is particularly important in relation to
monopolies where it may in fact be possible to
systematically sell commodities over their value.
[Sweezy, 1979, 27-30]
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establish whether either of the two forms can be a non-
universal theory of economic oppression Baudrillard's
objections to Marxism will now be examined.
Marx's Naturalism.
Baudrillard argued that when Marx developed his theory of
capitalism he made the naturalist assumption that humans
are productive animals with asocial needs and desires.
Baudrillard wrote that because of this assumption Marx:
"changed nothing basic: nothing regarding the idea
of man producing himself in his infinite
determinations, and continually surpassing himself
towards his own end.
Marx translated this concept into the logic of
material production and the historical dialectic of
modes of production. But differentiating modes of
production renders unchallengeable the evidence of
production as the determinant instance. It
generalises the economic mode of rationality over
the entire expanse of human history, as the generic
mode of human becoming." [Baudrillard, 1973, 33]
Baudrillard went on to claim that Marx's naturalist
assumption is the basis for his claim to universality.
That is, by claiming that all societies are based on the
fundamental necessity of production and then claiming to
be the definitive analysis of production Marxism could
claim to be the universal analysis of society. For
Baudrillard this meant that Marxism became 'self-
fetishising' because it took itself for objective reality
when it was in fact based on a particular set of
assumptions.
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"The proposition that a concept is not merely an
interpretive hypothesis but a universal movement
depends on pure metaphysics." [Baudrillard, 1973,
47]
Marxism's naturalism underpins its claim to universality
but the metaphysical assumptions that this naturalism
needs, for instance the belief that there is a subject
with natural needs beyond the logic of exchange, are
themselves ungrounded and so Marxism can be criticised
for relying on a purely metaphysical leap. These
arguments are the basis of Baudrillard's rejection of
Marxism but, paradoxically, they suffer from a similar
reliance on metaphysics.
Baudrillard rejects Marxism because it relies on the
statement 'it is true that people become people at the
point when they produce' but he does so by relying on the
statement 'it is not true that people become people at
the point when they produce', thereby relying on the same
type of metaphysics as Marxism. Having pointed out that
Marxism makes the metaphysical shift from hypothesis to
universality Baudrillard's criticism stays within the
standards of universality and truth that Marxism has
established and rejects Marxism for falling short of
those standards. In short, Baudrillard does not
reconsider Marxism as an interpretive hypothesis but
rejects it as a failed form of truth. To avoid repeating
the metaphysical mistake he criticises in Marxism,
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Baudrillard would have to alter the standards by which he
judges theories.
To fully reject a universalism based on naturalist
presumptions Baudrillard would have to assume that all
theories are based on hypotheses and not facts.
Baudrillard criticised the Marxist assumption 'it is true
that people become people at the point when they produce'
but he did not evaluate the consequences of rejecting
considerations of truth and analysing a Marxism based on
the statement 'what if people become people at the point
when they produce'. The addition of the 'what-if' creates
the basis for a non-universalist theory of Marxism by
pointing out that it does not matter whether Marxism's
basic hypothesis is true or not because indulging in the
search for such truths makes the mistake Baudrillard
identified of moving metaphysically from interpretive
hypotheses to universalities. What matters is that a
social theory can be developed from certain hypotheses
without having to claim that these hypotheses are
universally valid.
When Marx stated that "Individuals producing in society-
hence socially determined individual production- is, of
course, the point of departure", he set out his basic
orientation and understood it not as an interpretive
hypothesis but as a universality. [Marx, 1939, 83]
However, Baudrillard's objection shows that Marx's
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orientation is simply one question among others that
might be asked. For example, a theory might begin from
the question 'what if people in their sexual relations',
which might lead to a feminist theory, or 'what if people
become people through their racial relations', which
might lead to a theory of black liberation. Baudrillard
thus reveals that the condition for creating a non-
universal Marxism is the disconnection of Marxism's basic
orientation from the claim that this orientation is the
only fundamental question which can be asked of society.
The two interpretations of Marxism can now be connected
to these arguments because in both cases a Marxist theory
orders the various relations that make up a society
according to a particular interpretation of Marxism's
basic orientation. The technicist tendency within
Marxist-Leninism separates the fundamental area of
production from civil society and then claims that
production is determined by technological change whereas
civil society can be politically determined. For
technicism political issues must then revolve around the
control of production and the transformation of the
state, while other social relations are subordinated to
these twin tasks.
Leninism's basic orientation is determined by its
interpretation of Marx's own orientation. By interpreting
the means of production in a technicist manner and
assuming that this is the only possible interpretation of
society, Marxist-Leninism makes itself the only valid
view of oppression to which all others must be
subordinated. The manipulation conducted by Leninist
groups noted in the left's collective memory stems at
least partially from Leninism's collapsing of the
distinction between asking a certain question and
assuming that this is a universally valid question.
Outlining a non-technicist Marxism has shown how social
relations such as gender and race must be in some way
hierarchically ordered in relation to production if
Marxism is not to lose its distinctive orientation. If
the non-Leninist Marxism did not hierarchise the social
relations of production then it would not be able to
understand which social relations were more relevant to
production and as, on the face of it, all social
relations are relevant, this would lead to a Marxism in
which all social relations were equally significant. Like
Leninism the non-technicist Marxism must order society
according to its basic Marxist orientation. In order to
remain a form of Marxism the non-Leninist Marxism
developed in this chapter can be centered on the
extraction of surplus-value. Social relations such as
race and gender would then become organised according to
their place in the system of exploitation. The role of
women as mothers may thus be seen by this Marxism as less
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central than the role of women as a reserve army of
labour.
However, if this non-Leninist Marxism were also to be a
non-universal Marxism it would have to recognise that its
ordering of social relations was done on the basis of the
hypothesis 'what-if people become people when they
produce'. Such a non-universalist Marxism would leave
open the possibility that in a different 'what-if'
gender, race and production relations might have totally
different connections, where production may not be
dominant or where 'woman as mother' might be considered
more important than 'women as the reserve army of
labour'.
The crucial difference between a universalist and a non-
universalist Marxism is whether it crosses the
metaphysical divide identified by Baudrillard and
believes its interpretive hypotheses to. be universally
valid statements. A non-universal Marxism thus recognises
that the basic orientation of historical materialism is
not the only orientation that can be taken toward society
and oppression. Paradoxically, this also means that
Marxism should stick to its basic orientation and should
not try to theorise all oppressions as somehow Marxist
oppressions. A non-universal Marxism does not need to
encompass every oppression that may emerge, but instead
concentrates on the oppression it has identified, work-
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place based or economic oppression. A non-universalist
Marxism should also be a fundamentalist Marxism.
The Theory of Work-Place Based Oppression
It was noted earlier that when Marx defined his basic
orientation he conducted two operations. First, he
defined what his work addressed and, second, he claimed
that this was the only legitimate starting point for
history or political economy. A theory of work-place
based oppression can utilise Marxism, and fulfil the role
for it outlined in the collective memory as one anti-
oppression movement among other such movements, first, by
rejecting the claim that Marxism has defined the only
legitimate starting point for studies of society and,
second, by recognising that this need not affect the
acceptance of Marxism's orientation as an important one.
Accordingly, the metaphysical claim that Baudrillard
identified in Marx can be rejected in favour of treating
the definition of Marxism's object as an interpretive
hypothesis and so any attempt to create or utilise a non-
universal Marxism must carefully define what Marxism's
object is and then examine the results of assuming that
perspective. The results that can be gained by making
Marx's assumption, that humans are productive, may be
important in analysing economic oppression but they draw
no authority from absolute truth.
A theory of work-place based oppression can make use of
the theoretical and empirical resources of Marxism and be
consistent with the collective memory's claim that the
hegemony of Marxism over liberatory struggles has given
way to a multiplicity of anti-oppression struggles only
by surrounding Marxism with methodological guards.
Otherwise it will find itself, like Marxism before it,
proclaiming itself the fundamental struggle for
liberation. Otherwise it will find itself deriding and
insulting the struggles of those whose oppression cannot
be understood through the eyes of the work-place.
Otherwise feminists will become bourgeois again,
sexuality a titillating distraction and skin colour a
threat to working class solidarity.
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Chapter Three: Universalism and the Post-Sixties Left.
Universality and Value.
The analysis of Marxism posits a distinction between
Marxism's basic orientation and the universality of that
orientation, but the memory also posits the rise, since
the sixties, of movements which combat different forms of
oppression to class oppression. The relationship between
these statements can now be examined for if Marxism's
orientation is non-universal then so, perhaps, are the
orientations of all post-sixties anti-oppression
movements. This would imply that the left is made up of
many different anti-oppression movements all of which
address a particular oppression and none of which make up
an all-encompassing vision of liberation.
The result of analysing Marxism was that, in short,
Marxism's political values are not universal but are
still politically relevant. 'Universality' can here be
understood as the positing of one all-encompassing anti-
oppression struggle, whereas a 'value' can be termed the
basic political orientation of any one anti-oppression
struggle. Based on this distinction it can be claimed
that a political theory or movement takes as its starting
point a basic guestion or orientation toward society.
Examples of such orientations are believing that society
is determined by its production or society being
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determined by the sex of its inhabitants, but each
movement has such an orientation or set of values around
which its theories and actions are structured. Each
orientation will thus prioritise some political issues
over others and so will exclude or downgrade the concerns
of some oppressed groups.
A detailed example of the way that particular
orientations influence theories and exclude some groups
can be given through Nicky Hart's analysis of the
tendency of British women to vote disproportionately for
the Conservative Party.1 Hart claims that theorists have
explained this phenomenon by describing working class
women as 'deferential voters' who have an in-built
tendency to vote for the traditional authority
represented by the Conservatives. Hart notes that
theorists only need a notion like 'deferentiality'
because they assume that working class women should
identify first and foremost with the working class party,
the Labour Party. Working class women are thus seen as
having a form of false consciousness when they vote for
the Conservatives because they defer their true class
interests. [Hart, 1989, 21-25 & 38-41]
1 As Hart's article is being used as an example it is not
essential that her case be proven beyond doubt. Instead
her argument must clearly illustrate the point being made
by this thesis. However, for a similar view of the
relationship between women and the labour movement see
Campbell, 1984, 217-234.
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Hart attacks this view by demonstrating that it is
possible that women had interests as women, and not as
working class, that led them to vote Conservative. She
argues that working class men have traditionally had
control of the family income and have used it in their
own interests and not necessarily in the interests of
their partner or family. To establish this Hart analyses
family income and expenditure and argues that women were
given, by their men, an income that barely kept the
family alive, while men retained money which they spent
on alcohol and cigarettes. She notes that expenditure on
drink was most probably the largest single item of
household expenditure from the eighteen eighties to after
the Second World War, ahead of both bread and meat. She
also notes that women's knowledge of their husband's
alcohol expenditure was around eighty per cent below what
men actually spent because women did not know the total
household income. [Hart, 1989, 31-37]
As the Labour Party and other left-wing groups often
organised around the pub life of working men, Hart argues
there is probably a link between men's treatment of women
and women's dislike of the Labour Party. Hart develops a
picture in which women have good reason to be sceptical
of the socialism practised by their men and claims that
an opposition to Labour may well have developed as women
and their children went to bed hungry and early in order
to save fuel for the fire, while their men spent the
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household income in warm pubs organising the labour
movement. [Hart, 1989, 38-41]
Hart's theory establishes the possibility that working
class women voted Conservative because their own
interests, as women, were served by such a vote. She
shows that it is only the preconceptions of class
theorists, who have assumed that all working class people
have an equal and obvious interests in voting Labour,
that makes women's support for the Conservatives a
puzzle. Hart's analysis thus shows that assuming that the
interests of working class men and women can be equally
explained by class may not be valid because there can be
divisions between men and women. What class theorists
took to be a universal theory can actually exclude women
and their experiences.
Hart's work illustrates the argument that any movement
develops from a particular orientation, whether that
orientation is based on gender inequality or economic
exploitation, and that each particular orientation will
concentrate attention on certain aspects of society to
the exclusion of other aspects. Each political movement
will create a categorisation of both society and the
oppression that it fights and this categorisation will
include some aspects of society and will exclude or
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ignore others. This 'logic' will be called the logic of
exclusion and inclusion.2
The Logic of Exclusion and Inclusion.
Generalising the distinction between universality and
value means that all political theories and movements can
be regarded as having particular orientations which
exclude and include. However, this claim has to be
underpinned by a suspicion toward assertions of
universality because once any claim to universality is
considered suspect then all movements can be treated as
if the revelation of an exclusion from them can be
expected, but without this suspicion the quest for a
universal theory still seems valid. The left's collective
memory thus implies that a substructure of suspicion for
the logic of exclusion and inclusion has emerged. Two
sources for this substructure can be noted in the
breakdown of Marxism's hegemony over liberatory politics
and the rise of poststructural and postmodern theories.
The collective memory draws attention to the way that,
since the sixties, political movements have arisen which
challenge the assumed universality of both socialism and
2 The outline of this logic is indebted to
poststructuralist and postmodernist thought. See
Foucault, 1969; Eribon, 1992, 37-39; Lyotard, 1986, 37-
39; Derrida, 1967b, 278-293: Hekman, 1990; Flax, 1990
and the section on postmodernism in feminism in chapter
seven of this thesis.
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other political movements. These challenges have, in
turn, created both a suspicion of political universals
and a history of political exclusions. It has already
been noted, in the example of working class women who
voted Conservative, that the specificity of class theory
can exclude women. The memory also notes that similar
attacks have been mounted by movements not only against
class theory but also between anti-oppression movements.
It should not then be surprising if some movements come
to question the validity of any claim to universality
when they have had to struggle into existence against a
pro-claimed universality which excluded them. Simply put,
to have been excluded by a political movement which
claims to be universal provides a basis for suspicion of
claims to universality. That some movements go on to
establish new universals does not hide the fact that the
process of many anti-oppression movements emerging, as
outlined in the left's collective memory, continually
creates the basis for the suspicion of universals in the
repeated failure of existing universals to include all
oppressions. [Phillips, 1987: Amos and Parma, 1984]
A theoretical suspicion of universals has also arisen
since the sixties in poststructural and postmodern
theory. [Foucault, 1981, 131-183] These are two related,
but diverse, bodies of thought which, among other issues,
analyse the basic categories of Western thought. For
example, a common theme between the two has been a
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critique of the 'subject'. They have argued that if a
rational, unified subject is in control of its thought
then all products of thought must be considered the
intentional and controlled productions of human beings.
Poststructuralists and postmodernists have then drawn on
influences such as Freud and Nietzsche to question this
assumption of a unified, rational subject by, for
instance, arguing that thought might result from the
unconscious or from chance. [Foucault, 1972, 3-17:
Deleuze, 1962: Derrida, 1972a: Descombes, 1979] Once the
universality of the unified subject is questioned
political readings can follow which argue that the
subject has also been white, male and pro-capitalist. The
subject then appears as a political force and not a
neutral, universal basis for reason. Poststructuralism
and postmodernism have in this way questioned the
universal nature of categories such as the subject and
rationality and then have come to question the legitimacy
of 'universality' itself. Poststructuralism and
postmodernism thus hold up a theoretical mirror to the
political suspicion of universals that emerged from the
breakdown of Marxism's hegemony over left thought.
[Sturrock, 1979: Coward and Ellis, 1977: Flax, 1990:
Hekman, 1990]
Poststructural and postmodern philosophies share with
post-sixties anti-oppression movements a suspicion of
universals and so both a practical political experience
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and a sophisticated philosophy can underpin a suspicion
of universals. Once this suspicion is created then the
suspicion of all values can follow because the suspicion
of universals underpins the logic of exclusion and
inclusion.
One last component needs to be added to the logic of
exclusion and inclusion and its substructure of suspicion
in order to fully explicate that logic. This is the
equation of exclusion with oppression. The collective
memory notes that groups, ideas or interests that are
excluded from an anti-oppression movement feel themselves
to be oppressed, just as if they had been excluded from
power by their own oppressors. For example, Barbara
Omolade argued that:
"By confining their theories to their own particular
history and culture, white feminists have denied the
history and culture of women of colour and have
objectively excluded them from equal participation
in the women's movement." [Omolade, 1980, 247]
Omolade then goes on to accuse white feminist of racism
for excluding black women. Omolade's accusation is an
example of a general experience in feminism, as Rowbotham
noted when she wrote that feminism's tendency to muffle
differences was:
"fiercely attacked by Afro-Caribbean and Asian women
in Britain from the late nineteen seventies. They
rejected an invoked unity of sisterhood based on
hegemonic privilege. Similar criticisms came from
many other groups of women- for example, lesbians,
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women with disabilities, and older women."
[Rowbotham, 1989, 219-220]
The equation of exclusion with oppression is not
exclusive to black liberation struggles or feminism but
has occurred in most anti-oppression movements since the
nineteen sixties. For example, feminism has itself been
excluded from socialist struggles and so has criticised
the socialist movement for oppression through exclusion.
[Campbell, 1984] The equation of exclusion with
oppression is based on the claim that if a group is
excluded from a liberation struggle then that liberation
struggle will continue the oppression of the excluded
group by failing to address the problems of the excluded.
The logic of exclusion and inclusion claims that each
anti-oppression movement creates a categorisation that
will include some social groups and exclude others
because no movement can be considered a universal
movement. Such exclusions are felt, by an excluded group,
to be an oppression of essentially the same type whether
it is maintained by a dominant power in society, such as
men against women, or by another anti-oppression
movement, such as male dominated unions against women.
Anti-oppression movements based on unified values can
thus be expected to be oppressors because their
orientation will exclude some social group.
By disclosing the logic of exclusion and inclusion the
left's collective memory leads to serious difficulties
for anti-oppression movements based on unified
orientations, because creating such an orientation now
appears to be the eguivalent of being oppressive. The
twin attacks of poststructuralist theory and the
political practice of post-sixties movements thus create
a break in anti-oppression politics with any movement
that is based on a single unified set of values. This is
not to claim that this process has been linear or that
the break is clean, but that there is a logic, identified
by the left's collective memory, which cannot be ignored.
The logic of exclusion and inclusion may not cover all
left politics but neither can the left ignore its
conseguences.
Exclusion and Expansion.
At its strongest the logic of exclusion and inclusion
asserts that any attempt to base politics on a unified
set of values will create oppression. However, the logic
of exclusion and inclusion is perhaps simplistic because
it concentrates on a straightforward confrontation
between a claim of universality and the howls of the
excluded and so ignores the fact that politics involves
more complicated interactions than just stand-offs.
Perhaps, the logic simply neglects processes of political
negotiation which can overcome exclusions. In addition,
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negotiations between political movements might be
particularly expected when a confrontation is between
movements that are all, at least nominally, committed to
fighting oppression.
The obvious negotiation to consider is whether or not a
movement can progressively include the excluded. That is,
even if oppression by exclusion is accepted as
inevitable, it can then be asked whether movements can
gradually expand by including any group which asserts it
is being oppressed by exclusion. The left could then
answer the logic of exclusion and inclusion by making
universality a process or aim that is gradually achieved
through sensitivity to the inclusions and exclusions that
have been created.
An example of such a response to exclusion is Nancy
Hartstock's reworking of Marxist theory from a feminist
perspective. Hartstock argued that socialism in the
United States of America suffered from serious problems
because it failed to organise on a large scale and failed
to connect the experiences of working class people to the
theories and practices of socialism. Hartstock then
claimed that these problems could be overcome if
socialism adopted feminist methodologies. [Hartstock,
1975, 56-58] Such methods were valuable because they were
based on the premise that theories must be grounded in
the experiences of individuals. Feminism thus offered
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socialism a means of connecting theory and practice.
Hartstock then built on these claims by arguing:
"If all that I have said about feminism as a method
rooted in dealing with everyday life holds true,
what is it that makes this mode of analysis a force
for revolution ? There are three factors of
particular importance: (1) The focus on everyday
life and experience makes action a necessity, not a
moral choice or an option. We are not fighting other
people's battles but our own. (2) The nature of our
understanding of theory is altered and theory is
brought into an integral and everyday relation with
practice. (3) Theory leads directly to a
transformation of social relations in both
consciousness and in reality because of its close
connection to real needs." [Hartstock, 1975, 64]
Hartstock claimed that if socialism adopted this feminist
practice then it could be reinvigorated and again become
a universal theory incorporating both feminism and black
liberation. [Hartstock, 1975, 62-64] Hartstock therefore
believed that insights from an oppression excluded by
socialism could redefine socialism and recreate a
universal anti-oppression movement. For Hartstock, once
socialism included feminism its universality would be
restored.
It thus seems possible for universality to be redefined
as a project which will continually expand as new
exclusions come to light. What could be taken to be
universal at any particular moment would then become the
existing orientation, which is universal until proven
otherwise. Unfortunately, such an expansionist vision
suffers from a crucial difficulty, whose exposition will
75
deepen the problems posed for the left by the logic of
exclusion and inclusion.
A division of inclusion and exclusion among oppressed
groups is created as a by-product of a particular
definition of oppressor and oppressed. That is, the logic
of exclusion and inclusion points out there are social
groups who may be excluded from both categories of a
particular definition of oppressor and oppressed. For
example, socialism can define oppressor and oppressed
through Marxist theory as the bourgeoisie and
proletariat. However, this means that the specific
oppression of women will be excluded from socialism. In
this way, women can be oppressed through exclusion by the
socialist movement, that is by workers who are themselves
oppressed. The excluded can be oppressed by the
oppressed. The expansionist theory then claims that if an
oppressed group oppresses an excluded group then the
excluded should be included within the definition of
oppressed. To do this the oppressed and the excluded
group would have to merge, but this assumes that the
ability of different oppressed groups to amalgamate is
unproblematic. Unfortunately, there are reasons to expect
conflicts between oppressed groups that will render such
mergers problematic.
Conflict between oppressed groups can occur when an
oppressed group, who have excluded a different group that
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is also oppressed in a different oppression, is also
oppressed by the excluded group. An oppressed group that
excludes might itself be oppressed by the excluded group
by means other than exclusion. If this occurs then any
attempt to amalgamate these groups will be tantamount to
attempts to amalgamate oppressor and oppressed, which is
distinct from the amalgamation of excluded and oppressed.
Turning again to feminism and socialism it has already
been noted, through Hart's analysis of the Conservative
voting tendencies of British women, that the Labour
movement may be a masculine movement whose interests are
not those of working class women. If most workers are men
whose political movement privileges the role of the male
production worker then this oppressed group may also be
sexist. It may, as Hart argues, be made up of men who
both impoverish their partners and families while
simultaneously being committed to a 'pub socialism'. To
then ask women to simply amalgamate with this male
socialism would be to ignore real contradictions of
political interest that exist between men and women.
A second example of oppression between oppressed groups
is Omolade's accusation that white feminists have been
racist. Omolade notes that the oppression of black women
exists, in part, because of white women and so
contradicts solidarity between black and white women.
Omolade also claims that sexism contradicts solidarity
between black men and black women. She accordingly
writes:
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"The racism of white women will not allow them to
give us the right to speak on our own behalf, and
the male chauvinism of black men will not allow them
to give us the right to speak on our own behalf. We
must take the right to speak from them." [Omolade,
1980, 256]
The 'expansion theory', as a means of overcoming the
logic of exclusion and inclusion, cannot stand without
the assumption that oppressed groups can merge and this
assumption is questionable because there is no guarantee
that some oppressed groups do not oppress other oppressed
groups. Instead of assuming there can be mutual
amalgamations between oppressed groups there are grounds
for assuming there will be conflicts between oppressed
groups that are exactly the conflict of oppressor and
oppressed. Contradictions and conflicts, not simply
exclusion, can be expected between the oppressed and so
the expansion theory as a solution to the logic of
exclusion and inclusion falls.
In summary, the implications of the left's collective
memory are that it cannot be assumed that any struggle is
a universal struggle. Further, if a political group's
unified set of values are not universal then it can be
assumed that it oppresses by exclusion and so it can be
claimed that all anti-oppression groups based on unified
values are also oppressor groups. It has also been argued
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that oppressed groups may enter into conflict with each
other, which will make it impossible to a priori expect
all anti-oppression struggles to merge. Taken together
these implications create a vision of the left
fragmenting as each oppressed group splinters under the
pressures of those it has excluded. The distinction first
established in the analysis of Marxism between a
political group's particular orientation and the claim
that this orientation is universal, a distinction implied
by the left's collective memory, has thus led to the
fragmentation of a liberatory politics based on unified
sets of values.
The Failure of Unified Values.
At its most powerful the logic of exclusion and inclusion
claims that any political theories, actions or movements
based on unified values will be oppressive. One strand of
the left's collective memory thus seems to lead to
untenable results for the left. However, in the
collective memory there is also an indication of a
totally different reaction to the problems of value based
politics. The alternative to value-based politics is to
examine the possibility of a politics which pursues a
basis in difference. This possibility will be explored in
the next section of this thesis, first, through detailed
analyses of the difference based theories of Deleuze and
Guattari and Lyotard, and, second, by a consideration in
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general of the answers difference based theories offer to
the difficulties implied by the left's collective memory.
It has been argued in this chapter that once the
suspicion has been established that any anti-oppression
politics cannot be a universal politics then all
political movements can be considered particular
orientations. Each articulation of an oppression can then
be expected to include and exclude some social groups,
that is each articulation of oppression will not be
universal. Each exclusion can then be recognised as an
oppression because the difficulties faced by the excluded
are ignored. Any political movement based on a unified
set of values thus becomes an oppressor, despite the fact
that it is also struggling against its own oppression,
and the left is confronted with conflicts between
oppressed groups that dislocate its overall vision of
liberation.
Value based politics provide the most obvious means of
unifying the left because they found it on unified
values. However, with the proliferation of anti-
oppression struggles the consequences of a politics based
on unified values is the fragmentation of the overall
left struggle. The next section will explore whether the
reverse is true and so whether a politics founded on
creating difference can be the basis of a unified left.
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Chapter Four; Difference as Desire; Deleuze and Guattarl.
The Context.
Prior to the nineteen sixties the treatment of mental
illness in France had been overwhelmingly based on
psychiatric techniques that sought to identify and treat
a physical basis for mental illnesses with scientific
medicine. During the sixties this dominance was
challenged both by psychoanalysis, particularly through
Jacques Lacan's interpretation of Freud, and the
antipsychiatric movement. These challenges received a
boost from the events of May nineteen sixty-eight, when
France seemed on the verge of a revolution, because the
problems of daily life, and hence also mental life, were
brought forcefully into the realm of the political.
[Turkle, 1978, chapters 1-3]
Gilles Deleuze was by nineteen sixty-eight known in
France for commentaries on famous philosophers, such as
Nietzsche and Spinoza, and for his own philosophy which
explored the concept of difference. [Deleuze, 1962:
Deleuze, 1968: Deleuze, 1969: Foucault, 1970: Bogue,
1989, 1-4: Massumi, 1992, 1-3] Felix Guattari was, by
nineteen sixty-eight, a practising psychoanalyst
influenced by Lacan and an antipsychiatry activist
closely associated with the radical La Borde clinic for
mental health. [Guattari, 1984: Turkle, 1978, 83 & 254
f/n 23: Bogue, 1989, 4-6: Massumi, 1992, 1-3: Stanton,
1992] Deleuze and Guattari brought together their
expertise in difference and psychoanalysis after the May
events and in nineteen seventy-two published their first
joint work about capitalism and schizophrenia, the book
Anti-Oedipus.
Sherry Turkle claims that Deleuze and Guattari's work
emerged from three strands of the challenge to psychiatry
in France. [Turkle, 1978, 83] The first was the
interpretation of Freud developed by theorist and analyst
Lacan. [Turkle, 1978, 146-148] The second was the
antipsychiatric discourse on madness, which sought to
loosen scientific medicine's hold on the treatment of
mental illness and introduce therapies which diminished
the separation of mental institution and society.
[Turkle, 1978, 142-144 & 262 f/n 4] The third derived
from Marxism and focused on the way that therapies for
mental illness were pacifying the mentally ill so that
structures which caused mental illness would not be
challenged. [Turkle, 1978, 142-148: Bogue, 1989, 87] In
addition, Bogue points out that Deleuze's previous work
developing a philosophy of difference was an important
contributor to the work Deleuze and Guattari would
produce together. [Bogue, 1989, 2-4: Massumi, 1992, 1-3]
Emerging from this background Deleuze and Guattari
collaborated on three books, Anti-Oedipus, Kafka and A
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Thousand Plateaus, and in them attempted to create a new
form of politics and philosophy based on difference.
Unfortunately, Deleuze and Guattari pay a price for the
novelty of their work in accessibility, particularly in
their frequent coining of new terms. In order to provide
a clear summary of their work an outline of their basic
theory of desire will be followed by extended
interpretations, in their terms, of the British dance
music movement called Raving and the Italian political
movement Autonomia. A summary of several more of Deleuze
and Guattari's concepts, which will complete an outline
of their theory, will then be made on the basis of these
examples. The interpolation of concrete examples and
abstract reasoning will allow a flavour of Deleuze and
Guattari's complexity to be combined with clarifications
through tangible instances of those complexities. In
turn, this analysis of a particular difference based
theory will test the implication of the left's collective
memory that anti-oppression politics can be based on
difference.
Desire and Production.
Deleuze and Guattari develop a theory of desire as
productive of difference. Desire, they argue, is made up
of two forms. First, there are concrete constructions of
desire, called in Anti-Oedipus desiring-machines and in A
Thousand Plateaus assemblages, and second there is
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desiring-production, which is the order or principle of
desire. Deleuze and Guattari claim that desiring-
production can only be understood by realising that:
"production is immediately consumption and a
recording process (enregistrement), without any
mediation, and the recording process and consumption
directly determine production, though they do so
within the production process. Hence everything is
production" [Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, 4]
Desiring-production is the 'production of production', or
put another way, the principle of desire is to be
productive. For Deleuze and Guattari desire is neither
good nor bad, sexual or non-sexual, but is productive.
[Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, 4-6 & 296: Patton, 1981, 41:
Donzelot, 1972, 35: Bogue, 1989, 89-90]
Desiring-production is not, however, the existence of a
desire, it is its order or principle. Desire only exists
in a particular machine or assemblage that determines the
nature of desiring-production in that instance. In short,
desire and its productions are only brought into being
when a particular assemblage or desiring-machine exists.
Deleuze and Guattari wrote:
"Assemblages are passional, they are compositions of
desire. Desire has nothing to do with a natural or
spontaneous determination; there is no desire but
assembling, assembled desire." [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1980, 399]
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Assemblages or desiring-machines are desiring-production
made concrete, which means that desire achieves a certain
reality in the specific productivity of an assemblage.
Deleuze and Guattari claim that an assemblage is a sort
of machine because it produces in a certain way and they
stress this by arguing that the correct guestion to pose
about an assemblage is not 'what does it mean' but 'how
does it work'. In assemblages Deleuze and Guattari are
concerned not with problems of meaning but 'solely
problems of use'. Deleuze and Guattari thus created a
functionalist conception of assemblages and desiring-
machines because assemblages are recognised through the
functions or the use of their parts. [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1972, 179]
Deleuze and Guattari answer the accusation of
functionalism by distinguishing between the molecular and
the molar. Desiring-machines or assemblages form the
first connections or produce the first works, the
molecular elements, which are necessary for larger, or
molar, social machines to come into existence. For
instance, the molecular connection of a child's mouth and
a parent's food is a necessary basis for the family to
become a molar social institution. Deleuze and Guattari
claim they are immune to the standard critique of
functionalism because their functionalism is at the level
of molecular connections that make up social institutions
and does not concern the institutions themselves. This
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claim will be discussed in detail in a later section but
at this stage the important point is the stress Deleuze
and Guattari place on recognising desire by its
functions. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, 180-181]
Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire distinguishes the
order of desire from the reality of desires. Desiring-
production is the production of production and so is the
order or the immanent principle of assemblages and
desiring-machines. Put another way, the principle of
desire is to produce and a particular form of production
is an assemblage of desire. The particular form of
production of an assemblage can itself be recognised
through its functions, because Deleuze and Guattari claim
that use, functioning and production are the one thing
for an assemblage. A particular desire is a series of
functions which make up an assemblage.
A third concept must now be added to desiring-production
and assemblages in order to complete a basic
'deleuzoguattarian' perspective. [Bogue, 1989, 9] Deleuze
and Guattari argue that for there to be assemblages there
must be something that connects the product and
production, something that is also non-production because
it is the space where production occurs. Borrowing a
phrase from Antonin Artaud, Deleuze and Guattari call
this space the Body without Organs or BwO.
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"The body without organs is nonproductive;
nonetheless it is produced, at a certain place and a
certain time in the connective synthesis, as the
identity of producing and the product" [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1972, 8]
Assemblages take the productive drive of desiring-
production and realise themselves on the BwO because the
BwO is the place where product and production are
identified with each other. The BwO is where a particular
assemblage realises its desire and is therefore also
where production must be unconstrained, if production is
to be the principle of a specific assemblage. [Deleuze
and Guattari, 1972, 9-16: Deleuze and Guattari, 1980,
149-166: Bogue, 1989, 93-94] Deleuze and Guattari point
out that the BwO is accordingly opposed to an organism
that organises.
"The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that
organization of the organs called the organism."
[Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 158]
An organisation involves blockages because it places
organs in fixed relationships. In contrast, the BwO is
where assemblages are productive and so is a plane where
there is an unlimited and unblocked productivity of
desire. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 154]
In summary, desiring-production demands the production of
more and more assemblages, that is the creation of more
and more desires, and the BwO is the plane where this
immense productivity can occur. The three concepts of
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desiring-production, assemblages or desiring-machines and
the BwO which form Deleuze and Guattari's basic theory of
desire have now been outlined. There is, of course, more
to be said but some examples may be helpful at this
stage.
The Rave-Machine
Raving is a constellation of music, drugs, youth,
dancing, law evasion, fashion and money that existed in
Britain from the mid nineteen eighties until, at least,
the early nineteen nineties. The head of the 'pay party
intelligence unit' of the police in the West Midlands,
U.K. reported one thousand two hundred and twenty rave
parties, some with up to fifteen thousand participants,
in the West Midlands during the two years prior to April
nineteen ninety-two. [Campbell, 19 9 2 ]1 Stereotypically
raving consists of thousands of people dancing all night
to a specific form of music, in a venue fitted with some
form of lightshow with many people taking drugs, usually
E (Ecstasy). E's effect is, reputedly, that of a mild
hallucinogenic combined with the physical lift of an
amphetamine, which makes it perfect for a course of all-
night dancing to loud music because it provides both
energy and an altered reality. [O'Hagen, 1988: Leith,
1 The specificity of raving as opposed to Acid House, or
even just the dance scene in general, is too complicated
a question to tackle for this example, however the
existence of other closely related 'movements of the
dance floor' needs to be acknowledged. [Redhead, 1990]
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1991, 4: Foucault, 1970, 190-191] Shaun Ryder, lead
singer of the band the Happy Mondays, noted the role of E
when he listed his influences as:
"Northern soul...punk rock...Jimi Hendrix... Captain
Beefheart. And a lot o'drugs on top of that. It was
thru Bez [another member of the band] with E.. just
get1 em down yer throat, son ! More ! Go on ! Throw
'em down yer neck !...That's how we really got to
see how E can get you, like, right out there."
[Shaun Ryder in Leith, 1991, 5]
Some of the key elements of raving are dance, lights,
drugs, clothes, music, and time and the possible
combinations of these elements in a particular rave-event
created a sort of delirium so that people 'raved'. As
people affected by drugs danced for hours beneath
shifting patterns of light to powerful music, they
gradually achieved a communal state of euphoria. What can
be recognised as ravings production, or what is desired
by ravers through constructing a rave-event, is this
ongoing inducement into a desubjectified state of
something like rapture. [Leith, 1991: Redhead, 1990]
Using Deleuze and Guattari's terms raving can be
understood as a machine in which certain elements, such
as a drug, a song, a volume or an intensity of light, can
be connected to other such elements in order to produce
the desired state of raving. The rave-machine's parts can
thus be understood according to the work they do or their
function in constructing the machine which realises a
desire. For instance, one strand of the musical style of
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raving is a cross between rock and dance music in which
rock guitar lines are connected to dance rhythms. This
part of rave music functioned by supplying an endless
dance beat shot through with guitar riffs that accentuate
and break up the sound. [Brown, 1989, 33: Redhead, 1990,
2]2 This new style is both productive in itself, because
it fuels the creation of more music in a new style, and
when it is connected to other elements of the rave
machine, such as drugs, lights or time, functions to
create the collective state of raving. Journalist James
Brown noted a similar creativity in relation to fashion.
"Wander through the dry ice banks that cloak the
Hacienda and you'll see casual sports gear rubbing
up against fishing hats and hooded tops. Tattooed
legs, beatnik beards and pen-decorated flares bounce
around in pastel coloured tuff leather shoes and
high-rise baseball boots. Fashion has become a
spectacular free-for-all." [Brown, 1989, 33]
When there is such a free-for-all Deleuze and Guattari's
desire is present in the unrestrained creation of new
differences and it can therefore be asked 'what is the
BwO of raving ?'. Remembering that the BwO is both
'desire and non-desire' because it is the place where the
identification of producer and product occurs and also
remembering that the BwO is itself produced, the BwO of
2 The connection of rock and dance musical styles was not
originated in the musical style that became part of the
Rave-machine, rather it can be traced back at least to
early rap music in the mid nineteen seventies. It is also
only one form of music that has contributed to rave
musical styles, with at least one other style in the
development of Acid House and techno-dance music.
[Redhead, 1990, 2]
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raving would be the collective bodies of ravers producing
their collective delirium and ecstasy. [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1980, 149-150]
The BwO of raving is the undifferentiated state that
supports the connections that the raving-machine makes
between its different elements. This undifferentiated
state is the collective body, itself made of bodies,
produced by thousands of people jointly making the
connections of drugs to dance, music to dance, dance to
fashion, drugs to time, time to music and so on, thereby
gradually constructing the state of raving and so the BwO
of raving. The delirium is non-subjective and it is
smooth, as all the connections and functions of the
machine give way to intensities of feeling. Ravers may no
longer notice the lights, the other ravers or the music
as separate elements but feel them as the one intense
event. This is a phenomenon that has been called the
trance dance. [Redhead, 1990, 6]
In summary, desiring-production can be seen to have
invested a rave-machine which seeks, through the
connection of multifarious elements that are themselves
multiple such as lights, dance, fashion, music, or drugs,
to be productive and creative. This productivity
constructs a non-productive plane, or BwO, which
underpins the connections of the rave-machine and this
non-productive plane is the body of ravers that a rave-
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event, an actualization of the rave-machine, can create.
A collective body is the BwO of the rave-machine and the
desubjectified state of ecstasy is a raver's desire.
Though the rave-machine has been outlined using Deleuze
and Guattari's three main concepts it has been treated in
isolation from its social context. To broaden this
example clashes with at least two other social structures
or institutions can be outlined.
First, in nineteen eighty-eight raves had to confront a
combination of tabloid outrage and police action which
sought to directly repress a seemingly free-wheeling
multiplication of rave-events. An alarmist campaign from
the tabloid press, which centred on the perilous use of
drugs at raves, coincided with both repeated police
operations to close rave-events and judicial attempts to
criminalise raving by prosecuting rave organisers for
allowing drugs to be sold at rave-events, whether such
organisers were aware of the sales or not. [Redhead,
1990, 2-4: Wells, 1988]
Reaction to this assault on the rave-machine followed two
paths. First, there is some evidence to suggest there was
a reduction in the number of rave-events, which
constituted a running down of the rave-machine that is
difficult to disentangle from its possible demise as a
fashion. [Wells, 1988, 24: Campbell, 1992: See comments
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of DJ's in Wells, 1988, 24-25] Second, raves continued
but became secret, being held in isolated places
directions to which could only be obtained through
informal networks, such as a friend or a telephone
number, just before an event. A rave-event might then
occur completely hidden from public view. However, if the
police found out about and tried to prevent a secret
event a night of ravers trying to find a way past police
blocks ensued because ravers did not protests but simply
sought to find their event without being caught. Little
'normal' political action to protect their machine seems
to have been taken by ravers. For example, no-one
organised a Committee to Defend Raving, conducted
petitions or lobbied politicians. Ravers simply carried
on trying to find more ingenious ways of fleeing the
police, disappearing from public view and constructing
their desiring-machine. [Rayner, 1992]
The second major confrontation for the rave-machine was
with capitalism and this came about in two ways. First,
there was a commercialisation of elements of the machine,
with clothes and music being the most obvious examples,
and this may have blocked the lines of creativity the
machine ran along. For instance, the fashion free-for-all
became codified into a recognisable, reproducible and
manufacturable uniform, perhaps best represented by the
'Joe Bloggs' label. This is also a contradictory process,
especially for successful musicians who may enter the
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well defined and possibly financially rewarding economy
of pop and rock music, and has its idealists who see
commercial success as a means of spreading raving over
the world. [Leith, 1991, 5]
Second, the drug economy that has been associated with
raving seemed to become more violent, at least in
Manchester. It is difficult to obtain clear information
on this phenomenon and it is ripe for sensationalism, but
Leith does seem to establish a rise in violence which
affected raving. [Leith, 1991: Nevin, 1991] This can be
symbolised by the closing of Manchester's famous
nightclub the Hacienda, which reopened with extra
security including a metal detector, because the owners
felt they could not otherwise guarantee that fire-arms
would not be taken into the club. [Leith, 1991, 5: Nevin,
1991, 6]
The deleuzoguattarian analysis of raving can be the basis
for outlining more of their concepts, however before
passing back directly to Deleuze and Guattari's work, a
second example of a desiring-machine will be given
through the Italian political movement called Autonomia.
Once both these examples are established a solid basis




It is often assumed that the political eruptions that
occurred in Western countries during the nineteen sixties
peaked late in that decade and died out by the mid-
seventies. Italy would be an exception to any such
pattern because though conflict reached great intensity
in nineteen sixty-eight to sixty-nine, it then led to a
second period of turmoil followed by a second climax in
nineteen seventy-seven. By the time of this 'second
phase' a movement developed which both carried some of
the marks of Deleuze and Guattari's theories and
explicitly used their work, though this does not mean
that it was a movement carried out to their blueprint.
[Bifo, 1980, 159; Collective A/Traverso, 1980] The
movement seems to have been called simply that, II
Movimento, by its participants but has become known by
3 The nature of Autonomia is a matter of some debate,
ranging from Melucci and Willan, who both define it as
essentially a terrorist organisation and repeat the
judiciary's nineteen seventy-nine claim that various
leaders of Autonomia were also the organised head council
of the terrorist Red Brigades, to the special edition of
the journal Semiotext(e) which interprets Autonomia as a
definition of the 'new post-political polities'.
[Melucci, 1978: Willan, 1991, 183-190: Lotringer and
Marazzi, 1980] Melucci and Willan are far too dismissive,
reducing any involvement of Autonomia in politics to
violence, while Semiotext(e) seems to interpret Autonomia
as being too innovative. In general what follows is a
'sceptical semiotext(e)' line for two reasons; it allows
a clear example for the purposes of illustrating Deleuze
and Guattari's arguments and it appears to be the most
accurate summary from the material that is available in
English. However, it must be recognised that this
interpretation may overestimate the anti-Leninism and
political novelty of Autonomia. [Lumley, 1980]
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one of its guiding threads, Autonomy or in Italian
Autonomia.
Italian politics since the second world war can be seen
largely as a confrontation between communism and the
Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Catholicism and the
Christian Democratic Party (DC). This opposition began to
break down in the sixties as agitation culminated in
intense political activity by both right, in the
'strategy of tension', and left, in a growing
disillusionment with the PCI and its official unions.
[Bale, 1989, 5-8: Bifo, 1979, 148-152: Lotringer and
Marazzi, 1980, 16-17: Morris, 1978, 61-62: Willan, 1991]
The 'strategy of tension' was a response by the right to
both the struggles of workers and leftists and a growing
economic crisis. It essentially involved committing
terrorist acts which the left could be accused of
perpetrating and which could then be used as the pretext
for introducing repressive measures, for creating the
pre-conditions for a military coup and for discrediting
the left. [Willan, 1991] For example, four bombs were set
off on the twelfth of December nineteen sixty-nine in
Milan and Rome, of which the most serious was in a bank
in Milan where sixteen people were killed and over eighty
wounded. Immediately after the blast the Milan police
commissioner blamed anarchists. Several anarchists were
soon arrested, charged and later convicted and a
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crackdown against the local anarchist movement was
conducted. It was not until seven years later that
thirty-four neo-fascists and members of the security
forces were revealed as the perpetrators of the bombing
and were charged with the crime, with only three of the
thirty-four actually being arrested. [Willan, 1991, 122-
131: Bale, 1989, 5-6: Bifo, 1979, 150: CARI, 1980, 174]
The 'strategy of tension' was an ambiguous success
because, though it did not completely destroy the left,
by the late nineteen seventies it had helped to make it
impossible for the PCI to share power in an elected
government, despite compromises made by the PCI in
response to the sense of a social and economic crisis.
While the strategy of tension was underway an austerity
programme, made up of wage cuts, reduction of
absenteeism, greater productivity through harder work and
other elements, had been instituted by the DC government
in the late sixties. This programme was heightened by
increased austerity measures prompted by the Oil Shock of
nineteen seventy-three and a consequent deterioration in
the Italian economy. Under these economic pressures the
PCI entered into a 'Historic Compromise' with the
Christian Democrats in which, by abstaining from voting,
they allowed the DC to govern. A programme of
restructuring industry and reducing public expenditure,
often by massive increases in the price of public
services, resulted from this compromise and deepened a
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developing belief that the PCI was failing to represent
the interests of the workers and the dispossessed.
[Morris, 1978, 51-58: Censor, 1975: Lumley, 1990, chapter
1: Bologna, 1977, 48-50: Cherki and Wieviorka, 1980]
As part of the growing disillusionment with the PCI
several leftist groups independent of the PCI, such as
Lotta Continua (the Struggle Continues) and Potere
Operiao (Workers Power), were set up in the late sixties.
These groups organised both in and beyond the factories
and conducted a radical critique of work, drawing on
Mario Tronti1s analysis of the 'refusal of work'. [Bifo,
1979, 150-151: Melucci, 1978a, 101-102, footnote:
Lotringer and Marazzi, 1980, 17: Lumley, 1980]
Tronti argued that work itself should and could be
refused under capitalism, that workers should not seek to
run capitalism 'better' and that this refusal is both the
dividing line between reformist and revolutionary
political activity and a political action that can lead
to fundamental change. These ideas, developed by Tronti
and others during the sixties, then contributed to the
development of the concept of autonomy. [Tronti, 1965,
28-35: Moulier, 1989]
Autonomy developed as a two sided concept. First, it
asserted the right of workers to organise autonomously
outside their unions or the PCI. This followed the
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acceptance of Tronti's assertion of the right to refuse
work combined with the PCI's support for right-wing
austerity measures which demanded that labourers work
harder. Second, autonomy developed from the claims of
non-class based movements that emerged through the
sixties and seventies, such as the women's and the youth
movement, which aimed for autonomous control of their own
lives. Here the refusal of work coincided with the need
to reclaim lives that were being lost to the family or
the University as well as the factory. Overall, autonomy
influenced a political movement to develop social spaces
that were autonomous from the various oppressive power
structures of society. [Tronti, 1965, 28-35: Moulier,
1989: Bologna, 1977: Magale, 1980]
Autonomia emerged in the early seventies to become a new
form of political movement which had no central
structure, no one newspaper and no set of elected
leaders. In fact, Autonomia appeared not to be a formal
organisation at all. Rather:
"the PCI has found itself increasingly confronted
with a vocal and/or violent left opposition loosely
known as The Movement, il movimento. This movement
has a constantly shifting and sliding identity,
appearing unnervingly undefinable in a country used
to the definite policies, hierarchical structure and
orchestrated moments of change in the Catholic
Church on the one hand, and the Communist Party on
the other." [Morris, 1978, 53]
Morris identified three strands to Autonomia which she
called the semiological delinquents, the autonomous
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workers and the armed struggle. Though it will be argued
that the armed struggle actually runs counter to
Autonomia, Morris's definition of the other two strands
is useful. [Morris, 1978, 52-54]
Morris argued that the semiological delinquents, which
she also calls the creative wing, was made up of those
seeking to transform everyday life. This strand was often
drawn from those being excluded from industrial
restructuring, such as students, the unemployed, partly
employed or black market workers, was heavily influenced
by both the feminist movement and health and safety
issues at work and made its chief concern the 'reconquest
of personal life' through autonomy. Examples of action
by these groups were the network of pirate radio stations
that developed with the deregulation of Italian radio and
the autoreduction campaigns, which organised collective
action to 'self-reduce' the price of goods. [Morris,
1978, 53-58: Bologna, 1977: Torealta, 1980: Collective
A/Traverso, 1980: Guattari, 1984, 236-241: Cherki and
Wieviorka, 1980]
Second, Morris identified the autonomous workers groups
who had revolted against the results of the Historic
Compromise as part of Autonomia. As already noted these
groups were often set up in the late sixties in
opposition to the PCI and developed both the tradition of
autonomy and Tronti's ideas of the refusal of work. As a
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consequence, in some industrial disputes union's
controlled by political parties were bypassed by these
workers. For example, workers in a dispute in Porto
Marghera seemed to take more notice of students and
Potere Operaio than their Union and demanded a flat 5,000
lire increase for all, rather than union negotiated
changes in production bonuses. [Lumley, 1990, 174]
Last, Morris points to groups that resorted to the armed
struggle. Chiefly there was the Red Brigades, whose
beginnings dated back to violent actions in factories in
the late sixties, but there were also completely new
groups like Nuclei Armarti Proletari(NAP). Morris makes
these a strand of Autonomia and it is certain that
terrorist actions were integral to the political
landscape in which Autonomia moved. However, though
drawing distinct boundaries around Autonomia is difficult
terrorism should probably not be considered an integral
part of Autonomia itself. First, there was an ongoing
rejection both of the Brigades and any belief in
clandestine armed struggle by the theoreticians and media
associated with Autonomia. There was also a similar
rejection of Autonomia by the proponents of armed
struggle, which included at times barely veiled threats
from the Red Brigades. [Curcio, 1979] Second, the
confusion of groups conducting an armed struggle and
Autonomia can also be traced to two sources. Autonomia
does not, in general, reject violence, or even armed
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violence, but rather the attempt of a clandestine armed
group to claim leadership of the workers' movement, that
is it rejects the militarization of a mass movement.
Further, the Italian state in the late seventies went to
great lengths to associate Autonomia with the Red
Brigades. Through Autonomia's own acceptance of violence
and the efforts of the Italian state it is easy to
confuse Autonomia with the clandestine violence of
terrorist groups. Consequently, while the Brigades and
other groups committed to a clandestine, militarised
struggle are an important part of the politics in which
Autonomia was involved, it seems appropriate to reject
Morris' characterisation of them as the 'third stream' of
Autonomia. [Lotringer and Marazzi, 1980a, Section 4:
Beyond Terrorism: Morris, 1978, 70-73]4
To develop a deleuzoguattarian analyse of Autonomia its
BwO needs to be outlined. Paul Patton noted that a BwO
is:
"the ideal limit of a process of desire, one that
has attained the complete deterritorialization of
4 There was at least one terrorist group, Prima Linea,
that grew out of anti-leninist and anti-authoritarian
groups like those making up Autonomia. However, it is
only to the extent that this group retained the character
of an open organisation, not easy for a clandestine
terrorist group, that it can be seen as part of
Autonomia. How far this was achieved is impossible to
judge on present information. [Moulier, 1989, 31: Lumley,
1991, 292, note 3] For an opposing viewpoint that
identifies Autonomia with both the Red Brigades and
terrorism in general see Willan, 1991, 182-3 and for a
criticism of Willan see O'Hara, 1992.
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the body, removing all traces of its character as an
organism; but also that pure surface of intensity
which is the ideal point of departure and the
essential precondition for any process of desire."
[Patton, 1986, 24]
Autonomy preceded the Autonomia-assemblage both
theoretically, being a field of debate in Italian
political journals in the sixties, and practically, in
the worker, student and social struggles of the sixties.
Autonomy could thus be Autonomia's point of departure.
Desiring-production in the Autonomia-machine then
invested autonomy through the gradual construction of the
assemblage which could realise this desire for autonomy.
Autonomy, as a BwO, engendered a politics which rejected
the constraints of the Italian political organism in
order to create autonomous social spaces. That is, the
institutions of the Italian political organism, such as
the parties, the police, the newspapers and media, were
removed to create social spaces where autonomy could be
lived. If autonomy was the desire, then its BwO was these
autonomous spaces which support the living of a life free
from the police, teachers, the family and all other
oppressive institutions of the Italian political
organism. [Lotringer and Marazzi, 1980b, 8-10: Lumley,
1990, 34-45, ch.16 & 17: Bifo, 1980, 149-152]
For example, the development of autonomous space was
aided by the pirate radio stations which offered
information, exploration and organisation. They did this
by producing autonomy through discussions of the refusal
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of work and the rediscovery of control of one's person,
through the broadcast direct to air of phone calls from a
demonstration which offered information of police and
demonstrator movements or through the instant
communication of the decisions of organisations. One
participant, Bifo, noted that:
"Through this channel [the pirate radios] circulated
an uninterrupted flood of music and words, a flood
of transformations on the symbolic, perceptive and
imaginative planes." [Bifo, 1980, 156]
The Autonomia-assemblage grew by constituting its BwO
throughout the seventies and reached a peak in nineteen
seventy-seven. In February of that year the wounding by
fascists of a student who was protesting against DC
reforms led to the occupation of several Universities,
first in Rome but then in Palermo, Naples, Florence,
Torino and Bologna. These were not occupations just by
students but included the fractions of society that had
been thrown up in the seventies, such as the unemployed,
partly employed, women and so on. The slogan was 'all
work for less time' and the multiply articulated program
was:
"We want to make possible a general reduction in
working time and we want to transform the
organisation of work in such a way that an
autonomous organisation of productive experimental
organisation may become possible." [Bifo, 1980,
158]
104
March saw street battles in Rome and Bologna and the
state's grip on both cities seemed to be weakening. The
PCI's failure to control revolt in Bologna, where it had
run the local government for many years, set this revolt
especially outside the control of the Italian political
organism as it placed it beyond the left-wing of that
organism. Repression then followed with hundreds of
arrests, the closing of radio stations, newspapers,
bookstores and other avenues of political activity,
increased violence from police and a storm of accusations
from the mass media. The battle continued throughout the
summer and in September a convention, called by Autonomia
in Bologna with the aim of advancing the movement, was
attended by seventy thousand people. [Bifo, 1980, 157-
160: Lumley, 1990, chapter 20: Lotringer and Marazzi,
1980a: Morris, 1978] However, the repression had had its
effect and the continued production of the Autonomia-
assemblage, the realisation of autonomy, was being
blocked and replaced with reactions to the repression.
Bifo wrote that:
"The September Convention was the great opportunity-
missed however- for the Movement to overcome its
purely negative, destructive connotations, and
formulate a programmatic position for the autonomous
organisation of a real society against the State, an
autonomous organisation of social intellectual, and
productive energies that might make possible a
progressive liberation of lives from salaried
work....the gathering concluded without producing
any direction for the future, any new program, and
without advancing the Movement. Instead it was
restricted to hearing tales of repression and then
defining, in negative terms, its reaction." [Bifo,
1980, 159-160
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According to Bifo Autonomia had become ensnared in the
repression operated by the Italian state and so had
become a reactive rather than an active movement. No
longer creating new and different political
possibilities, Autonomia was drawn into politics that
were increasingly defined by the state and so the
creativity and productivity of Autonomia were blocked.
[Bifo, 1980, 157-160: Lumley, 1990, chapter 20: Lotringer
and Marazzi, 1980: Morris, 1978, 63-69]
The peak of struggle passed for Autonomia but actions
continued with the clandestine armed struggle moving to
centre stage. In particular, after the kidnapping and
assassination in nineteen seventy-eight of Aldo Moro, who
was president of the DC and one of the architects of the
Historic Compromise, further repression was launched. As
part of this wave of repression around sixty influential
intellectual and organisational members of Autonomia were
jailed in April nineteen seventy-nine for being the
controlling council of the Red Brigades. Many of the
charges seemed to have little evidential support and the
investigations sometimes took the form of inquisitorial
analyses of the writings and thought of Autonomists, in
this way directly criminalising Autonomia's intellectual
basis. Many of the accused were held on remand for years
and then were acguitted or released for lack of evidence,
though some were convicted and jailed. [Lotringer and
Marazzi, 1980a, see Part 3: April 7 Arrests: Moulier,
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1989, 37-38, note 21: Moss, 1989, chapters 5 & 6:
Jamieson, 1989, 176-178: Bifo, 1980, 158-160: O'Hara,
1992 ]
The example of the Autonomia-assemblage and its BwO will
be left here, in its decline. At its highest point
Autonomia seemed on the verge of tearing the Italian
political organism to pieces and substituting the
productivity and multiplicity of a desire for autonomy on
all social levels. At its most threatening Autonomia
seemed to be creating liberation as Deleuze and Guattari
understood it when they wrote:
"what belongs to all requirements of liberation: the
force of the unconscious itself, the investment by
desire of the social field, the disinvestment of
repressive structures." [Deleuze and Guattari, 1972,
61]
The Theory of Lines.
Only Deleuze and Guattari's central concepts of desiring-
production, assemblages and the BwO have so far been
examined. Other important ideas, such as the war-machine
or lines of flight, have been put to one side to offer
the theory of desire as clearly as possible and then to
explore that theory through examples. Before passing to
criticism of their work it will now be useful to return
directly to Deleuze and Guattari and examine several
additional concepts.
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Deleuze and Guattari analyse assemblages or desiring-
machines by examining the 'bundles of three sorts of
lines' that can make them up and, though this is not the
only way they analyse assemblages, their 'theory of
lines' shows most clearly what is revolutionary or
liberating in their interpretation of desire. In the
theory of lines there are three main concepts; molar
lines, molecular lines and lines of flight. [Bogue, 1989,
124]
Molar lines are rigid and segmentary and they stop any
free flows of creativity or productivity by forcing them
into categories. An example is the Rave-machine's
confrontation with the molar line of successive stages of
pursuit, capture, incarceration and trial used by the
police-judicial apparatus. Each segment of this judicial
line is predetermined to lead to the next, leaving no
space for creativity once a raver is ensnared by it.
[Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 202-207: Patton, 1986, 25]
Molecular lines are less rigid and less segmentary than
molar lines, but they still follow a determinate path.
For instance, the personal alliances that may be formed
among people in a large bureaucracy may be as important a
basis for action as the rigid hierarchy, even though such
alliances are more fluid and less rigid than the formal
hierarchy. Another example is that finding out about a
secret rave-event was often a matter of being at another
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event where information was available. The connection was
therefore more fluid than a molecular line but also had
to be made in a particular way to be successful. [Deleuze
and Guattari, 1980, 202-207; Patton, 1986, 25]
Last, there are the lines of flight. By constructing
these lines an escape from segmentarity can be made and a
pure flow of productivity created. These are the lines of
liberation. Lines of flight run where a system of molar
and molecular lines break down or where something new can
come into effect. Deleuze and Guattari also call them
'lines of deterritorialization' because a line of flight
breaks a territory from its boundaries. For example, the
music of rock and dance each had their own territory in
which formulas were well defined for producing what was
distinctly rock and distinctly dance music. In Deleuze
and Guattari's terms there were molar and molecular lines
of rock, in guitar riffs, and dance, in bass-heavy
rhythms. However, in the Rave-machine some of these lines
of rock and dance were deterritorialised and brought
together to form a productive line of flight from rock
and dance which fed music into the Rave-machine. A second
example of a line of flight occurred when ravers, in
reaction to police attempts to prevent raves, could be
found late at night drawing new routes on the British
landscape according to secret maps to a rave. When
confronted by a police road-block ravers would turn and
simply try to draw a new line through a new route to the
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rave. Rather than trying to organise a protest within the
state system ravers answered the police's molar lines
with creativity and flight. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1980,
202-207 & 508-510: Patton, 1986, 25: Guattari, 1984, 236-
241: Rayner, 1992]
There are, then, three sorts of lines that make up
assemblages. Yet, this means that assemblages are not
necessarily free embodiments of desire, for they may be
crossed by molar and molecular lines that segment and
block. It has already been noted that the rave-machine
was confronted by an assemblage made up of the police and
the judicial system and that Autonomia was met by the
Italian state. Deleuze and Guattari must, therefore,
distinguish the machine that invents lines of flight.
They call it the war-machine.
War-Machine and State: Smooth and Striated Space.
The war-machine is not a machine for waging military war,
despite its name, but is the abstract form of assemblages
that create lines of flight. The war-machine wages war on
molar and molecular lines. As such the war-machine is a
machine dedicated to mutations, changes, productions and
creativity and its aim is the formation of lines that
deterritorialise. So, to the extent that the Rave-machine
and the Autonomia-machine were able to construct lines of
flight they were also war-machines. Deleuze and Guattari
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claim that the war-machine exists in opposition to the
state or, in their terms, the state-form. [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1980, Plateau 12: Patton, 1984: Patton, 1986]
"The State-form, as a form of inferiority, has a
tendency to reproduce itself, remaining identical to
itself across its variations and easily recognisable
within the limits of its poles, always seeking
public recognition (there is no masked State). But
the war machine's form of exteriority is such that
it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists
in an industrial innovation as well as in
technological invention, in a commercial circuit as
well as in a religious creation, in all flows and
currents that only secondarily allow themselves to
be appropriated by the State." [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1980, 360]
According to Deleuze and Guattari the state-form operates
by capturing lines of flight and constructing an
'inferiority', or interior territory, where individuals
and groups are fixed in certain positions. The state's
relations to whatever is external to it, that is the
state's relations to anything that is not already
territorialised, are therefore those of capture and
bondage. The state-form is associated with 'striated and
sedentary space', which is the space across which molar
and molecular lines run, which ensnare and control
creativity and productivity, and striated space gives
rise to a 'plane of organisation' which forms the basis
for an organism. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, Plateau 13:
Patton, 1986]
In opposition to striated space Deleuze and Guattari
claim there is 'smooth space', where the free-flowing
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lines of flight run and so this is the space that the
war-machine constructs. Smooth space has no blocks to
creativity and Deleuze and Guattari associate it with
nomads who cross space not to travel from point to point
but because the line on which they travel is their
object. Smooth space constitutes a 'plane of
consistency', where there are no blocks, and hence makes
up a BwO. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 70-73 & 422-423]
The two forms of space, smooth and striated, are not
mutually exclusive. As has already been noted, the state-
form seeks to capture lines of flight and construct molar
lines and the war-machine seeks flight from striated
space. Consequently, the two forms of space are
continually turning into each other and these inter¬
relations form politics. Examples of this politics have
so far been given in the contest between the creativity
of the Rave-machine and the territorialisations of the
tabloid press and the police and between the productivity
of Autonomia and the actions of the Italian state.
[Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, Plateau 14: Patton, 1986]
In summary, Deleuze and Guattari have produced a theory
that is wide in scope and ambitious in its attempt to
base desire, and ultimately liberation, on the continual
production of difference. All the strange devices of
desiring-production, assemblages, BwO, the theory of
lines and the war-machine are dedicated to producing an
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uncompromising theory of a revolutionary, difference-
based desire. It is their commitment to difference and
creativity that makes Deleuze and Guattari important for
this thesis because analysis of their work should offer
insight into a politics totally committed to difference,
a politics which has been called a postmodern ethics.
[Patton, 1986]
Functionalism.
The single-mindedness of Deleuze and Guattari in
realising a theory of difference is reflected in the
tight connections between the terms of their analysis.
These terms, such as production, functioning and
creativity, are connected within the theory of desire,
and from them is derived all the additional apparatus of
flows, breaks and territorialisations. However, it can
also be argued that the tightness of these connections
also makes their theory functionalist. As already noted
Deleuze and Guattari take note of their own
functionalism. This is clear when they wrote:
"It has often been said and demonstrated that an
institution cannot be explained by its use, any more
than an organ can. Biological formations and social
formations are not formed in the same way in which
they function. Nor is there a biological,
sociological, linguistic, etc., functionalism of
large determinate aggregates (des grands ensembles
specifices). But the same does not hold true in the
case of desiring-machines as molecular elements:
there, use, functioning, production, and formation
are one and the same process. And it is this
synthesis of desire that, under certain determinate
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conditions, explains the molar aggregates (les
ensembles molaires) with their specific use in a
biological, social, or linguistic field. This is
because the large molar machines presuppose pre-
established connections that are not explained by
their functioning, since the latter results from
them. Only desiring-machines produce connections
according to which they function, and function by
improvising and forming the connections." [Deleuze
and Guattari, 1972, 180-181]
For Deleuze and Guattari the theory of desire consists,
at its heart, of the realisation of 'desiring-production1
in specific desiring-machines or assemblages. A
particular desire can therefore be identified through the
assemblage that produces it. Deleuze and Guattari also
argue that for assemblages use, functioning and
production are all the same thing, their mode of work,
and so for Deleuze and Guattari the central guestion is
'how does it work', not 'what does it mean'. As Frank
remarks their work accordingly results in a "vision of
total functioning". [Frank, 1983, 167: Deleuze and
Guattari, 1972, 180-181 & 287-288: Donzelot, 1972]
Deleuze and Guattari recognise that functionalism is
inadequate for understanding 'large determinate
aggregates' however they exempt the molecular from this
failure because the molecular is the realm of lines of
flight and of creativity. But this amounts to ignoring
whether functionalism is a valid theory or not because it
is a necessary corollary of desiring-production. [Deleuze
and Guattari, 1972, 180-181] Rather than introducing some
consistency between their rejection of functionalism in
114
general and their endorsement of a functionalist theory
of desire, Deleuze and Guattari seem content to simply
announce that desire is functionalist and then to deflect
the accusation of functionalism by confining it to the
molecular level.
Deleuze and Guattari need to accept functionalism
because, logically, once they have bound functioning and
production together as the same thing if they then reject
functionalism they would have no other choice than to
also abandon their theory of desire as productive. For
Deleuze and Guattari desire incessantly makes new things
and its nature is thus totally encompassed by a process
of creativity and production. There is consequently no
way for Deleuze and Guattari to recognise manifestations
of desire, that is to recognise assemblages or lines of
flight, except by what they do or by their functions
because that is all assemblages are. For instance the
analysis of pirate radio as a line of flight in the
Autonomia-machine must focus on how the stations function
as part of the movement. Consequently, it is noted they
are an open forum for ideas, a communication channel for
meetings or a means of organising demonstrations.
Questions concerning the meaning of these activities are
irrelevant.
Deleuze and Guattari's functionalism has been largely
ignored in analyses of their work. However, Alberto
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Melucci touches on it indirectly in his criticism of
theories of 'marginality' and Autonomia.
Melucci has little sympathy with Autonomia or its
theorists because at a practical level he sees a strong
link with terrorism and at a theoretical level he finds
them functionalist. [Melucci, 1978a, 101-103 & 114-115]
He claims that theorists of Autonomia have adopted
marginality and deviance as the chief categories of their
politics. He notes that such an analysis moves 'wildcat'
actions to the centre of attention as the paradigm of new
forms of struggle. Homages to Marxism usually accompany
these analyses but, Melucci claims, as a fig leaf to
cover an 'extremist functionalism':
"Marginality and deviance are concepts that make
sense only in a theoretical framework that assumes
consensus to be the condition of integration of the
system, and avoids problems of power, of conflict,
and of class relations." [Melucci, 1978a, 101]
Melucci notes the glorification by some leftists of a
riot led by fascists in Reggio Calabria as an example of
the inability of a functionalist analysis of deviance to
identify progressive struggles from just any form of
struggle. The functioning of a riot, that is the events
that make up a riot, is the same whether it is led by
left or right and so issues of this particular riot's
meaning were ignored by some leftists even though it was
lead by neo-fascists. [Melucci, 1978a, 103] Melucci
counterposes to functionalism the need to rediscover the
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antagonistic conflicts of Italian society by reanalysing
'the mode of production of society' in order to identify
the new conflicts over control of production.
Melucci's criticisms are undoubtedly mistaken in relation
to several theoreticians of Autonomia, who have in fact
undertaken the analyses he recommends. [Bologna, 1977:
Bifo, 1980: Negri, 1978: Negri, 1989] However, his
criticisms seem appropriate to Deleuze and Guattari on
two grounds, functionalism, as has already been
discussed, and the failure to be able to identify 'good'
struggles from 'bad'.
Good and Bad Politics.
The second criticism of Deleuze and Guattari is that
their theory cannot differentiate 'good' and 'bad' forms
of politics. Deleuze's analysis of the logic used by the
investigating judges in Autonomist Toni Negri's trial is
emblematic of this.
Negri was one of the group of leading activists and
theoreticians of Autonomia who were arrested in nineteen
seventy-nine and accused of being the controlling council
of the Red Brigades. He was specifically accused of
phoning Aldo Moro's family on behalf of the Brigades
after Moro was kidnapped and of armed insurrection
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against the state.5 A month after Negri's arrest Deleuze
wrote an open letter to his judges, which was published
in the newspaper La Repubblica, and in which he raised
"two principles that vitally concern all responsible
democrats." [Deleuze, 1979, 182]
The first principle was that in a trial both the accused
and the substance of the charge must be identified
clearly and the content of the charge must be non-
contradictory. Deleuze argued that charges should
therefore 'contain a minimum of identifiable consistency
and must not be vague or general' and that this principle
had been broken in Negri's case. For example, the
committal warrant recapitulated the events of the Moro
kidnapping, at which Negri was not accused of being
present, and invoked Negri's writings and ideas. Deleuze
argued that warrant therefore "leaps from ideas to
whatever events suit the prosecution case". [Deleuze,
1979, 183]
Deleuze's second principle was that committal hearings
must conform to a certain principle of disjunction and
exclusion, so that either A or B can be true, if B then
5 Negri was eventually jailed for 30 years, reduced to 12
on appeal, for 'armed insurrection against the State'
with the charge of direct complicity in Moro's kidnapping
and death dropped. He was released when elected as a
Radical candidate for Parliament and fled to exile in
France when it appeared he would be re-arrested after
further accusations. [Moulier, 1989, 37-38, note 21:
Willan, 1991, 182-190: O'Hara, 1992]
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not-A and so on. This principle was also broken by the
judges because they prevented contradictory elements from
cancelling each other out and instead allowed them to
accumulate. For example, it was thought that the phone
call to Moro's family from the Brigades was made from
Rome, but if Negri was in Paris when the call was made
then Negri is not exonerated but the origin of the call
is switched to Paris. [Deleuze, 1979, 183]
Deleuze's criticisms certainly seem relevant to any
responsible democrat, however the judges behaviour also
seems full of desiring-production because they allow no
block to stop their flow of accusatory creativity. If
Negri is in Paris and the call is from Rome then the
judges seem to say 'so what' and these alternatives are
merely accumulated in the desire to make the judicial-
machine produce the desired conviction. It is not that
Deleuze's criticisms are misguided because if anyone
should be committed to the principles of a democratic
judiciary investigating judges in a democracy should be
and Deleuze is therefore pointing out contradictions in
their commitments and not necessarily in his own. The
problem for Deleuze and Guattari's work is simply that
what appears to be genuinely creative behaviour, of the
sort declared by them to be inherently liberatory, is
clearly unpalatable and there seems little in their
theory to support such a distaste. After all it is
Deleuze and Guattari who recommend taking an existing
119
molar line and making it flow and Negri's judges seemed
to be making the segmented and pre-defined codes of the
judiciary flow in new and creative ways. [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1972, 379-380]
A similar problem is posed by Sylvere Lotringer and Chris
Marazzi who recognised a deleuzoguattarian attitude in
the functioning of the whole of the Italian state in its
attitude to Autonomia:
The Italian State has moved onto its adversary's
territory; it has simulated the fluidity
characteristic of Autonomy. A 'pilot' decision
rendered September 21, 1979, in the trial of Luigi
Rosati, ex-husband of the Brigadist Adriana Ferrand
and ideologue of Autonomia Operaio, described
Autonomy as 'an indefinable mixture of groups and
varied tendencies, a veritable mosaic made of
different fragments, a gallery of overlapping
images, of circles and collectives without any
central organisation.' This definition echoes in
every respect the logic deployed by the prosecution
against Autonomy" [Lotringer and Marazzi, 1980a, 18-
19]
Lotringer and Marazzi go on to point out that the state
was not the same as Autonomy because the state became a
desiring-machine only in order to grasp another desiring-
machine, Autonomia itself, and to reinscribe Autonomia
within state logic, by making it coincide with the Red
Brigades. The state would in this way block Autonomia's
creativity. Lotringer and Marazzi wrote:
"The logical delirium of the State projects the
mosaic of Autonomy upon the rigid screen of the Red
Brigades." [Lotringer and Marazzi, 1980a, 20]
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Lotringer and Marazzi argue that the state apes Autonomia
and turns itself into a desiring-machine in order to take
hold of Autonomia and force it to coincide with the Red
Brigades. Once this is achieved by, for example, accusing
Negri of being a member of the controlling council of the
Brigades, then the state can block Autonomia and
dismantle it as a desiring-machine by, for example,
imprisoning Negri. Lotringer and Marazzi therefore
distinguish the politically correct creativity of
Autonomia from the politically incorrect creativity of
the state by arguing that the state's creativity aimed to
create blockages while Autonomia's sought greater
productivity.
Deleuze and Guattari directly address the possibility of
lines of flight being set in motion by the state and they
develop a similar position to Lotringer and Marazzi.
Deleuze and Guattari claim the state is able to become a
war-machine and to create lines of flight, but only in
order to turn those lines of flight into molar lines and
weave more striated space. The state can thus produce
genuinely creative lines of flight but only in order to
weave them into blockages. For example, Negri's judges
only functioned creatively in order to block him through
imprisonment. The striated space of the judicial system
flowed but only in order to weave molar lines around a
creative thinker.[Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 351-380]
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However, this means that Deleuze and Guattari
differentiate lines of flight created by the state from
those created by the war-machine because state lines of
flight are made to stop being lines of flight. In effect,
Deleuze and Guattari differentiate state from non-state
lines of flight when state lines are no longer lines of
flight but this still leaves the difficulty of lines of
flight created by the state before these lines become
blocked. Deleuze and Guattari offer no means of rejecting
these state lines of flight and therefore have problems
in defining politically 'good' and 'bad' lines of flight.
They conseguently have no theoretical basis for rejecting
the judge's behaviour in Negri's case or the state's
behaviour as identified by Lotringer and Marazzi as long
as this behaviour remains creative. To be consistent it
appears that Deleuze and Guattari should applaud the
judge's creativity in obtaining a conviction but condemn
the transformation to imprisonment. [Hans, 1981, 62-63]
The problem of distinguishing 'good' from 'bad' politics
is repeated by Deleuze and Guattari in their analysis of
capitalism. They argue that for capitalism to be
realised:
"there must be a whole integral of decoded flows, a
whole generalized conjunction that overspills and
overturns the preceding apparatuses ...Circulation
constitutes capital as a subjectivity commensurate
with society in its entirety. But this new social
subjectivity can form only to the extent that the
decoded flows overspill their conjunctions and
attain a level of decoding that the State
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apparatuses are no longer able to reclaim: on the
one hand, the flow of labour must no longer be
determined as slavery or serfdom but must become
naked and free labour; and on the other hand, wealth
must no longer be determined as money dealing,
merchant's or landed wealth, but must become pure
homogenous and independent capital." [Deleuze and
Guattari, 1980, 452]
For Deleuze and Guattari capitalism is set in flow by a
twin deterritorialisation which creates the two lines of
flight of labour and money. However, capitalism does not
stay as a pure deterritorialisation and instead
constitutes a 'general axiomatic of decoded flows'. That
is, the two lines of flight are recoded by the nation-
state, which intervenes to realise specific instances of
labour and money and so make up a particular axiomatic.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that for capitalism to be
realised in any particular instance it must have its two
free flows, labour and money, recoded by the state, even
though this may lead to further deterritorialisations on
the part of capital, for example in multinational
corporations which seek to evade the control of nation-
states. Deleuze and Guattari call the 'deepest law' of
capitalism that "it continually sets and then repels its
own limits, but in doing so gives rise to numerous flows
in all directions that escape its axiomatic." [Deleuze
and Guattari, 1980, 472 & 452-473] Or, as they put it in
Anti-Oedipus:
"One sometimes has the impression that the flows of
capital would willingly despatch themselves to the
moon if the capitalist State were not there to bring
them back to earth." [Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, 258]
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Deleuze and Guattari's theory of capitalism is remarkably
close to Lenin's in its positing of the state as the
executive branch of capitalism that promotes capitalism
but must also, at times, contest its excesses in order to
prevent its self-destruction. In addition, if the
reterritorialisations are carried out by the state and
capitalism continually seeks to evade these
territorialisations in order to flow, then Deleuze and
Guattari seem logically committed to a state-less
capitalism because they consider free flows of
productivity to be liberatory. This would make Deleuze
and Guattari's economic politics akin to monetarism
because a capitalism unencumbered by the state can be
expected to go to the moon in search of greater
creativity.
To the extent that capitalism creates lines of flight,
and Deleuze and Guattari certainly argue that it can do
that, capitalism carries out their revolutionary
political programme because, for Deleuze and Guattari,
the making real of desiring-production through
deterritorialisations and lines of flight is the
revolutionary process. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, 341 &
379-381] Jean Baudrillard has also noted the similarity
between capitalism and the demand to continually produce
difference. He wrote:
"This constraint of liquidity, of flow, of the
accelerated circulation of the psychic, the sexual
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and of bodies, is the exact replica of what governs
commodity value; capital must circulate, it must no
longer have gravity or any fixed point"
[Baudrillard, 1977, 195]
It seems clear that Deleuze and Guattari have no means of
distinguishing 'good' from 'bad' forms of creativity,
either in relation to Negri's judges, the Italian state
or capitalism. This shortcoming stems from their complete
allegiance to the creation of difference, which excludes
allegiance to any political values but the creation of
difference. For Deleuze and Guattari all that matters is
whether a line of flight can be created, not what that
line might mean and so the allegiance to creativity
overtakes all other considerations.
The Indifference of Difference.
The left's collective memory pointed to the possibility
of a left based on the affirmation of many different
oppressions and Deleuze and Guattari have been
investigated in detail because they can be interpreted as
an example of such a theory of liberation. However, two
serious problems have emerged. The first is functionalism
and the second is an inability to differentiate politics
except through the creation of difference.
The second problem is particularly important because it
not only allows capitalism and certain operations of the
state to be considered revolutionary, but it also implies
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that all the different forms of post-sixties anti-
oppression movements should be judged by the one standard
of difference creation. That is, if being revolutionary
is defined by a politic's ability to create lines of
flight, then only that ability to produce difference is
fundamentally politically relevant. Paradoxically,
Deleuze and Guattari develop a politics that is
unconcerned with differences between anti-oppression
movements except in relation to their ability to produce
difference. Difference in Deleuze and Guattari leads to
indifference.
The general significance of the problems of functionalism
and political indifference for theories of difference
will be considered in chapter six. However, before that
an investigation of a second theory of difference, that
of Lyotard1s, will be undertaken. It will accordingly be
possible to see if Lyotard's theory is more successful
than Deleuze and Guattari's and so avoids the pit-falls
of functionalism and an indifference to everything but
the creation of difference.
126
Chapter Five: A Logic of Difference; Jean-Francois
Lvotard.
Lyotard's History and the Left's History.
Jean-Francois Lyotard's intellectual and political career
mirrors the left's collective memory because it passes
from an allegiance to Marxism to an exploration of post-
Marxist liberatory politics. Lyotard's commitment to
Marxism was made in the early nineteen fifties, when he
taught in Algeria and witnessed the Algerian struggle for
independence. In 1954, back in France, he joined the
group Socialisme ou Barbarie whose Marxism was already
guestioning the dominant Leninist and Trotskyist
interpretations of Marx. In 1964 Socialisme ou Barbarie
split over a set of theses which asked whether Marx's
analysis of capitalism had become irrelevant to a changed
world. Lyotard, despite his affinities for the theses,
joined the more traditional Marxist off-shoot of
Socialisme ou Barbarie called Pouvoir Ouvrier. However,
in 1966 he resigned from Pouvoir Ouvrier and began a
reassessment of Marxism and his own thought prompted, he
later wrote, by the question:
"What if Marxism itself were in its turn one of
those particular universals which it was not even a
question of going beyond...but which it was at the
time at least a question of refuting in its claim to
absolute universality, all the while according it a
value in its own order ?" [Lyotard, 1982a, 50]
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Lyotard's reassessment of his thought was then fuelled by
the insurrectionary events of May nineteen sixty-eight in
France and accelerated by the subsequent emergence of
different forms of anti-oppression struggles. His post-
sixty eight work then falls roughly into two phases.
[Carroll, 1987, 210-211, footnote 6] From the early to
mid-seventies he addressed the disruptive power of desire
in such books as Discours, figure and Economie Libidinal.
Here Lyotard sought the answers to his difficulties in a
connection between Marx and Freud. However, later in the
seventies, Lyotard's work began its second phase and took
a 'linguistic' turn which rejected desire as the oasis
for a renewed liberatory politics. [Bennington, 1988, 1 &
113: Veerman, 1988] After this Lyotard began to explore
the possibility of basing justice and politics on
difference. In this phase he made an important
contribution to the debate around postmodernism in his
book The Postmodern Condition, published in nineteen
seventy-nine, and explored the nature of justice in the
co-authored Just Gaming, also published in nineteen
seventy-nine. These two books laid the groundwork for the
systematic exposition of his views on the nature of
thought and politics in the wake of the sixties, which
was published in nineteen eighty-three in The Differend.
[Lyotard, 1979: Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979: Lyotard,
1983b: Lyotard, 1982a: Lyotard, 1988: Bennington, 1988,
2: Readings, 1991]
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Lyotard's intellectual career encapsulates the
disillusionment with Marxism and the subsequent need to
redefine politics which makes up the left's collective
memory and so it is his work of the late seventies and
eighties, which offers his understanding of post-marxist
politics and the role of difference and creativity in
that politics, which will be analysed here. As already
noted, this work is contained in the three books The
Postmodern Condition, Just Gaming and The Differend, all
of which will be explored in this chapter, and develops a
politics based on difference.
Expositions: The Postmodern Condition1
The Postmodern Condition was written at the request of
the University Council of the government of Quebec, as a
report on the condition of knowledge in the highly
developed countries. [Lyotard, 1979, xxiii-xxv] For this
report Lyotard took as his working hypothesis the idea,
first, that the status of knowledge has altered as
economies enter the postindustrial age and culture enters
the postmodern and, second, the belief that through the
computerisation of society knowledge has become the
principle force for production while simultaneously being
itself transformed into a commodity. Knowledge in the
1 Lyotard has offered several meanings for the word
postmodern. This section will be solely concerned with
establishing what Lyotard means by it in The Postmodern
Condition. Other definitions by him can be found in
Lyotard, 1982b, 1982c and 1986.
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postmodern age has become external to the knower, in the
sense that it will no longer be part of the 'training of
minds' but will be bought and sold on the principles of
exchange and value. [Lyotard, 1979, 1-6]
Lyotard is not concerned to establish this hypothesis
empirically but takes it as the starting point for a
philosophical analysis. To conduct this analysis he
develops a method which is based on Wittgenstein's view
of language games. He summarises Wittgenstein's view as:
"each of the various categories of utterances [such
as a question, a promise and so on] can be defined
in terms of rules specifying their properties and
the uses to which they can be put- in exactly the
same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of
rules determining the properties of each of the
pieces, in other words, the proper way to move
them." [Lyotard, 1979, 10; Brackets added]2
Lyotard summarises this method in two principles. First,
that 'speech acts fall within the domain of a general
agonistics' or a field of play. To formulate a speech act
or make an utterance is to make a move in a game. Second,
he states that the 'observable social bond' is made up of
these moves in the possible fields of language games.
[Lyotard, 1979, 10-11] Lyotard also makes three
observations concerning his method. First, the rules of
2 Lyotard's interpretations of other authors' work is
notoriously idiosyncratic and he has been accused of
being 'wild' and 'impious' in his readings. In this
analysis no attempt has been made to compare Lyotard's
readings with original work, as the aim is to summarise
Lyotard's thought whatever its source. [Lyotard, 1984,
18-19]
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these language games do not legitimate themselves but are
the subject of a contract between players, though this
does not necessarily mean that the players make up the
rules. Second, if there are no rules there is no game and
any change in the rules changes the nature of the game.
Last, he reiterates that any utterance should be
considered a move in a game. [Lyotard, 1979, 10]
Lyotard gives the example of a university dean or rector
who makes the utterance "the university is open" at a
convocation. The utterance has an addressor, the rector,
an addressee, the audience at the convocation and more
widely anyone concerned with the university, and a
referent, the university and its openness. He notes that
this utterance is part of the particular language game
called the performative, where the effect of an utterance
coincides with its enunciation. That is, the utterance is
performative because the university is open when the
rector pronounces it open in the correct circumstances.
By making his utterance the rector thus makes a move in a
particular language game and so constructs part of the
social bond. [Lyotard, 1979, 9]
Lyotard next makes a point concerning the nature of
knowledge by stating that knowledge is not just a set of
statements which 'denote or describe objects that may be
declared true or false', but also involves questions of
technical efficiency, justice or happiness, beauty and so
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on. That is, knowledge is the way language games are
organised to produce or define not just what is true and
false, but also what is ethical or just, how beauty is
grasped and so on. [Lyotard, 1979, 18-19 & 26] Lyotard
then outlines the 'pragmatics' of two forms of knowledge,
narrative and scientific, in order to compare them.
Narrative knowledge, Lyotard claims all anthropologists
and ethnologists agree, is the 'preeminent form in the
formulation of traditional knowledge' and he highlights
five aspects of it. First, narratives allow the society
in which they are told to define its criteria of
competence and the ways in which this criteria can be
evaluated. This is done through the successes or failures
that greet a hero's adventures that are recounted in a
narrative. Telling a story confers legitimacy on certain
social institutions and on positive and negative role
models. [Lyotard, 1979, 19-20]
Second, each narrative contains a wide variety of
language games which are held together by the unified
viewpoint of a particular narrative. In the course of a
story different language games, such as interrogatives
(like the sphinx's riddle), denotatives (like the state
of flora or fauna in areas or seasons), evaluatives and
so on, can all be offered up to listeners on the basis of
the unity the narrative stories offer. [Lyotard, 1979,
20]
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Third, there are certain rules which define the
transmission of the narrative. There are three narrative
'posts', addressor, addressee and hero or referent, and
these three posts are organised so that the right to be
an addressor is based on having been both an addressee
and a referent. That is, the right to tell a story is
based on having listened to a story and having been told
of in a story. In this way a narrative defines the three¬
fold competence of know-how, knowing-how-to-speak and
knowing-how-to-hear, which together constitute the
pragmatic rules which make up the social bond of a
community. [Lyotard, 1979, 20-21]
Fourth, narratives have a rhythm which combines accent
and time in a way that, as metre takes precedent over
accent and all accents are consequently reduced to an
equal, monotonous repetition, moves the telling of
narratives beyond time. Lyotard calls this a 'lethal
function' of narrative knowledge because it kills time.
He also notes that it knits the previous three functions
of narrative knowledge together by moving narrative
stories, and so also the social bond that these
narratives construct, outside of time. Once outside of
memory and time stories can refer simultaneously to the
present and the past. [Lyotard, 1979, 21-22]
Last, Lyotard claims that narratives are incommensurable
with the language game played by the modern West. He
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argues that the West establishes the legitimacy of
knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, through an
inguiry but a narrative's legitimacy comes from itself,
because in being told a narrative defines the rules which
form the social bond. Cultures based on narrative
knowledge have no need for legitimation external to the
narrative because narratives are self-legitimating.
[Lyotard, 1979, 22-23]
Scientific knowledge is a different matter to narrative
and Lyotard describes it in three basic principles.
First, the addressor is required to tell the addressee
the truth about the referent of a statement. Truth is
here understood as the twin ability to offer a proof and
to refute any alternative view. Second, the addressee
must be able to validly give or withhold his or her
assent to a statement, which implies that the addressee
must be a possible addressor because the addressee's
assent is based on the same requirement of truth that the
addressor must satisfy to tell a truth. Scientific
statements are addressed to other scientists and not to
all members of society. Last, the way the statement
'expresses' the referent must be in accordance with what
the referent actually is or, put another way, a
scientific statement must accord with reality.
The last of Lyotard's three principles raises a problem
for scientific knowledge because a statement that
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endorses a statement of reality can only be expressed in
the same form as the original statement, which means that
the two statements are of equal legitimacy and so one
cannot authorise the other. This means there is no proof
of the proof of reality and so the third principle of
scientific knowledge produces a legitimation problem.
[Lyotard, 1979, 23-24] Lyotard complicates this problem
by noting that science's recurrent demand for truth makes
contentment with any form of legitimation inherently
unstable. Lyotard argues that though legitimation can be
settled by procedures, such as the consensus of all
possible addressors, any legitimating procedures can also
be destabilised by the requirement of science's language
game that it form truthful statements, because scientists
will eventually have to ask whether the legitimation is
true and if so what proves that it is true. At this point
science's inability to prove its proofs will recur.
[Lyotard, 1979, 27-31]
Scientific and narrative knowledge diverge on many points
and Lyotard notes five. First, while narratives involve
all language games science requires only one, the
denotative which governs statements like 'this is an x'.3
Second, science establishes itself outside of language
games that form a social bond because scientific
3 Lyotard says of this use of 'denotation' that
"'Denotation' corresponds here to 'description' in the
classical use of logicians." [Lyotard, 1979, 88, footnote
29 ]
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statements are addressed between scientists and not to
the whole of society. Third, the referent in a scientific
statement is external to the nature of the addressor or
addressee of the statement. That is, the nature of a
scientist's statement is independent of the nature of the
scientist, unlike in narratives where the nature of the
addressor and statement are intertwined. Fourth,
scientific statements are only valid if they are
currently verifiable, unlike narrative statements that
may be continually retold. Science has a memory and a
chronology where narrative is timeless. Last, whereas
narrative knowledge can tolerate scientific knowledge,
because narrative can treat science as just another
variant of the 'family of narrative cultures', science
cannot tolerate narrative because narrative knowledge is
not legitimated according to scientific criteria. Science
sees narratives as fables unfit for mature societies
because they cannot be scientifically legitimated.
[Lyotard, 1979, 25-27]
Lyotard then argues that despite these differences
science has for a long time solved its ongoing problem of
legitimation by recourse to narratives. Lyotard notes
that even if this marriage is a strange one:
"It is not inconceivable that the recourse to
narrative is inevitable, at least to the extent that
the language game of science desires its statements
to be true but does not have the resources to
legitimate their truth on its own." [Lyotard, 1979,
27 ]
The narratives which answer science's legitimation
problems are called by Lyotard the meta-narratives of
Western civilisation. He claims they sprang up in
movements, such as the Renaissance or the Enlightenment,
which were legitimating the bourgeois classes newly
gained social authority and he details two of them; the
dialectic of the Spirit and the emancipation of humanity.
[Lyotard, 1979, 27-30: Lacoue-Labarthe, 1982, 27-34]
Lyotard traces the dialectic of the Spirit to the
founding of Berlin University after eighteen seven and
claims that it validates a notion of 'knowledge for its
own sake'. A universal subject that is actualised by
learning and which grounds both the legitimacy of
knowledge and social institutions is posited. Knowledge
can then be legitimated by its contribution to the
development of this universal subject, also called the
Spirit. [Lyotard, 1979, 32-35]
The second meta-narrative posits not a universal, ideal
subject but a practical one, humanity. The narrative
story here consists of the emancipation of this subject
from whatever prevents it liberating itself. This meta-
narrative assumes that the laws that humanity makes to
govern itself are just because the people who make the
laws are subject to them. Lyotard gives the example of
Napoleon's reforms to higher education which were aimed
at training people to run the state so that the whole
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nation would gain its freedom through the state-sponsored
spread of education. Under Napoleon education was thus
legitimised by its ability to free the people.
Ultimately, legitimacy in this meta-narrative is gained
from serving the goals of the collective. [Lyotard, 1979,
31-32 & 35-36]
Lyotard states that the appeal to meta-narratives such as
the dialectic of the Spirit or the emancipation of
humanity for legitimation is characteristic of the modern
age and that the postmodern age is initiated by
incredulity toward meta-narratives. [Lyotard, 1979,
xxiii-xxiv] He remarks that this change from modern to
postmodern came from two sources.
First, there has been the effect of both post-Second
World War technology, which has shifted emphasis from the
ends of action to its means, and the capitalist
prosperity of this same period, which has 'valorised the
individual enjoyment of goods'. Second, meta-narratives
contain the seeds of their own destruction. For example,
the narrative of the dialectic of the Spirit is damaged
by science turning its own need for truth against the
dialectic, which results in a failure to legitimate the
'Spirit'. Put another way, science cannot prove to its
own satisfaction the existence of the universal subject
that the dialectic of the spirit uses to legitimates
science. Science also criticises the meta-narrative of
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the emancipation by pointing out there is no guarantee of
the connection between the descriptive statements of
science and the prescriptive statements of humanity.
Lyotard claims that the meta-narrative of humanity is
destroyed without the passage from the descriptive (an
'is'), to the prescriptive (an 'ought'), because there is
no reason to connect descriptives like 'humans are by
nature free animals' to prescriptives, such as laws to
safeguard that freedom, any more than there is a
relationship of consequence between the statements 'the
door is closed' and 'open the door'. [Lyotard, 1979, 37-
41]
Lyotard has now reached his intended target, the nature
of knowledge in the postmodern age. According to Lyotard
postmodern knowledge disbelieves meta-narratives and so
also disbelieves the major forms of legitimation for
knowledge that have existed in Western society. Lyotard
is then led to consider the nature of legitimation in
postmodern knowledge.4 Lyotard first examines
legitimation by 'performativity', which is the form of
legitimation that results from the introduction of
capitalism to both science and technology.
4 At this point Lyotard also quickly rejects the
Habermasian project of legitimation through a consensus
achieved by communication by claiming that it is
dependent on the meta-narrative of the emancipation of
humanity. [Lyotard, 1979, 60-61 & 65-66: Lyotard, 1982b
71-73]
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Lyotard notes that wealth must be invested in research in
order to produce new technology, but that once new
technology is produced and applied to the system of
production it can optimise the efficiency of the task and
so optimise the surplus-value obtained from production.
Once this surplus-value is sold by selling the product
some of it can be reinvested in new research and so
"science becomes a force of production, in other words, a
moment in the circulation of capital." [Lyotard, 1979, 45
& 44-46 ]5
Lyotard claims that science legitimated by performativity
is involved in a form of self-legitimation, in the sense
that science is legitimated by its efficiency in
production but what science produces is still scientific
knowledge made according to the rules of the scientific
language game. Science produces greater efficiency by
producing more technically useful scientific proofs and
this greater production of scientific proofs is
legitimated by economic demands. Science legitimated
through performativity is thus a form of postmodern
knowledge because it does not refer to a meta-narrative.
However, Lyotard also notes problems with legitimation
through performativity. [Lyotard, 1979, 47]
5 According to Lyotard, performance should be understood
as an input/output equation which seeks to maximise the
output that can be gained from the input.
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Performativity assumes determinism, that is it assumes
there is a stable system in which the output can be
determined from the input and Lyotard argues that this
hypothesis has been undermined in two ways. First, the
language game of science does not seek such stability but
continually seeks to invent counterexamples to existing
proofs and then to develop 'new rules in the game of
reasoning'. Second, the nature of twentieth century
science itself limits the applicability of determinism.
For example, quantum mechanics and atomic physics deny
that a complete definition of the initial state of a
system is possible and without this definition
determinism in a system is uncertain. Alternatively,
quantum mechanics claims that precision is limited by the
nature of matter, in the sense that uncertainty and
accuracy can simultaneously increase. Lyotard also notes
that these problems are not confined to micro-physics.
[Lyotard, 1979, 53-59: Levy and Pierssens, 1983]
For these reasons Lyotard sees performativity as itself
delegitimated and so he outlines a second form of
postmodern knowledge.
"Postmodern science- by concerning itself with such
things as undecidables, the limits of precise
control, conflicts characterised by incomplete
information, 'fracta', catastrophes, and pragmatic
paradoxes- is theorising its own evolution as
discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and
paradoxical. It is changing the word knowledge,
while expressing how such a change can take place.
It is producing not the known but the unknown. And
it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing
to do with maximised performance, but has as its
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basis difference understood as paralogy." [Lyotard,
1979, 60]
Lyotard defines paralogy as the making of moves in a
language game and so claims that postmodern science can
be legitimated by the ability to make moves. He quotes
P.B.Medawar saying that "having ideas is the scientist's
highest accomplishment." [Lyotard, 1979, 60] Science's
role is thus to create difference, to make new ideas and,
in general, to practice proliferation rather than
performance. Legitimation by paralogy is also self-
legitimating because it answers the question 'how do we
prove our proofs' by turning back to its own language
game and stating that a proof of a proof is that a new
idea has been established. Legitimation accordingly
consists of the right to make moves or to play the game,
and proof of a legitimate move is that it has been made.
[Lyotard, 1979, 60-64]
"Science is a model of an 'open system', in which a
statement becomes relevant if it 'generates ideas',
that is, if it generates other statements and other
game rules." [Lyotard, 1979, 64]
Finally, in The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard asks what
the relevance of this vision of postmodern science is for
all forms of knowledge under the conditions of
postmodernity. He notes that though social language games
do not have the simplicity of scientific games, the
essentials of legitimation through paralogy are still
relevant and can be expressed through two principles
which establish the nature of postmodern language games.
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First, the heterogeneous nature of language games must be
recognised because there are no meta-narratives which can
legitimate one game over another. This means that the
only form of game that can be rejected is that of terror,
because this is the game that denies other games the
right to exist. Second, any consensus on the rules of a
game must be local, subject to agreement by its players
and subject to eventual cancellation, otherwise there
would be the ever present threat of terror. The
introduction of short term contracts reflects this
principle. For example, in the West there is an
increasing rejection of a single life-long relationship
between the sexes in favour of a series of short term
relationships or contracts. [Lyotard, 1979, 64-66]
Lyotard completes his report by returning to his original
hypothesis, that knowledge in the postmodern age has been
deeply affected by the computerisation of society,
because computers can be seen as the perfect tools for
both knowledge legitimated by performativity and
knowledge legitimated by the pure inventiveness of
paralogy. For performativity, computers could be the
perfect instrument to control and regulate the world
market. For example, computers have the ability to track
stock market changes around the world instantaneously or
to control a company's stock by the hour. For paralogy,
Lyotard notes that if people had free access to computer
data-banks then this could provide equal access to the
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knowledge in society, thereby enabling participation by
everyone in language games of perfect knowledge at any
given moment. [Lyotard, 1979, 67]
Several objections could and have been made to Lyotard's
report, not least of all by Lyotard himself. [Lyotard,
1986, 6; Bennington, 1988, 116-117] In the present
context the most important facet of his analysis is that
knowledge legitimated by paralogy is knowledge
legitimated by its ability to create difference or make
new moves in language games. Paralogy, or the creation of
difference, is the means of legitimating knowledge in
postmodern society because there are no meta-narratives
that can legitimate one language game over another.
Before analysing this vision the content of Just Gaming
and The Differend will also be summarised.
Expositions: Just Gaming.
Just Gaming takes the form of a dialogue that was
conducted on seven days over seven months between Lyotard
and Jean-Loup Thebaud, who was in nineteen seventy-nine
the editor of the French literary quarterly L'esprit. The
dialogue covers many topics but a central thread concerns
the nature of justice.
Justice first emerges in Just Gaming when Lyotard re¬
poses the disjunction between descriptive and
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prescriptive statements, that has already been noted in
The Postmodern Condition.
"I am struck by the fact that prescriptives, taken
seriously, are never grounded: one can never reach
the just by a conclusion. And particularly, that
which ought to be cannot be concluded from that
which is, the 'ought' from the 'is'." [Lyotard and
Thebaud, 1979, 17]
An 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is', Lyotard
argues, because they are different forms of statements.
Lyotard notes that descriptive statements concern
propositional logic and attempt to state the truth but
that prescriptive statements concern neither of these.
Any passage between the two is therefore 'properly
speaking unintelligible' and additional premises are
needed to move from one to the other. For example, the
description 'there are three million people unemployed'
and the prescription 'the government should create more
jobs' are not intelligibly connected unless a range of
premises, such as 'unemployment is bad' and 'unemployment
is the government's responsibility', are added. [Lyotard
and Thebaud, 1979, 19-22] Lyotard argues that politics
and justice are intertwined in this logical point
because, from Plato to Marx, the conviction that there is
a true being to society and that justice will reign when
society is brought to that true being, has dominated
western politics. [Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979, 23-24]
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Lyotard then warns that what can easily follow the
disconnection of prescriptives from descriptives is an
allegiance to a 'philosophy of opinion'. [Lyotard and
Thebaud, 1979, 73-74] He writes that the result of such a
disconnection could be that:
"one would reach the very simple position that what
is just in a collectivity of human beings at a given
moment, is that which has been convened as just.
But, locked in this frame, one loses all capacity to
make the slightest judgement about what ought to be
done....A rule by convention would require that one
accept, let's get to the bottom of things right
away, even Nazism. After all, since there was near
unanimity upon it, from where could one judge that
it was not just ?" [Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979, 74]
For Lyotard, the consequence of prescriptives being based
on themselves, and not a different language game, is that
politics may become a 'politics of opinion', where any
prescriptive may be accepted because all prescriptives
occur within the prescriptive language game and so there
are no means of judging between them. As Lyotard notes,
the reverse or 'bad' side of a politics which does not
derive its prescriptives from descriptives is a political
indifferentism. [Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979, 73-76 & 96]
Lyotard responds to this difficulty with Kant's Idea of a
suprasensible nature, which he interprets to mean that
all actions must be compatible with the survival of the
'totality of practical, reasonable beings'. Lyotard
reiterates that he has done with 'rational politics'
because the prescriptive cannot be derived from another
language game, but he also wishes to avoid the possible
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relativist consequences. He therefore proposes Kant's
Idea as a limit which does not itself advocate a positive
ethical vision but which restricts what is ethically
acceptable by rejecting any politics that would result in
the totality of practical, reasonable beings no longer
existing. [Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979, 75-79] Of Kant's
Idea Lyotard states:
"It is not even able to give us contents for
prescriptions, but just regulates our prescriptives,
that is, guides us in knowing what is just and what
is not just." [Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979, 77]
In summary, when the heterogeneity of the descriptive and
the prescriptive is generalised to all language games,
Lyotard becomes faced with the problem of political
relativism. That is, he is faced with the problem that
all language games are legitimate only within their own
game and so can never legislate for another game.
Language games must remain 'pure' but if they do so the
politics of opinion results. [Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979,
96-97] Kant's Idea here emerges as the claim that any
language game that does not respect this purity is
unjust, as it does not respect the heterogeneity of
language games and will not protect the totality of
reasonable beings. Kant's Idea establishes a limit which
can reject certain language games and accept others
thereby overcoming, to a certain extent, relativism.
Terror, defined as the prevention of a language game or
the liquidation of the Kantian community, thus becomes
the only form of politics that can be legitimately
opposed. [Lyotard and Thebaud, 1979, 91-92]
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Just Gaming thus reaches similar conclusions to The
Postmodern Condition. In each case Lyotard destroys a
form of legitimation and in its place discovers a
multiplicity of heterogeneous language games where only a
politics that does not respect this heterogeneity can be
barred. But Lyotard's thought is still haunted by a
political indifferentism among all the possible politics
that do not employ terror. That is, Lyotard seems to have
no means of answering the question, how can non-terrorist
politics be judged. The Postmodern Condition and Just
Gaming have created negative arguments but it is not
clear whether Lyotard could endorse any positive or
constructive politics. To examine Lyotard's systematic
politics his book, The Differend, needs to be analysed.
Expositions: The Differend.
The Differend is a book of a different quality to both
The Postmodern Condition and Just Gaming. It is long
where the others are short, it is detailed where the
others are sketchy and it is conclusive where the others
are speculative. Through these differences The Differend
attempts to live up to its claim to have achieved the
postmodern philosophy that the other two books merely
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call for. It is therefore important to outline the
philosophical system this book proposes.
Lyotard builds this system from the test of universal
doubt. He asks 'what cannot be doubted' and the answer
stems from his rejection, subsequent to The Postmodern
Condition and Just Gaming, of the terminology of language
games. He argues that this terminology suggests that
players are able to use language as a toolbox, by
implying that players choose a game and then play it.
Instead, Lyotard develops the term 'phrase', in order to
imply that people are situated by the phrase and not
vice-versa. [Lyotard, 1983b, 55: Lyotard, 1984, 17] The
'phrase' is also the answer to the Cartesian question
'what cannot be doubted' because to doubt involves making
a phrase. Lyotard wrote: "It does not result from the
phrase I doubt, that I am, merely that there has been a
phrase." [Lyotard, 1983b, 59] Put another way, the phrase
'the phrase escapes universal doubt' cannot be denied
without forming a phrase and so affirming it. For Lyotard
it is impossible for there to be no phrase. [Lyotard,
1983b, 65-67: Lyotard, 1986, 53-54]
A phrase is not a sentence or a proposition, for a wink
or a shrug of the shoulders can be a phrase, as can
exclamations such as 'whoops' and even silence. Using a
Greek myth as an example Lyotard wrote:
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"Back from Troy, Agammemnon has just entered the
palace of Atreus, leaving Cassandra, his captive
motionless in the chariot. Clytemnestra entreats her
to come in too. Frozen by her vision of the
impending crime, Cassandra neither hears nor
answers: "She bears herself like a wild creature
newly captured" (1063). The queen grows impatient:
"But if failing to understand our language, you do
not catch my meaning, then instead of speech, make
sign {phrase} with thy barbarian hand." -Silence as
a phrase. The expectant wait of the Is it happening
? as silence. Feelings as a phrase for what cannot
now be phrased." [Lyotard, 1983b, 70]
Another example, which will be used throughout this
chapter in order to provide clarity and continuity, can
be taken from the world of hard-boiled detective fiction.
A fictional detective might make the phrase 'you took it
!' to a woman and be met with a silence. The silence
might tell the detective, named Marlowe, what he needs to
know and so allow him to make a new phrase 'the silence
confirms she took it'. Such a silence from 'her' is also
a phrase that may be met with a spoken phrase, 'give it
here', a physical phrase in an attempt to search her for
'it' or another silent phrase as Marlowe, having
understood the first silent phrase, is left with his own
silence perhaps meaning 'she's got it, but what do I do
now ?'.
Lyotard next stresses that though the fact that a phrase
exists is certain, its content is not. He claims that it
is only the 'there is' of the phrase 'there is a phrase'
that is certain. The fact that a phrase happens is
certain, not what the phrase means. Lyotard then claims
that the 'there is' that is entailed by 'there is a
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phrase' is a universe made up of "what is signified, what
it is signified about, to whom and by whom it is
signified: a universe." For example, when Marlowe says
'you took it !' a universe of addressor ('Marlowe'),
addressee ('her'), referent ('it'), and sense (the
prescription tell me if you took something'), is
presented. [Lyotard, 1983b, 70] Accordingly, what is
indubitable for Lyotard is not 'the universe that is
presented' but the 'presentation of at least one
universe'. That is, that a universe is presented in a
phrase is certain, not the nature of a presented
universe. [Lyotard, 1983b, 70-72]
It is only 'at least' one universe that is certain
because any one or more of a universe's four components
could be equivocal. For example, if Marlowe were not sure
that she took it, he might find himself in more than one
universe. Marlowe makes his accusation, 'you took it I',
and then she is silent. The silence could be ambiguous to
Marlowe so that he forms the phrase,'she could have taken
it, but maybe the dwarf took it', and suddenly Marlowe
must deal with two universes depending on whether she or
the dwarf have 'it'. [Lyotard, 1983b, 13-14 & 69-71;
Bennington, 1988, 126]
A phrase is the presentation of a universe. This universe
is four part; sense, referent, addressor and addressee.
Lyotard also notes that the phrase situates each of its
151
four parts. It is not that a phrase is an instance passed
between two independent addresses but that in a phrase
the addressee and addressor are instances presented by
the phrase. The phrase does not presume a subject who
controls and enunciates it. [Lyotard, 1983b, 11: Lyotard,
1984, 17]
Having established both the indubitability of a phrase
and its nature as a universe, Lyotard also establishes
that there is more than one phrase. A phrase, as
Bennington puts it, "presents what it presents, but
cannot present that it presents what it present."
[Bennington, 1988, 126] A phrase is just the 'there is',
it is just the fact that a universe exists, which means
that the phrase does not itself tell us that its universe
exists. It is necessary for at least one other phrase to
link to a phrase in order for the first phrase to be
presented, otherwise it would not be known that the first
phrase existed. For example, Marlowe's phrase 'you took
it !' is only known because it is presented by the
phrases of the author of these detective novels, called
Chandler, or is used as an example by the author of this
thesis. If Chandler had not made the phrase which
presents the particular case of Marlowe's phrase, then
'you took it !' said by a detective to a woman about an
'it' and with the sense of a prescription, that is to say
a universe, would not have been presented and so it would
not have existed.
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"The presentation entailed by a phrase...is not
presented in the universe that this phrase
presents.... It is not situated. But another
phrase...can present it in another universe and
thereby situate it." [Lyotard, 1983b, 71]
"What is not presented is not. The presentation
entailed by a phrase is not presented, it is not:
Being is not." [Lyotard, 1983b, 77]
It is indubitable that there is a phrase and so it is
indubitable that there is a phrase that presents the
phrase, or else the first phrase would not exist because
it would not be presented. It is therefore indubitable
that there is more than one phrase and that these phrases
link. However, the way that phrases link to each other is
not determined, all that is certain is that they do link.
[Lyotard, 1983b, 29] For example, both Chandler and the
author of this analysis of Lyotard linked to Marlowe's
phrase and in the two different universes created by
Chandler's phrase and this author's phrase Marlowe's
phrase is different. In one the sense of 'you took it' is
that of a detective narrative and in the other it is an
example of the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard. In
short, different links to 'you took it' can occur, all
that is certain is that there must be a link to that
phrase or it would not exist. [Lyotard, 1983b, 66-80] The
way phrases link is Lyotard's next problem and he
isolates two systematic forms of linkage, phrase regimens
and genres of discourse.6
6 In the following regimens and genres will be
distinguished but Lyotard, though he stresses the
importance of keeping the two separate, is not always
rigorous and at times there seems to be confusion between
the two. For example he wrote "Between the phrases of
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Lyotard defines regimens and genres by noting there is a
difference between the rules of a game and the strategy
needed to play a game well. He then claims that regimens
are analogous to the rules of a game, whereas genres are
the strategy needed to play a game in a certain way.
[Lyotard, 1983b, 136-137]
Regimens link phrases together according to a set of
rules. For example Marlowe's phrase is part of the
prescriptive regimen because it was 'you took it !'
understood in the sense of 'you must tell me if you took
it' and so was formed according to the rules for
prescribing actions to others. In contrast, when the
following phrase of silence from her is understood as
'yes, I took it' it is ruled by the descriptive because
it is then formed according to the rules for describing a
situation. An important facet of phrase regimens is that
they are heterogeneous because regimens cannot be
translated into each other, just as the rules of chess
cannot be translated into those of tennis. [Lyotard,
1983b, xii, 123, 136-137: Bennington, 1988, 122-123]
Regimens link phrases according to heterogeneous sets of
rules but genres make links between phrases from
imagination on the one hand, the phrases of technical
effectuation on the other, and finally the phrases that
follow the rules of the economic genre, there is
heterogeneity. Capital subordinates the first two
regimens to the third." [Lyotard, 1983b, 175] In this
passage the economic appears confusingly as both a
regimen and a genre.
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heterogeneous regimens according to an end. Lyotard
argues that after a phrase is made it is inevitable that
another phrase will link to it, though which particular
phrase may come next is not inevitable. Genres influence
what phrase may come next and reduce which linkages are
possible by introducing an end toward which phrases are
influenced. [Lyotard, 1983b, 83-85 & 135-137]
"The idea of seduction needs to be extended. A genre
of discourse exerts a seduction upon a phrase
universe. It inclines the instances presented by
this phrase toward certain linkings, or at least it
steers them away from other linkings which are not
suitable with regard to the end pursued by this
genre. It is not the addressee who is seduced by the
addressor. The addressor, the referent, and the
sense are no less subject than the addressee to the
seduction exerted by what is at play in a genre of
discourse." [Lyotard, 1983b, 84]
For example, there is the phrase 'you took it !', in
which there is an addressor, Marlowe, an addressee, her,
a referent, it, and a sense, a prescriptive understood as
'tell me if you took it'. This universe is situated in
the genre of the detective novel which exerts an
influence and so makes certain linkings to Marlowe's
phrase more likely than others. For instance, a woman in
such a genre often exerts power by seduction rather than
physical force and so her silence is a phrase influenced
by the genre in the sense that it 'fits' with how a woman
in such a genre could be expected to act; that is, her
silence accords with the ends of the genre which assign
certain characteristics to women and men. If she had
linked to the universe of 'you took it!' by saying 'you
155
make a command to me, you are operating from the
prescriptive but I may link as I choose because phrase
regimens are heterogeneous and I choose to link with
cognitive phrases and analyse your genre', while
simultaneously brandishing a copy of Jean-Francois
Lyotard's The Differend, then this would have resisted
the teleology of the detective genre. In contrast, if the
genre was not the detective novel but literary criticism,
then the second 'Lyotardian' answer to 'you took it !'
might be appropriate to that genre's ends. [Rowson, 1990:
Symons, 1972: Lambert, 1975; Knight, 1980]
In genres some possible linkages are destroyed because
one linkage becomes a reality. For instance, 'she' did
not brandish a copy of The Differend but replied with a
guilty silence which, within the genre of the detective
novel, is easily read as a silent admission of a woman to
an accusation. This appropriate or 'seduced' linkage made
other linkages impossible, such as one where 'she' turns
out to be an alien and eats Marlowe, or another where
'she' turns out to be the superhero Wonder Woman and
lassos him, or as already noted when she is a student of
Lyotard. Lyotard noted of this destruction of possible
linkings that:
"'I can come by your place' allows many diverse
linkings, and if not all of them, then at least some
of them, stem from different genres of discourse.
The multiplicity of stakes, on a par with the
multiplicity of genres, turns every linkage into a
kind of 'victory' of one of them over the others.
These others remain neglected, forgotten, or
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repressed possibilities... there is only one phrase
'at a time' (a la fois). There are many possible
linkings (or genres) but only one actual or current
'time'" [Lyotard, 1983b, 136]
The 'kind of victory' Lyotard mentions occurs within
genres and is an example of what he calls a 'differend'.
A differend is when the judgement of a conflict is
conducted by rules which cannot recognise at least one
viewpoint to the conflict. In contrast, a litigation is
where both parties can be presented in the conflict.
[Lyotard, 1983b, 1-6] An example of a differend is given
by Bill Readings from the Werner Herzog film Where the
Green Ants Dream. In this film there is a character
called Mute, who is an Australian Aborigine who is
thought to be mute, but during a trial concerning
Aboriginal land rights Mute suddenly begins to speak and
the judge asks for a translation. The judge is then told
that Mute is the last of his tribe and no-one can
understand his language. Mute's claim to land rights in
this trial is therefore unpresentable, though the trial
will address Mute's claim, and this failure to allow Mute
representation forms a differend. [Readings, 1991, 123-4]
A second example is a labour court where a Marxist
interpretation of labour is not admissible. Accordingly a
Marxist inclined worker cannot have his or her claim
recognised in this court and so when the court rules in
relation to this worker a differend results. [Lyotard,
1983b, 10]
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As already noted a genre links together phrases that
serve its own end and so prevents other possible linkages
from occurring. In this way genres continually create
differends by seducing particular linkages which deny
other possible linkages. For example, it does not serve
the ends of the genre of the detective novel if 'she'
turns out to have superpowers and so the phrase which
would present that particular universe is pushed aside by
the genre's powers of seduction and a differend is
created.
"In the differend, something 'asks' to be put into
phrases, and suffers the wrong of not being able to
be put into phrases right away." [Lyotard, 1983b,
13]
Lyotard's system now faces the problem of how and where
such phrases meet in order to form differends because
phrases from heterogeneous regimens, strictly speaking,
never meet each other. Lyotard's answer is that phrases
meet through proper names. He claims that names are
'rigid designators' because they are rigid, the name is
always the same, and they designate something, though
what is designated may vary. A name is constituted by its
rigidity and the fact that it designates, not what it
designates. [Lyotard, 1983b, 32-41] For example,
'Marlowe' is rigid in that it is always the same but what
'Marlowe' designates is not certain. There is Marlowe the
hard-boiled detective or Marlowe the example of Lyotard1s
philosophy or Marlowe the sixteenth century English poet.
In addition, Lyotard notes that a relation between names
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can itself be given a name and he calls networks of names
and names of relations between names, a world. [Lyotard,
1983b, 40-50]
Lyotard can now argue that differends can occur because
heterogenous phrases meet in networks of proper names.
For example, a worker is known as such whether the labour
court sense or the Marxist sense of 'worker' is used, but
in front of the labour court or in front of a panel of
Marxists there is a differend because one party cannot
have its phrases presented. Similarly, Mute was known as
an aborigine and so could be present at a trial
concerning aboriginal land rights, but because his
particular form of aboriginality was incommunicable he
could not present his claim to the court and so a
differend resulted.
Lyotard's basic 'philosophy of phrases', as it is
presented in The Differend, consists of phrases which
present four-part universes each made up of addressor,
addressee, referent and sense. Phrases can be organised
according to the rules of phrase regimens, which are
themselves heterogeneous from each other. Phrases from
different regimens can be linked together according to
genres of discourse which provide an end toward which
phrases are seduced. Heterogeneous phrases are able to
meet because networks of names provide common reference
points which do not enforce a common 'sense' to the
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phrases which include them. Differends are formed in the
clash of heterogeneous phrases when one phrase cannot be
presented in the clash.
Lyotard also considers the form of politics that this
philosophy of phrases supports. He argues that the search
for some political authority which could control the
genres that make up society, by forming the language
moves that make up the social bond, forever runs into the
heterogeneity of phrases. [Lyotard, 1983b, 142]
"What politics is about and what distinguishes
various kinds of politics is the genre of discourse,
or the stakes, whereby differends are formulated as
litigations and find their 'regulation'. Whatever
genre this is, from the sole fact that it excludes
other genres, whether through interdiction (slaves
and women), through autonymic neutralization,
through narrative redemption, etc., it leaves a
'residue' of differends that are not regulated and
cannot be regulated within an idiom, a residue from
whence the civil war of 'language' can always
return, and indeed does return." [Lyotard, 1983b,
142 ]
Lyotard argues that politics concerns the different ends
and linkages that various genres form, while recognising
that there is no means of authorising one genre's end
over any other. Politics is the realm of genres and in
this realm, due to the heterogeneity of phrases, there is
no form of legitimation that can authorise one genre's
control of phrases over any other genre. [Lyotard, 1983b,
140-144]
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In addition, Lyotard claims there is a legitimate
responsibility related to preventing anyone from being
prevented from phrasing because to prevent anyone from
making phrases would exclude them from the political.
Political responsibility thus consists of defending the
right to make phrases, which means detecting differends
and trying to find phrases for those phrases that have
been prevented from being presented. Such attempts to
'present the unpresentable' are called by Lyotard the
sublime. [Lyotard, 1983b, 142]
The sublime is the feeling of wanting to be able to put
into phrases an idea or a totality but not being able to
do so, it is a mixed feeling of the pleasure of realising
the capacity to conceive ideas beyond any intuitive
presentation and the pain of not being able to put those
ideas fully into phrases. The sublime is the simultaneous
recognition of the limitations of thought and the
affirmation of thought's possibilities. The sublime is
political, in Lyotard's terms, because it affirms the
ability to make new or different phrases. [Lyotard,
1983b, 139 & 178: Bennington, 1988, 166: Carroll, 1984,
82-84]
The politics of the sublime developed by Lyotard can be
understood as two tier. The first tier is that of genres
where ends are created and social moves are made to
realise those ends, but where there is no hope of
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legitimating any one genre over another. As already noted
Lyotard calls this tier politics. The second tier is the
principle that anyone must have the right to phrase and
so the only genre that can legitimately be outlawed is
one that prevents people phrasing. Lyotard calls this
tier philosophy.
"One's responsibility before thought consists... in
detecting differends and in finding the (impossible)
idiom for phrasing them. This is what a philosopher
does." [Lyotard, 1983b, 142]
Philosophy's task is endless because genres, in the realm
of politics, always calls forth differends by preventing
some phrases from being presented. For Lyotard to play
politics is necessarily to commit injustices by creating
differends and to play philosophy is to ensure that the
injustices created by politics are uncovered.
The definitions of politics and philosophy derived from
the philosophy of phrases complete the exposition of the
essential system of The Differend and the political
implications that have been found are similar to those
derived from The Postmodern Condition and Just Gaming.
For all three, the only politics that can be completely
rejected is that of terror which prevents the right to
phrase, destroys the right to play language games or
prevents the existence of the totality of reasonable
beings. Otherwise all politics are egual, in the sense
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that there is no means of legitimating one non-terrorist
politics over the other.
Difference and Indifferentism.
To begin analysis of Lyotard's work it can be argued that
it yields the same problem of indifferentism that was
found in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Lyotard argues
there are no grounds, and can never be any grounds, for
one genre and the ends it pursues being legitimated over
another genre. This is guaranteed by the heterogeneity of
phrase regimens and is the condition of postmodern
politics. [Lyotard, 1982c, 178 ] By defining politics as
the way in which particular genres attach phrases from
heterogeneous regimens according to an end Lyotard
abandons the political to the 'politics of opinion'
because he abandons any possibility of judging between
genres. This abandonment is most obvious in Just Gaming,
where the effect of recognising the heterogeneity of the
descriptive from the prescriptive is a politics that at
one point seems unable to oppose even the Nazis, but it
is also clear in The Differend and The Postmodern
Condition.
In Just Gaming Lyotard attempts to save himself from
political relativism by inscribing politics within a
horizon determined by the Kantian Idea that any politics
must not prevent the continued existence of the 'totality
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of practical, reasonable beings'. Lyotard interprets Kant
into his own terminology as the right to play language
games, or later as the right to make phrases, and so he
sets an outer limit to politics and then, in The
Differend, gives philosophy the role of guarding it.
However, within this limit there is still political
indifferentism. In fact Lyotard makes clear in The
Differend that the limit is meant to impose such an
indifferentism by ensuring that the differends, the
unsaid phrases that genres inevitably throw up, are made
into phrases by philosophy. The unpresented phrases that
philosophy presents will then contradict the genres that
threw them up, because that is why the phrases went
unpresented in the first place. In short, philosophy's
role is to continually disrupt the political by
disrupting genres. In Lyotard a commitment to difference
results not only in being solely concerned with the right
to make differences, but also with the disruption of any
form of politics that does become established.
Lyotard thus reproduces the problem already called
indifferentism. Lyotard's conclusions do not, however,
result from a commitment to a theory of desire but from
his 'linguistic turn'. Once this turn is followed through
a second objection to Lyotard can be made, because the
philosophy of phrases is also idealist.
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Lyotard and Cartesianism.
Lyotard's path to The Differend began with the difficulty
he had expressing his disillusionment with Marxism. He
wrote that he was initially stupefied in his attempt to
articulate his differend with Marxism by the question
'what language could it be expressed in'. If he used
Marxist terms then this reintroduced what he wanted to
criticise, Marxism, and if he used non-Marxist terms then
the Marxists he wished to communicate with would reject
his claims. He was thus forced to consider the question
"according to what rules can we debate the rules to adopt
for debate ?" [Lyotard, 1982a, 52 & 52-54]
Lyotard was, at the outset of his quest for a new form of
politics, immediately directed to the forms of
legitimation of political debate. In The Differend he
offers an answer to the nature of the preconditions of
debate in the philosophy of phrases and the two tiers of
politics and philosophy. It has already been noted that
this philosophy leads to political indifferentism, but it
can also be shown that beginning from the Cartesian test
of universal doubt creates an idealist basis for the
philosophy of phrases. This can most clearly be done by
examining Lyotard's analysis in The Differend of the
historian Robert Faurisson's claim that it cannot be
proved that mass murders occurred in Auschwitz.
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Lyotard begins The Differend by analysing Faurisson's
argument that the Nazi 'Final Solution' cannot be proven
because Faurisson has not been able to find a single
person who was an eye witness to the operation of the gas
chambers. That is, Faurisson says the mass murders are
unproven because he has never found someone who witnessed
death occurring in the gas chambers. [Lyotard, 1983b, 1-
31] Lyotard explains Faurisson's logic in this way:
"To have 'really seen with his own eyes' a gas
chamber would be the condition which gives one the
authority to say that it exists and to persuade the
unbeliever. Yet it is still necessary to prove that
the gas chamber was used to kill at the time it was
seen. The only acceptable proof that it was used to
kill is that one died from it. But if one is dead,
one cannot testify that it is on account of the gas
chamber." [Lyotard, 1983b, 3]
A differend is where the victim is divested of the
ability to represent themselves in front of a tribunal
and Faurisson has established a tribunal, 'to really see
with his or her own eyes', which reduces the inmates of
concentration camps to silence and so creates a
differend. The only people who can fulfil Faurisson's
criteria would be dead, as that is the only authoritative
way to have witnessed the murders but because they are
dead they cannot testify and so the inmates are reduced
to silence as ineligible witnesses. The obvious question
to ask of this argument is, why does Faurisson's criteria
carry weight ? Lyotard argues:
"Why should there be less paranoia in denying the
existence of gas chambers than in affirming it ?
Because, writes Leibniz, 'nothing is simpler and
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easier than something'. The one who says there is
something is the plaintiff, it is up to him or her
to bring forth a demonstration, by means of well-
formed phrases and of procedures for establishing
the existence of their referent. Reality is always
the plaintiff's responsibility. For the defense, it
is sufficient to refute the argumentation and to
impugn the proof by counter-example. This is the
defense's advantage... it cannot be said that a
hypothesis is verified, but only that until further
notice it has not yet been falsified. The defence is
nihilistic, the prosecution pleads for existents
(l'etant). That is why it is up to the victims of
the extermination camps to prove that
extermination." [Lyotard, 1983b, 8-9]
Faurisson has the advantage of setting the criteria
because Leibniz's principle of simplicity delivers it to
him. Faurisson claims less than the victims of the camps,
he claims there were no camps, and this simpler reality
will stand until disproved by the proof of a more complex
reality.
In criticism of Lyotard it can be argued that he allows
Faurisson's statement priority as the defence only
because he reads Leibniz's principle in a manner which
decontextualises statements. Lyotard holds Faurisson's
statement to be simpler because it says 'not-p' where
others have for a long time said 'p'. For Lyotard, the
content of 'p' is irrelevant when deciding which
statement is simpler because he focuses on the logic of
Leibniz's principle. However there is an alternative to
Lyotard's interpretation, for a materialist or
contextualist version of the Leibnizian principle of
simplicity could claim that there is always a reality,
though it is not certain what form that reality takes,
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and therefore when a certain reality has become
established it is more complex to change that reality
than to leave it unchanged. In this case 'what is new' is
the plaintiff because what is established is simpler. On
this materialist principle of simplicity Faurisson, who
presents a case in the genre of history which goes
against over forty years of historical work, must prove
there were no gas chambers and cannot rely on the
privileges of defence. In addition, Faurisson would not
be being asked to prove a negative because there is a
body of historical evidence that he must confront and
disprove if he is to establish his case.
In each of the two interpretations of Leibniz's principle
there is an assumption made as to what 'nothing' and
'something' mean. Lyotard takes an abstract view which
assumes that the referent for 'nothing' can be a state
totally beyond any social or linguistic context and
therefore that any claim about such contexts will be a
'something'. The alternative version argues that, as
there is never a nothing outside of a social setting,
nothing must be understood as the currently accepted
reality and therefore 'something' is the claim that there
is a new reality different to the established one. The
difference between the idealist and contextualist
versions of nothing turns on the opposed assumptions that
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there can be phrases with no context or that phrases are
always in a context.7
The central point here is not to establish whether either
of these two forms of the Leibnizian principle are more
correct than the other, rather it is to locate Lyotard's
interpretation and the fact that it privileges the
abstract over the material or the contextual. In the
example of Faurisson and the differend of the deportees
Lyotard gives a decontextualised account because he bases
his analysis on the assumption that Faurisson's phrases
can exist outside of the genre of historical inguiry.
This is idealist because it removes Faurisson's phrases
from any context and deals with them in the abstract.
7 If Lyotard's version appears more intuitively correct
that is probably because the signifier 'nothing' seduces
its referent, through a proper name, toward the idealist
or Lyotardian sense. 'Nothing' in Lyotard's version is
taken to refer to the generally understood sense of
nothing, a null or a void, and so 'no gas ovens exist' is
a nothing against the something 'gas ovens exist'.
However, this move itself demonstrates the materialist
hypothesis that there is always a context because the
move can only be made by relying on the pre-existence of
a referent for the signifier 'nothing'. That is, the
meaning of 'nothing' as a null or void can be linked to
Leibniz's 'nothing', only if the referent 'null or void'
already exists. This referent forms a context in which
the meaning of 'nothing' can be seduced to 'null or
void'. What is paradoxical in this case is that the
referent of nothing denies that such referents as itself
exist. The materialist hypothesis may be counter¬
intuitive but it accepts that no word is contextless and
so what is simpler is not to change a context. In this
way Faurisson's positing of 'no gas ovens exist' must
take the responsibility to establish itself over the
existent, and therefore simpler, context of 'gas ovens
exist'.
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Lyotard's commitment to abstraction results from the test
of universal doubt because that test legitimates the
notion of phrases outside of any context. What is
indubitable for Lyotard is that a phrase exists and that
it links and not that phrases always exist in the context
of genres and regimens. For Lyotard a linkage is not
restrained or made impossible by the certainty of a pre-
existent genre but the certainty that a linkage must be
made makes genres and regimens possible. The test of
doubt leads to the privileging of the contextless phrase
and its contextless links over any context.
Another example of the primacy of the contextless or
abstract phrase is that, for Lyotard, every linking of
one particular phrase to another prevents other phrases
being linked, which produces differends and so is
responsible for the production of injustice in the
prevention of a phrase coming into being. What is here
given primacy is the abstract possibility of any linkage
over a context which might make only certain linkages
sensible. For example, it makes little sense to link to
Marlowe's phrase 'you took it !' with 'her' being
revealed as an alien and eating him, unless the linkage
occurs in a different genre to the detective novel.
However, Lyotard's view is that the failure of such alien
phrases to link, and so be presented, forms differends
which it is philosophy's responsibility to form.
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It is a form of linguistic idealism to base a philosophy
on the possibility that in any context any phrase or any
linkage between phrases is equally possible and sensible.
This idealism, which underpins the concern for
differends, amounts to a belief that phrases such as
having Philip Marlowe eaten by aliens or lassoed by
Wonder Woman on the mean streets of San Francisco must be
given equal status as possible linkages as 'her' silence.
Idealism and Indifferentism.
Analysis of Lyotard reveals his commitment to difference
in his commitment to the right to make phrases or play
language games above any other right. As with Deleuze and
Guattari, Lyotard becomes primarily concerned to protect
the right to create new differences and he thus develops
a vision where legitimate politics are non-terrorist but
there are no means of choosing between different non-
terrorist politics. For Lyotard, the only means of
choosing between forms of politics is with a line between
legitimate and non-legitimate that is drawn by the right
to create differences or, in Lyotard's terms, to make
phrases and play language games.
A second result of Lyotard's assertion of the rights of
difference creation is idealism. This idealism develops
from his concern to protect the creation of difference
because it stems from his assumption that all phrases are
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equally sensible no matter what their context, because
all different phrases have an equal riqht to exist. It is
the failure to locate phrases in a context that underpins
Lyotard's idealism.
The left's collective memory implies that a post-Marxist
left might be based on difference and so two distinct
theories of difference have been outlined and analysed.
To completely develop the implications of the left's
memory difference based theories now need to be
considered in general. The next chapter will examine the
relationship of a difference based left to the political
indifferentism and functionalism of Deleuze and Guattari
and the political indifferentism and idealism of
Lyotard's post-Marxist philosophy of phrases.
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Chapter Six: The Failures of Difference Based Politics.
Difference.
Theories of difference, like those of Lyotard's and
Deleuze and Guattari's, have had a political referent in
the emergence of new social movements. It is not that
difference based theories encapsulate these movements but
when such theories address politics they often endorse
post-sixties anti-oppression movements. For example,
Autonomia was theorised as the precursor of 'post-
political politics' by writers influenced by Deleuze and
Guattari. [Lotringer and Marazzi, 1980b] The rise since
the sixties of many different anti-oppression movements
and the rise of difference based theories are in this way
connected and, as the left's collective memory implies,
it is therefore possible to ask whether a left that
includes all the different post-sixties anti-oppression
movements should be a left based on difference.
The significance of difference based theories has so far
been examined by outlining and criticising Deleuze and
Guattari's theory of desire and Lyotard's philosophy of
phrases and general conclusions about a difference based
left can now be drawn from these critiques. Once this is
completed the two major paths that are implied by the
left's collective memory, value based or difference based
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politics, will have been explored and the implications of
the left's collective memory will be clear.
The Recall of Value.
Deleuze and Guattari's work develops a belief in
difference as liberatory through a theory of desire. The
key objection to this theory was its inability to support
any politics beyond those that promote creativity.
Deleuze and Guattari's politics consist of the injunction
to create lines of flight and the only form of politics
that their theory can reject thus becomes the blocking of
such lines. The particular values of any post-sixties
anti-oppression movements are thus irrelevant to Deleuze
and Guattari, all that matters is whether these movements
promote or block creativity.
A general issue for theories of difference is raised by
the analysis of Deleuze and Guattari; how can a theory
based on the right and necessity to differ and to keep
making difference have any politics other than the
protection and promotion of that right ? What is here
introduced as the shadow of difference based politics is
the nature of oppression and the possibility of a
politics that can say more than 'creativity must be
promoted'. The failure of Deleuze and Guattari's theory
to support even their own politics, notably in their
failure to distinguish capitalism from their theory,
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underlines this problem because that politics clearly-
opposed by the left may not also be opposed by a
difference based politics. The general problem raised by
analysing Deleuze and Guattari's work is that the
different values of post-sixties anti-oppression
movements could become irrelevant to a left based on
difference. This problem also implies that, if the left
is to include different anti-oppression movements, a
means of reintroducing the values of these movements is
needed. The failure of difference in Deleuze and Guattari
thus points to a reintroduction of value. Before
considering this possibility in general it will help to
examine whether problems identified in Lyotard's
difference based theory lead to similar conclusions.
Lyotard's work can be regarded as an emblem of the left's
collective memory because his intellectual career mirrors
the disillusionment with Marxism and the consequent
concern for political differences which centrally
constitutes that memory. What is interesting is that,
like Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard's work does not seem
to advance beyond a despair that there are no values
which can legitimate political movements in the wake of
Marxism's demise and the subsequent conclusion that
politics should celebrate the making of differences.
However, Lyotard also offers a distinct perspective to
Deleuze and Guattari on difference's failures by
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stressing the inherent instability of a difference based
politics. In his terms philosophy's role, as guardian of
the right to differentiate, is to detect any genre of
discourse that prevents a phrase coming into existence.
All linkages of phrases thus become not just the
development of a particular genre but also the failure to
develop a different genre and so all linkages must be
detected and disrupted by philosophy. According to
Lyotard, all theories and movements, by the mere fact
that they and not some alternative exist, prevent
differentiation and so should be disrupted.
Like Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard's work demonstrates
that a pure commitment to difference reproduces no
politics but the commitment to create difference. In
addition, his work shows that a commitment to
differentiation is an opposition to any stable genres of
politics because stability will restrain differentiation.
The results of analysing Deleuze and Guattari and
Lyotard thus argue that in a difference based left the
various oppressions that have emerged since the nineteen
sixties would have to be judged according to their
creativity and not according to struggles developed
around their own oppression. Consequently, the commitment
to difference made by Deleuze and Guattari and Lyotard
seems to call for the reintroduction of values in order




The central problem revealed in both Deleuze and Guattari
and Lyotard is that a politics of difference results in a
politics concerned with nothing but difference. This is
because all political differences are reduced to the one
concern with creating difference. All the particular
characteristics of post-sixties anti-oppression movements
would thus be irrelevant to a difference based left. In
order to develop this as a general conclusion, and to
bring the work of the previous five chapters to a
culmination, the shift of a politics from value to
difference will now be traced in two stages; first, in
the dissolution of value through the logic of exclusion
and inclusion and, second, in the establishment of
difference.
A politics based on unified values can be challenged
through the logic of exclusion and inclusion that was
outlined in chapter three. A political movement can then
recognise that its unified value has been oppressing some
social groups by excluding them from its liberatory
struggle. For example, socialism can be based on a
unified value derived from Marxism. This value could
define oppression as the extraction of surplus value from
workers by their employers combined with the
subordination of all other social relations to this
exploitation, as was discussed in chapter two. Socialism
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would thus have a unified set of values which could order
its theories and actions. However, this unity can be
challenged by oppressions that are excluded by Marxist
values. For instance, women may argue that their
oppression centres on the home and the reproduction of
life and not the factory and the production of
commodities. Or black liberation groups might argue that
they have developed political solidarities which cross
the division of worker and employer. In both these cases
a group that is excluded from socialist political action,
and conseguently from the socialist dream of liberation,
asserts this exclusion and so challenges the values on
which socialism is based.
The first stage to a politics based on difference is
opened through the realisation by an oppressed group that
its values oppress another oppressed group. It follows
that if the original group is attempting to be an anti-
oppression struggle then it must try to rid itself of the
oppressions that it creates. The first stage may continue
with the original group attempting to incorporate the
differences raised by the excluded and oppressed groups.
However, as noted in chapter three two complications can
arise. First, the multiplication of these differences can
appear to be endless as new and different exclusions
continually emerge. Second, contradictions between these
different oppressions can occur, making attempts to
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incorporate all oppressions into one movement effectively
like attempts to unite oppressor and oppressed.
For example, socialism may react to the challenges of
feminism and black liberation by trying to include them.
Several socialist groups have, at times, set up semi-
autonomous women's organisations and there have been
attempts to create a socialist-feminism that merges the
concerns of the two movements. Similarly, there have been
attempts to synthesise black liberation and socialism,
for instance in the work of the journal Race and Class.
However, these attempts establish the principle that it
is wrong for socialism to exclude groups that are
oppressed. It is then difficult to prevent any other
excluded and oppressed group from asserting a right to be
included within socialism. Groups oppressed by their
sexual preference, physical or mental disability or
locality can all demand that socialism expand itself to
include them and so expansion can begin to appear
endless.
A socialism that is being destabilised by expansion also
faces a second problem because excluded groups can
oppress each other. Conflict can break out as different
excluded groups attempt to form an allegiance to one
political movement and find themselves oppressed by other
groups who are forming a similar allegiance. For example,
feminism may have developed racist biases or black groups
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homophobic views and any attempt to merge feminism, black
liberation and gay and lesbian rights into socialism
would effectively be trying to unite oppressor and
oppressed within the one movement.
In the face of these problems a movement might simply
reassert its original value. For example, socialism could
simply return to it original view and reassert the
primacy of workers' exploitation. However, this would
also return socialism, or any movement, to the problems
which initiated attempts to include the excluded. An
alternative to resurrecting these problems would be for a
movement to initiate the second stage of the transition
to a politics of difference by questioning the need for a
basis in unified values.
The alternative to the inherent oppression of values
could then be posited as liberation created through
affirming the invention of many different forms of
politics. For example, rather than trying to harmonise
the various oppressions of excluded and included groups
according to Marxist values, socialism might become the
process of fostering all struggles against oppression.
The advantage of this change would be that socialism
would never again be an oppressor because it would be
based on the affirmation of all possible forms of anti-
oppression struggle. All definitions of oppression would
thus become part of the socialist struggle, that is if
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they contribute to the further creation of differences,
and so socialist liberation would aim to release all
oppressed groups from the categorisations or values that
oppress them.
If such changes were made then the homogenisation of
anti-oppression struggles according to their allegiance
to differentiation would be complete, because a
difference based anti-oppression movement would make its
goal the protection and promotion of differentiation.
Values would be seen as blocks to this process and so
would become not only lost to difference based politics
but actually the opposition that must be fought. For
example, the result of socialism realising that any
categorisation that it creates will be oppressive is not
just the loss of both its Marxist values and the
particular values of other anti-oppression movements, but
also means rejecting in principle any stable values
because these create categorisations that oppress.
Paradoxically, the result of basing a politics in
difference is a single struggle that judges all politics
by the same yardstick. There is no basis for the values
that informed feminism, black liberation or any other
anti-oppression movement within a difference based left
as these are exclusionary values. Instead, all forms of
politics become the politics of difference. A general
assessment of difference based politics thus leads to the
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conclusion that difference forms an indifferent politics,
which cannot distinguish between the various forms of
anti-oppression struggles. A politics based purely on
difference sees a single political world governed by
differentiation.
In addition, an allegiance to differentiation not only
homogenises all oppressions but might not even be able to
exclude some groups the left clearly think of as
oppressors. For example, in The Communist Manifesto Marx
and Engels made the bourgeoisie seem paragons of
differentiation.
"The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly
revolutionising the instruments of production, and
thereby the relations of production, and with them
the whole relations of society.... Constant
revolutionising of production, uninterrupted
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois
epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable
prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-
formed ones become antiquated before they can
ossify. All that is solid melts into air" [Marx and
Engels, 1848, 476]
It is true that Lyotard and Deleuze and Guattari are
opposed to capitalism and seek to show that it is not
compatible with their theories. However it has already
been argued that, at least, Deleuze and Guattari fail to
do this and, even if other attempts are more successful,
it seems clear from Marx and Engels' words that
capitalism's productivity exists as a shadow to
difference based theories which demonstrates that the
182
ability to create difference is not necessarily
liberatory. [Baudrillard, 1977, 193-196]
There are other objections to a difference based
politics. For example, functionalism has been found in
Deleuze and Guattari and idealism in Lyotard but, in
contrast to indifferentism, these criticisms may be
regarded as probable results of difference based
theories. That is, functionalism can arise as a means of
identifying what is new and idealism can be based on the
claim that all differences have an egual right to exist
and so both functionalism and idealism have a basis in
difference, but it is not clear they are necessary
results of difference. Nevertheless, despite these
propensities, what is centrally important to a political
assessment of difference is the homogenisation of all
different forms of politics according to their
productivity or creativity.
The failure of difference based politics lies in their
inherent need to homogenise all forms of politics around
the production of the new and so all the various post-
sixties anti-oppression movements become reduced to the
common denominator of difference. To the extent that
difference based politics rid themselves of unified
values, they become valueless and indifferent.
Consequently, though difference provides the basis for an
overall unified left, it does so at the price of the
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values that originally led anti-oppression movements to
challenge the left and seek their own liberation.
Difference does not carry forward feminism, black
liberation, socialism or any other anti-oppression
movement into a new left but instead transforms them into
the same struggle, the struggle to differentiate.
The Failure of Difference.
The analysis of difference based politics argues that for
the left to be based on difference the left would have to
discard its characteristic definitions of oppression in
favour of the play of difference. The left's collective
memory thus leads to confusion whether the left is based
on value or difference. Value fails because of its
inability to allow different forms of anti-oppression
struggle equal legitimacy and difference fails because of
its inability to incorporate the distinctive values of
anti-oppression struggles.
To develop a path beyond this impasse it can be noted
that Lyotard's intellectual trajectory wound from the
politics of a particular value, that of the proletariat,
along the hypothesis of difference to the philosophy of
phrases and that a similar path exists in Deleuze and
Guattari, with their attempt to renovate Marx and Freud
in Anti-Oedipus moving into their philosophy of pure
multiplicities in A Thousand Plateaus. In both cases a
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critique of Marxism was broadened to a critique of any
value based politics and then allegiance was given to
difference. The distinction between the two paths is,
perhaps, just that Lyotard takes the principle of
difference as a necessity in order to prevent the
creation of further oppression, whereas Deleuze and
Guattari celebrate its liberatory powers. The paths of
Lyotard and Deleuze and Guattari also mirror the left's
collective memory because all three move from the
critique of any politics based on value, beginning with
Marxism, to the construction of a politics based on
difference.
It was also noted that because difference based politics
fail to encapsulate the characteristic values of the left
a return to the left's values be the next step. However,
the criticism of difference shows only that difference
has failed to construct a positive form of politics, not
that its critique of value is incorrect. Even if
difference's homogenisation of left politics seems to
call for a reinstitution of values, such a restitution is
still blocked by the logic of exclusion and inclusion.
Difference's criticisms of value remain valid, even if
difference based politics fail.
What therefore emerges from the analysis of the left's
collective memory is that both value and difference
cannot legitimate the politics of a unified left because
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they are locked into critiques of each other. Value fails
because difference's critique, made up centrally of the
logic of exclusion and inclusion, holds good and
difference fails because it is not concerned with the
values of anti-oppression movements only that they
proliferate. Consequently, what can next be conducted is
an analysis of the left's collective memory as if value
and difference have moved into a constant debate with
each other and not as if there is a linear progression
from one to the other. This debate is the subject of
chapter seven.
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Chapter Seven: The Difference and Value Debate.
The Difference/Value Debate Introduced.
The left's collective memory claims that difference arose
in the left through various anti-oppression movements
asserting their difference first from class-based
movements and then from each other. Difference-based
theories and practices developed into both a general
opposition to politics based on unified values and an
assertion of the liberatory powers of differentiation.
However, as the previous chapter argued, difference has
failed to completely supersede value. Instead,
difference's own failings seem to call for the
reinstitution of value, even while the critigue of value
simultaneously remains valid.
An example of these interrelations between difference and
value occurred early in 1991 at a one day feminist
conference held in Edinburgh to discuss the future for
women in Scotland. At this conference an initial plenary
was held, followed by workshops and finally a concluding
plenary. Until the final plenary a unified viewpoint of
'woman' was largely assumed as a basis for discussion
over a range of topics. However, in the final plenary
Scottish nationalism was raised and the identity of woman
fractured. Women from the Socialist Workers Party brought
up class, a lone woman said the word 'lesbian' because it
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had not been said and, after some debate, nationalist
women advised English women to go back south and declared
English accents, whether feminine or masculine, to be an
insult. What had been a largely harmonious conference
broke up in anger and recrimination as the common
identity of woman became a field of play for all the
different politics that found voice. Nonetheless, in
spite of this acrimonious ending, plans for a future
women's conference were also laid by some participants.
At this conference both 'woman' as value and 'woman' as
difference occurred and it is misleading to describe the
conference without both concepts because its central
story is the vacillation between the specificity of women
as different within the field of politics and the
specificity of many other oppressions as different within
the field of feminism. This implies that the particular
nature and structure of a debate between difference and
value needs analysis, in order to understand both
particular examples like this conference and the
implications of the left's collective memory that neither
difference nor value are an adequate basis for a
revitalised left.
This chapter will therefore investigate the structure of
a debate between difference and value that the left's
collective memory implies underlies the interactions of
theories and practices of the left. To do this a brief
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abstract analysis of the difference/value debate will be
given followed by an extended example, in the controversy
over postmodernism in feminism, which will in turn
provide the basis for further analysis. Though the
analysis that follows will necessarily be abstract the
debate that will be analysed itself exists in both
political actions and theories, as shown by the
conference described above. As with the whole of this
thesis it is ideas that are analysed, but they are ideas
that concern both practices and theories of anti-
oppression movements.
Difference and Value.
Stated essentially the term 'value-based politics' refers
to theories and practices built around defending and
promoting a certain unified value. The term 'value' is
employed rather than 'identity' because identity politics
is one form of value politics. That is, it is possible to
have a politics based on a unified value where that value
does not refer to a unified subject or identity.
Ecological politics provides an example where the unified
value can be 'nature' or 'ecology' and not a human
identity. In difference-based politics an allegiance to
creating differences, or differentiation, becomes the
unifying core of a movement.
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Two questions will be briefly asked to initially examine
the relations between difference and value. First, what
obvious paths might theories and practices move along in
the difference/value debate ? Second, is there a point
when value reveals difference and vice versa ?
Once a conflict or debate is entered by political
movements around issues of difference and value there are
four obvious paths that can be followed. Two
uncompromising paths are formed simply by giving complete
allegiance to one of the two poles. Theories and actions
may try to base themselves exclusively on difference, as
Deleuze and Guattari have done, or may affirm a
particular unified value, such as that of Marxist-
Leninism. There are also two moderate paths called
recuperation and alliance. In recuperation a movement
might try to deny the validity of a difference from its
value, while also trying to incorporate elements of that
difference within its value. For instance black caucuses
or women's newspapers have at times been set up within
socialist groups. In contrast, an alliance may develop
through the acceptance by a movement of a plurality of
different unified and self-sufficient movements between
whom alliances can be struck. For example, there have
been attempts to ally socialism and feminism, while
simultaneously maintaining their independence.
190
Of these four possibilities the two moderate alternatives
tend to collapse into the uncompromising paths because
the contradiction between difference and value that they
attempt to manage itself contradicts that management.
Recuperation ultimately does not admit the legitimacy of
difference but rather seeks to neutralise it by
accommodating it, thus leaving in place the original
problem which called a recuperation into existence.
Alliances accept the legitimacy of difference but then
reintroduce value by positing unified movements between
whom alliances may be struck. However, as with
recuperation, this merely displaces the issue because
once the legitimacy of asserting difference is accepted,
there is no means of preventing difference being asserted
within movements thereby restarting the confrontation
between difference and value.
The second question to be asked of the opposition of
difference and value is whether they contain each other.
Does the politics of difference also hold a politics of
value and vice versa ?
The politics of difference, in its purest form, appears
to hold no allegiance to any fixed value for it valorises
only difference and the making of difference. Lyotard's
short article "Answering the question: what is
postmodernism ?" could stand as a manifesto for this
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rejection of fixed values. In this article he identified
the opposition:
"This is a period of slackening- I refer to the
colour of the times. From every direction we are
being urged to put an end to experimentation"
[Lyotard, 1982, 71]
and attacked them.
"The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given
us as much terror as we can take. We have paid a
high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and
the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and
the sensible, of the transparent and the
communicable experience. Under the general demand
for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the
mutterings of the desire for a return of terror, for
the realization of the fantasy to seize reality. The
answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be
witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the
differences and save the honour of the name."
[Lyotard, 1982, 81-82]
Lyotard's statement is useful because its clarity reveals
the terror beneath his own concepts in the war he is
happy to declare on totality. Lyotard is willing and able
to wage war and in doing so reveals the value he holds
dear in the right to make differences. A similar
conclusion could be drawn from Deleuze and Guattari and
their principle of desiring-production, whose political
opponents can be identified as those who would block the
'free flows' of creativity set in train by war-machines.
In both cases the right to create difference is the value
on which their politics is based.
In general, the extent to which creativity and the right
to make differences is promoted against anything that
might restrain these rights, reveals a commitment to
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'rights of difference' as the unified value at the centre
of a politics of difference. Difference has a value and
it is the principle of creating differences.
Value reveals difference in a mirror-image of the way-
difference has revealed value. In difference the value of
something is decided by reference to its novelty and its
difference from whatever pre-existed it. In value what is
different is decided by its relation to a central unified
value. A politics based on a value thus judges the nature
of theories and practices according to their sameness or
difference to its value. This does not mean that value
operates with only the two categories of same or other to
its value. Rather, a unified value governs the
distribution of difference within limits it sets. For
instance, feminism often offers as its core a belief in
the identity of women as oppressed by men but this does
not mean that feminism can only deal with the categories
of 'woman' and 'man'. Rather, feminism can organise
differences between men and women on the basis of the
identity 'woman' and so, for example, women in the
family, black women, women at work and so on are
differences that can be organised and related through the
common value of woman. In value based politics difference
is governed by value and is used to establish differences
within a clearly defined framework.
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In both difference and value there is a central value
that governs the dispersion difference can create. Value
and difference thus enclose each other and play similar
roles in their respective structures.
On first analysis, the difference/value debate's abstract
structure consists of two poles, value-based or
difference-based theories and practices, around which
four general paths are intertwined. These paths are
allegiance to either difference or value, alliance of
difference and value or the recuperation of one within
the other. Further, the two poles have a similar
structure but within those structures are opposites of
each other. Both poles possess a principle of unity which
defines the boundary of a movement and a principle of
dispersion that recognises the differences between
theories and practices within and without that boundary.
The pole of value is made up of movements that have a
unified value as their principle of unity and which
subordinate the distribution of differences to this
central value. The pole of difference is made up of
movements that have the principle of differentiation as
their central value and which distribute differences
according to whether theories and practices promote the
making of difference or not. To explore this abstract
analysis of the difference/value debate further an
extended example of its operation will be given in the
confrontation within feminism over postmodernism.
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Postmodernism and Feminism.
For the purposes of this example feminism will be taken
to be the social movement that erupted across the Western
world in the late nineteen-sixties which fought the
oppression of women. Often called second-wave feminism,
after the first wave of the suffragettes' struggle, it is
one of the chief examples of the post-sixties anti-
oppression movements posited by the left's collective
memory. [Dahlerup, 1986: Evans, 1980: Rowbotham, 1990:
Kaufman-McCall, 1983: Duchen, 1986]
Difference has arisen within feminism around several
theoretical and practical issues. First, in the late
nineteen-sixties there was the simple assertion of a
difference from men and particularly from men in the New
Left. [Dahlerup, 1986: Evans, 1980] Second, there has
been a debate, called equality versus difference, which
has discussed whether feminism should aim at equality
with men's standards or the establishment of a standard
based on the specificity of women. [Scott, 1988: Vogel,
1990] Third, there has been a debate over the nature of
the unity that is referred to by the term woman,
particularly over whether some women have been excluded
from this unity. [Ardill and 0'Sullivan, 1986: Omolade,
1980: Lazreg, 1988: Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983: Flax,
1990, 174-178: Hekman, 1990] Further debates around
difference can possibly be located in feminism, however
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it is the third debate, over the unity of woman, that
will be examined here. [Barrett, 1987]
A practical example of such differences within feminism
occurred in nineteen eighty-five in the London lesbian
community over the right of lesbians who practice
sadomasochism (SM) to use the newly opened London Lesbian
and Gay Centre. As some lesbians held that SM practices
embodied the brutality of male sexuality there was an
attempt to exclude SM groups, including lesbian SM, from
meeting and organising at the centre. Within a
politicised lesbian community there then occurred a rift
over what constituted a lesbian. SM lesbians were
considered by some lesbians as 'repositories of male
violence', by others as a legitimate difference within
lesbianism and by themselves as 'sexual outlaws' who were
opening up lesbianism to new and revolutionary
possibilities. Against the unity of 'lesbian' three
differences arose and entered into conflict with each
other. After a sometimes bitter debate, a general meeting
which included men voted to allow SM groups to meet in
the Center and though this largely closed debate in the
Center itself it also led to a split in the lesbian
community when some women opposed to SM left the Centre.
[Ardill and 0'Sullivan, 1986]
As part of the realisation, created by incidents such as
SM in the Lesbian and Gay Center, that women are divided
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as well as united some feminists, particularly in France
and the USA, turned to post-structuralist and
postmodernist theory. It was argued by these feminists
that such theories explore the concept of difference in a
way that helps understanding of what it means for 'woman'
to be an internally differentiated category. [Eisenstein
and Jardine, 1980: Duchen, 1986: Nicholson, 1990: Hekman,
1990, chapter l]1 Such a perceived convergence of
postmodernism and feminism led some to call for the
establishment of a postmodern feminism. Susan Hekman
wrote:
"Feminists have attempted to fashion new discourses
about the feminine, discourses that resist the
hegemony of male domination, that utilize the
contradictions in these hegemonic discourses in
order to effect their transformation. In this task
the perspective of postmodernism is a help rather
than a hindrance. Both postmodernism and feminism
are counter discourses that challenge the modern
episteme at its roots. This fundamental commonality
suggests that an alliance between these two
movements will further the aims of both." [Hekman,
1990, 190]
Postmodern feminists argue that to prevent feminism
excluding some women from women's liberation a feminism
based on difference and the protection of difference must
1 Following most feminists working in this area
'postmodern' will in this example stand for the varied
thought which has come from France since the nineteen-
sixties under several labels and associated with such
thinkers as Derrida, Lacan, Foucault, Lyotard and others.
Both Benhabib and Flax claim this body of thought is
based on the three 'deaths' of man, history and
metaphysics, though others recognise the diversity and
complexity that is being subsumed by such
categorisations. [Benhabib, 1991, 137-138: Flax, 1990,
31-32: Butler, 1991, 150-151]
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be created. Postmodern feminism, they argue, can develop
a fully revolutionary politics which never makes black
women or lesbians, or any of the as yet unseen
differences within woman, feel excluded from the women's
liberation movement. [Hekman, 1990: Butler, 1991, 159-
161: Flax, 1990: Di Stefano, 1990, 65] For example,
Judith Butler wrote:
"Identity categories are never merely descriptive,
but always normative, and as such exclusionary. This
is not to say the term 'women' ought not to be used,
or that we ought to announce the death of the
category. On the contrary, if feminism presupposes
that 'women' designates an undesignateable field of
differences, one that cannot be totalised or
summarised by a descriptive identity category, then
the very term becomes a site of permanent openness
and resignifiability. I would argue that the rifts
between and among women over the content of the term
ought to be safeguarded and prized, indeed that this
constant rifting ought to be affirmed as the
ungrounded ground of feminist theory." [Butler,
1991, 160]
For Butler what should be important in feminism is the
ability to create differences between women and never to
summarise or totalise these differences, as this would
oppress by excluding some women. Accordingly, feminism
needs a basis in a process of 'constant rifting' or, put
another way, in creating and sustaining differences
between women. Instead of an originary definition with
establishes who is the same as a woman and who is other
than a woman, Butler's postmodern feminism would be based
on a process that is open to all the differences that
women can create. The male, binary opposition of the same
and the other would be replaced by a feminist
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understanding of woman as the endless process of
contesting the nature of woman, thereby ensuring a
radical openness to all manifestations of woman. [Flax,
1987, 642-643: Hekman, 1990, chapter 5: Di Stefano, 1990:
Jardine, 1985: Jardine, 1980: Feral, 1980]
In general postmodern feminism argues that feminism
needs:
"an equality that rests on differences- differences
that confound, disrupt and render ambiguous the
meaning of any fixed binary opposition." [Scott,
1988, 48]
Or, put another way, gender can be seen to function as:
"'a difference that makes a difference'" [Di
Stefano, 1990, 78]
Unsurprisingly there have been feminists who do not agree
with the postmodern diagnosis of the inherent
repressiveness of Western rationality and who do not want
to give up a unified concept of woman. The feminist
replies to postmodern feminism tend to a reassert the
political need for a unified, rational subject that can
act as the agent for social change. [Hartstock, 1987:
Hartstock, 1990: Lazreg, 1988: Benhabib, 1991: Oliver,
1991: Tress, 1988] For example, anti-postmodern feminists
sometimes argue that the postmodern dissolution of the
Western or Enlightenment model of rationality is itself a
ploy of male power.
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"Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at
the precise moment when so many groups have engaged
in 'nationalisms' which involve redefinitions of the
marginalised Others that suspicions emerge about the
nature of the 'subject', about the possibilities for
a general theory which can describe the world, about
historical 'progress'. Why is it that just at the
moment when so many of us who have been silenced
begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act
as subjects rather than as objects of history, that
just then the concept of subjecthood becomes
problematic ?" [Hartstock, 1990, 163]
For feminists like Nancy Hartstock it might be acceptable
for the dominant male subject to decentre itself but the
model of a neutral rationality governed by an informed
subject is one that many subjected peoples, including
women, aspire to achieve in order to gain control of
their lives.
Ironically, the women who are 'other' than white,
heterosexual and middle class, whose assertion of
difference caused feminism to consider its internal
differentiation in the first place, themselves often
assert this anti-postmodern vision of politics. For
example, Marnia Lazreg both attacks Western women for
their failure grasp the specificity of Arabic and Islamic
men and women's lives and history and simultaneously
rejects as another colonialist trick the adoption of
theories of difference in order to deal with these
differences.
"Antihumanism has not provided any authority higher
than itself that could monitor its excesses. Old-
style humanism, in contrast, and despite its
shortcomings, makes itself vulnerable to criticism
by appealing to its unfulfilled promise of a more
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reasonable rationalism or a more egalitarian
universalism. Indeed, the universalistic claim to a
supracultural human entity embodied in reason
provided colonialised societies with the tool
necessary to regain their freedom. Colonialised
women and men were willing to give up their lives in
order to capture their share of humanity celebrated
but denied by colonial powers....It is not
accidental that the rise of antihumanisra coincided
with the collapse of the French colonial empire,
more specifically with the end of the Algerian war
(and it was at this time that both Foucault and
Derrida began publishing)." [Lazreg, 1988, 99]
Anti-postmodernists claim that women, and other
colonialised subjects, should not be deprived of the
power that can be derived from Enlightenment concepts
just as these people are gaining this power. The struggle
of women to name and constitute themselves as active
political subjects is thus seen as the necessary basis
for feminism, to which postmodernism is a clear threat to
this subject. [Benhabib, 1991: Oliver, 1991: Hekman,
1990, chapter 5] For example, Seyla Benhabib concedes
much of Butler's postmodern criticism of the concept of a
unified, autonomous and self-conscious subject but she
also states that:
"nevertheless we must still argue that we are not
merely extensions of our histories, that vis a vis
our own stories we are in the position of author and
character at once. The situated and gendered subject
is heteronomously determined but still strives
toward autonomy. I want to ask how in fact the very
project of female emancipation would even be
thinkable without such a regulative principle of
agency, autonomy and selfhood ?" [Benhabib, 1991,
140]
Benhabib and others argue that a unified concept of
'woman' is needed by feminism. They claim that the
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assertion of other subjectivities within woman does not
demand the complete dissolution of the rational subject,
but is rather a call for sensitivity to what woman may
exclude and for openness to appropriate revisions. In
this way Benhabib and others hope to retain 'woman' as a
value on which feminism can be based. [Benhabib, 1991:
Lazreg, 1988: Tress, 1988: Hartstock, 1990]
The two poles of difference and value are clear in
feminists who either reject or accept postmodernism and
its political consequences. Postmodern feminists want to
give feminism a basis in a process of creating
differences, while anti-postmodern feminists want to
retain a value in the category or subject of 'woman.
There is also a third group of feminists who have sought
a middle way between a total dissolution of the subject,
with the attendant possibility of a failure of feminism
in relativism, or the reassertion of a rational subject
who has always previously been a man who protected male
power.
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson are an example of this
middle way and they argue for a fusion of postmodernism
and feminism through a recognition of both the
limitations of each and what each offers the other. In
opposition to feminists who wish to base feminism totally
on difference Fraser and Nicholson demand the retention
of feminism's ability to make normative judgements based
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on values and in opposition to feminists who advance an
uncritical concept of woman they reject any
'universalising' or 'totalising' concepts as potentially
repressive. [Fraser and Nicholson, 1990, 19-34: Fraser,
1991, 175]
On the one hand, Fraser and Nicholson are unwilling to
fully commit themselves to postmodernism because they
believe many politically useful genres are thrown out by
it. They wrote:
"Lyotard...goes too quickly from the premise that
Philosophy cannot ground social criticism to the
conclusion that criticism must itself be local, ad
hoc, and nontheoretical. As a result, he throws out
the baby of large historical narrative with the
bathwater of philosophical metanarrative and the
baby of social-theoretical analysis of large-scale
inequalities with the bathwater of reductive Marxian
class theory.... Suppose one began not with the
condition of Philosophy, but with the nature of the
social object one wished to criticise. Suppose,
further, that one defined that object as the
subordination of women to and by men. Then, we
submit, it would be apparent that many of the genres
rejected by postmodernists are necessary for social
criticism." [Fraser and Nicholson, 1990, 25-26]
On the other hand, Fraser and Nicholson are unwilling to
commit themselves to a single unified concept of woman
because:
"In recent years, poor and working-class women,
women of colour, and lesbians have finally won a
wider hearing for their objections to feminist
theories which fail to illuminate their lives and
address their problems. They have exposed the
earlier quasi-metanarratives...as false
extrapolations from the experience of the white,
middle-class, heterosexual women who dominated the
beginnings of the second wave." [Fraser and
Nicholson, 1990, 33]
203
Fraser and Nicholson argue that feminists do not need to
abandon historical narratives or analysis of 1 societal
macrostructures', as long as such analyses are recognised
to be limited and non-universalistic. Accordingly, the
belief in 'unitary notions of woman' must be replaced
with 'plural and complexly constructed conceptions of
social identity, treating gender as one strand among
others'. [Fraser and Nicholson, 1990, 34-35] Fraser and
Nicholson's alliance of postmodernism and feminism would
accordingly retain a notion of 'woman' but would
recognise each such notion, and its attendant historical
narratives and social analyses, as limited and partial.
Feminism would then become plural in "the practice of
feminisms", without succumbing to the ahistoricism and
relativism of postmodernism or the essentialism and
exclusionary practices of a universalised category of
woman. [Fraser and Nicholson, 1990, 35]
Fraser and Nicholson's middle-way asserts that
postmodernism must be subsumed within feminism but that
this can best be done through a selective alliance. The
unified value of 'woman' can remain but it is
historicised and recognised as necessarily partial. In
this way feminism would be based on a value for 'woman',
and not on the continual invention of difference, but
that value is allied with postmodernism by opening it to
differentiation through a recognition of its limited
nature. Difference is recuperated under value in a
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general sense but this recuperation is itself created by-
allying aspects of value with aspects of difference.
Fraser and Nicholson thus fashioned a 'mid-way' between
difference and value from a combination of the two paths
of alliance and recuperation.
Fraser and Nicholson's theory suffers the difficulties of
all middle-ways because it can be criticised by both the
two opposing poles it tries to combine. Postmodern
feminists can argue that masculine values, such as the
macro-social theories Fraser and Nicholson want to
retain, are still being used to establish feminism and so
they can be accused of not being thorough enough in their
critigue of masculine values. Anti-postmodern feminists
can argue that there seems to be nothing to unite all the
feminisms posited by Fraser and Nicholson as one feminist
movement. Fraser and Nicholson's conception of 'woman'
seems so limited that it is hard to imagine what or who
it unites as feminist.
Three different positions can be identified in the debate
within feminism over postmodernism: an allegiance to
postmodernism and difference, an allegiance to 'woman'
and value and an attempt to ally difference and value.
The debate itself developed from the realisation that the
category 'woman' not only could not be assumed but could
also actually be oppressive. This led some feminists to
reject categorisation altogether in favour of difference
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as a basis for feminism. Against the dissolution of a
unified category of woman in favour of woman as a
principle of making difference some 'value feminists'
reassert an allegiance to a unified value. They argue
there is a need xor women to name themselves and to join
a movement which represents them and that this can only
be achieved through the development of a value for
'woman'. Further, they accuse postmodernism of a
political indifference to women that results from
exploding the category of woman. However, the reassertion
of an allegiance to value does not necessarily deal with
the objections to feminism which postmodern feminists
found compelling. Instead what has already been rejected
by postmodern feminists is simply reasserted because of
its political efficacy and the perceived failure of
postmodernism. As an alternative, some feminists resisted
a choice between value and difference and fashioned a
middle way. However, this path is also open to the
criticisms value and difference make of each other.
At this point conflict between the three alternatives
within the feminist debate over postmodernism begins to
look endemic, because each of the three positions
possesses a ready made critigue of each other to which
their own beliefs provided an answer. It is not just that
they all have criticisms of each other but that implied
by each criticism is an answer that is already at play in
the debate. It is therefore obvious where any participant
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in the debate could go for answers if they found
criticisms that are raised compelling. For example, if a
feminist is disturbed by making woman into a process of
differentiation then she is immediately faced with the
alternatives of value or the mid-way. She can then seek
an answer in these alternatives that is compatible with
the reasons she came to examine 'woman as
differentiation' in the first place. In this way the
debate is never stalemated and always offers
possibilities within itself for change, while never
moving beyond the poles of difference and value. The
example of feminism and postmodernism thus posits the
difference/value debate as being endless while
simultaneously avoiding a stalemate. From this claim a
critigue of the difference/value debate can now be
developed.
Paralysed Motion.
The endless motion that is possible in the feminism and
postmodernism debate can also be identified in the
generalised difference/value debate. As already argued,
the two poles of difference and value are mirror images
of each other in that they are structured in a similar
way but have their central principle of unity reversed in
relation to each other. As such, difference and value
produce problems which are the mirror image of each other
and also offer solutions to each other's problems.
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Value is based around a central unified definition of
what a theory or a politics prizes. Value's difficulty is
that in establishing such a unity it must include some
things and exclude others. The problem for any value-
based politics is thus that its central principle can be
accused of being inherently oppressive. In short, when
there is a same there will always, necessarily, be others
who can claim to be oppressed by being made other.
Difference-based theories and practices offer an answer
to this problem of value's inherent oppressiveness
because difference excludes no position as an other.
Difference-based systems argue that if any static
definition is inherently oppressive then only the
endorsement of continual transgressions can be liberatory
and so, for example, feminism must become a process of
continual rifting. However, though no-one is excluded a
problem for difference-based theories emerges because
difference dissolves all movements into a homogenous mass
of creativity. Difference-based theories and practices do
not oppress by excluding but neither do they seem to
liberate or fight any particular oppression because they
are always demanding change. Differences between theories
and practices accordingly matter less than their ability
to produce difference and, paradoxically, difference-
based systems produce political indifference.
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Value-based systems clearly offer an answer to the
indifference of difference. Perhaps a modified sense of
value, as when Fraser and Nicholson make values
explicitly limited and partial, could be used but some
form of value seems the obvious cure for theories and
practices which have been homogenised according to the
sole criteria of difference. Value-based systems thus
find themselves able to criticise and move beyond
difference-based systems in a mirror image of the claims
of difference-based systems make against them. Both poles
thus possess criticisms of each other and answers to
those criticisms.
At this point the difference/value debate is closed
between the two poles of difference and value. Set in a
particular anti-oppression movement there is scope for
such a debate to be conducted with each twist and turn
offering a move beyond the previous position but in fact
leading to a new articulation of difference versus value.
The nature of the difference/value debate is not only
that it will be inconclusive but that it will also always
offer both the hope of resolution and a possible path to
that resolution. The difference/value debate can now be
characterised as one of paralysed motion because there is
always motion but there is also the paralysis of a debate
that can never be finalised.
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There are two obvious reactions within anti-oppression
movements to the paralysed motion of the difference/value
debate. First, there is simply disillusionment. This can
occur when movements are simply abandoned by people who
once saw their importance but who become exhausted by
internal disputes over the values and differences of a
movement. Second, there is the fragmentation that can
easily follow from disputes over difference and value.
Difference, as it erupts within movements, by its nature
seeks a fragmentation but if a movement then seeks to
resist this fragmentation through the establishment of
some value it finds, inevitably, that some group,
practice or theory is excluded by this value and so
fragments away. Fragmentation seems an inevitable by¬
product of the difference/value debate.
These two consequences, disillusionment and fragmentation
capture the endemic nature of problems for oppositional
movements that the difference/value debate can create.
Within this debate a movement is either caught within
paralysed motion or it fragments into smaller and smaller
chunks or its members drift away disillusioned or
exhausted by a process which is full of passion yet
always seems to lead to similar problems. Consideration
of a third reaction is therefore necessary and this would
be to examine what assumptions the difference/value
debate is itself based on and whether the debate can be
transcended through rejection or modification of them.
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The Third Reaction.
What gives value's critique of difference and
difference's critique of value force ? This question
arises because if feminists criticise Marxism for being
sex-blind then what makes this a fault of Marxism ?
Marxists could shrug their collective shoulder and reply-
that 'we are not developing a theory of women's
oppression or directly trying to liberate women and so
cannot be criticised for not doing so'. Marxists could
then affirm women's difference by claiming that Marxist
theory and practice deals specifically with economic
oppression, women's oppression thus occurs in Marxism
only when it is related to the economy and so a movement
devoted specifically to women is needed for women to be
liberated. However, such a response has not usually been
considered legitimate, if it has been thought of at all,
within the left, as has already been seen in the force
held for feminists by the accusation that second-wave
feminism excludes black women or non-heterosexual women.
That a theoretical shrug of the shoulders has not
constituted a legitimate political position indicates
that within the left there is an underlying assumption
that all oppressions should be encompassed in any one
understanding of oppression.
An example of this assumption of 'one oppression' is
given by Negri, who considers it a constituting factor of
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modern politics and philosophy. When discussing Spinoza's
innovations in political theory he notes that Hobbes's
assumption of the 'war of all against all' is:
"insuperable when we approach it from the
perspective of individuality. Therefore...the
Spinozian dislocation must also found a new
ontological horizon... This horizon is collective.
It is the horizon of collective freedom, of a
nonproblematized collectivity.... The idea of the
multitude* transforms what was a Renaissance,
Utopian, and ambiguous potentiality into a project
and a genealogy of collectivity, as a conscious
articulation and constitution of the whole, of the
totality. The revolution and its boundary are
therefore, in Spinoza, the terrain on which an
extraordinary operation is founded, the
prefiguration of the fundamental problem of the
philosophy of the subsequent centuries: the
constitution of collectivity as praxis." [Negri,
1981b, 20-21]
What Negri outlines as Spinoza's political horizon of the
collective constituted by practice is close to the key
assumption which lies behind the difference/value debate.
That is, Negri's Spinoza argues for an ontology which
offers 'truly revolutionary being', which can itself be
understood as the capacity to fundamentally transform
society, to a collective which is constituted through
people's activity or praxis. The ontological framework of
the difference/value debate is also made up of this
horizon of the practically constituted collective which
alone bears the ability to reconstruct society, as this
assumption is the basis on which difference and value can
confront each other.
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If it is assumed that one collective must be constituted
in order for society to be fundamentally transformed,
then the nature of that collective is crucial to
liberatory politics. Difference and value then offer two
ways of articulating the nature of this collective and so
have a common object over which they can struggle. Put
another way, what makes the difference/value debate
important for anti-oppression movements is that its two
poles embody both theoretical and practical issues which
occur within movements, but what keeps these issues
relevant, and therefore enmeshes movements in paralysed
motion, is the assumption that the truly revolutionary
political movement is both singular and so constituted
through value or difference.
Once the assumption is made that revolution can only be
conducted by one collective then a shrug of the
shoulders, in reply to the accusation that an anti-
oppression movement is not dealing with all oppressions,
is impossible because the shrug would mean excluding a
group from the one revolutionary collective. If there is
only one revolutionary movement then it must include all
anti-oppression struggles or some oppressions would not
be confronted by the revolutionary movement and so would
survive the revolution. Accordingly, difference and value
based theories and practices cannot shrug their shoulders
at each other but must contest with each other the nature
of the revolutionary collective. Difference and value's
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objections to each other have force for each other
because they concern the way society can be transformed.
A paradox appears here because is it not simply true, as
noted by the left's collective memory, that there is more
than one anti-oppression movement and does this not
refute the claim that only one revolutionary collective
is being assumed by left politics involved in the
difference/value debate ? It is, of course, true that
there are many different anti-oppression movements but it
is the framework that these movements exist in, and so
how their expectations and actions are structured, that
is relevant here. There is no contradiction between the
existence of many movements and the claim that all these
movements believe fundamental political change will come
when a single revolutionary collective is constituted and
so structure their theories and practices according to
this assumption.
Analysis of the difference/value debate thus implies that
liberatory politics has failed to take account of the
emergence of many anti-oppression movements because it
has failed to question the assumption of one
revolutionary collective. Indeed, the anti-oppression
movements have also failed to take full account of the
implications of their own rise, as they have retained the
ontological horizon which allows only one collective to
be revolutionary.
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An example of this failure to question the assumption of
one collective, even while simultaneously endorsing the
rise of many anti-oppression movements, is given by
Guattari and Negri in their nineteen eighty-five call for
the renewal of the spirit of communism. Guattari and
Negri note that feminists have made reproduction a
central political issue, that students have raised issues
of the 'non-material labour force' and they endorse in
general 'movements of the marginal', but they also
believe that all these different movements contribute to
the one struggle. They wrote:
"It is not a paradox to say that only the
marginalities are capable of universality, or, if
you prefer, of movements which create
universality.... Truth 'with a universal meaning' is
constituted by the discovery of the friend in its
singularity, of the other in its irreducible
heterogeneity, of the interdependent community in
the respect for its appropriative values and ends.
This is the 'method' and the 'logic' of the
marginalities which are thus the exemplary sign of a
political innovation corresponding to the
revolutionary transformations called forth by the
current productive arrangements.
Every marginality, by placing its stakes on itself,
is therefore the potential bearer of the needs and
desires of the large majority." [Guattari and Negri,
1985, 42]
The marginals are conceived by Guattari and Negri as
bearers of the universal struggle in relation to the
'current productive arrangements'. In this way the
specificity of anti-oppression movements is dissolved by
assuming there is a common revolutionary struggle which
these movements are privileged to construct. Guattari and
Negri then widen communism far beyond its own specificity
215
by claiming that all social relations have been taken
over by capitalist production, that all life is like
factory work and so is in need of a communist revolution.
[Guattari and Negri, 1985, 21-22 & 49] Guattari and
Negri, for all their whole-hearted support of movements
of the marginal, fail to respect the specificity of these
struggles, fail to analyse what these specificities might
mean for a communist revolution and so recuperate anti-
oppression movements into a generalised communist
struggle.
The confrontation around SM lesbians in the London
Lesbian and Gay Center has similar features for, without
the assumption that lesbians form the one collective, the
accusation that SM lesbians were not 'true' lesbians
would have been irrelevant. There could only be a battle
over the definition of lesbian because at some level it
was assumed there had to be one lesbian movement.
Accordingly, different forms of lesbianism had to be
unified or dispelled and so SM lesbianism had to be
included or excluded. [Ardill and 0'Sullivan, 1986, 54-
57]
A third example of the assumption of one revolutionary
collective occurs in theories of difference which assume
a unified political horizon, despite an overtly anti-
totalist stance. For instance Deleuze and Guattari
transfer the unity of struggle into a process,
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differentiation, but still articulate one form of
oppositional politics in the one struggle to free desire
and creativity. They can accordingly be heavily
prescriptive in demanding that everyone create difference
because they want to constitute the revolutionary
collective on the basis of differentiation.
The difference/value debate within oppositional movements
is based on an ontological framework which was
essentially established as early, according to Negri at
least, as the differences between Spinoza and Hobbes. The
struggles over difference within and between oppositional
movements that have emerged since the sixties have thus
remained on the same political ground as theories and
practices of value and so have engaged them in political
conflict. Without the assumption of one revolutionary
collective confrontations between difference and value
could evaporate in a multiple shrugging of shoulders.
The Difference/Value Debate Concluded.
The difference/value debate in the field of oppositional
politics is made of two poles. One consists of theories
and practices which are based on a unified value and the
other is of theories and practices which are united
around a principle of differentiation. The two poles of
difference and value are related to each other through a
framework which posits that truly revolutionary being is
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possessed by a collective which is constituted through
practice. Difference and value dispute with each other
the nature of political change by disputing whether this
revolutionary collective can be constituted by value-
based theories and practices or by difference-based
systems.
Within the difference/value debate each pole possesses a
powerful critique of the other and provides mirror like
answers to those critiques, so ensuring there is always
an answer to a criticism made by a difference or value-
based system at play in the debate. The result is that
the difference/value debate is always fluid but also can
never be finalised; the debate is both paralysed and
constantly in motion. Two consequences of this are the
disillusionment of participants in movements, as problems
are finalised and then reopened only to be repeated in a
new guise, and fragmentation, as theories and practices
continually break down and reconstruct their unity.
The final part of this chapter examined the ontological
assumption of one revolutionary collective that underpins
the force the objections that difference and value make
of each other. This assumption has been implicitly
questioned by the number and practice of post-sixties
anti-oppression movements, but this questioning has not
been understood clearly enough nor examined deeply enough
to progress beyond the difference/value debate.
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Chapter 8: The Nature of Emancipatory Collectives.
The Ontology of Emancipatory Collectives.
The present topic is not a definition of all forms of
social movements or of a new, twenty-first century
society, but is restricted to the definition of an
emancipatory politics that can transcend the
difference/value debate.1 To begin this definition it can
be noted that the post-sixties emergence of many
different anti-oppression movements challenges the
underlying principle of the difference/value debate by
demonstrating there is more than one collective that can
be liberatory. The left's collective memory implies that
emancipatory politics cannot assume that liberation will
be defined and carried out through the formation of one
mass struggle. The challenge is thus an ontological one
because it affects what can be considered politically
progressive from a left-wing viewpoint; there is a
challenge to the Being of the left.
In this context a political ontology will be defined as a
framework that outlines the nature of political forces
that can fundamentally transform society. A political
ontology thus defines the Being of revolution. For
example, it has already been argued that the ontology
1 Emancipation, and its opposite oppression, should now
be assumed to have a narrow technical meaning which will
be defined in the rest of this thesis.
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underlying the difference/value debate claims that
revolutionary being is possessed by one collective
constituted through practice. In contrast, the vision of
emancipatory politics that will now be developed will
posit many different revolutionary struggles as the basis
from which an overall view of politics may be
constructed.
The ontological reversal from one liberation to many
emancipations establishes the basic principle of the new
political ontology that will now be developed. This
ontology will be called the ontology of emancipatory
collectives. To adeguately develop it the nature of
emancipatory collectives and the structure in which they
exist, that is the relationships between them, must be
fully examined. The nature of emancipatory collectives
will be defined in this chapter, initially through an
analysis of Alberto Melucci's theory of social movements,
while the following chapter will analyse the relations
between collectives.
Melucci and New Social Movements.
The work of Italian sociologist Alberto Melucci
represents, in some senses, a culmination of the
sociology of post-sixties social movements because he
develops both criticisms and a synthesis of its two broad
currents. The first current is European, developing
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chiefly from the work of Alain Touraine but also from
Jurgen Habermas, and the second is chiefly from the USA
in such schools as resource mobilisation theory and
relative deprivation theory. [Melucci, 1983; Foss and
Larkin, 1986: Diani, 1992]2 Melucci calls the post-
sixties anti-oppression movements 'new social movements'
and an examination of his theory will provide the basis
for a theory of emancipatory collectives.
Melucci claims that nearly all previous theories of
social movements have conformed to 'dualistic thinking'
because they make social movements either 'an effect of
structural conditions or an expression of values and
beliefs'. Melucci rejects this dualism and so rejects the
identification of social movements by their objective
position in society or through the beliefs of their
members. [Melucci, 1989, 17-20] Melucci also argues that
the work of Touraine, Habermas and resource mobilisation
theory have moved beyond this dualism but each separated
the question of how a social movement formed from why it
formed and then addressed only one of these questions.
Touraine and Habermas examined why and resource
mobilisation theory how, with all mistaking the answer to
2 Mario Diani notes four main trends in the sociology of
social movements: the collective behaviour perspective,
resource mobilisation theory, the political process
perspective and the new social movements approach. The
first three are chiefly associated with the U.S.A., with
the fourth being considered European and so can be
reconciled with the view that there are two broad trends
in social movement theory. [Diani, 1992, 1-7]
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one question for an answer to both. Despite these
shortcomings, Melucci claims that this work created a
sceptical paradigm which no longer treated social
movements as things and did not take everything said by
such movements at face value. [Melucci, 1983, 820-822]
To develop this sceptical paradigm Melucci suggests that
movements should be treated as 'socially constructed
collective action systems'. He claims that members of
social movements negotiate their actions through three
poles of a collective action system. These poles are:
"the goals of their action; the means to be
utilized; and the environment within which their
action takes place." [Melucci, 1989, 26]
As collective actions are negotiated both between and
within these axes a plurality of possible meanings exists
across any collective action system. That is, the
constructed unity of a collective action system itself
contains a plurality of meanings. Melucci argues that it
is consequently impossible to use the naive empirical
unity of a new social movement as a starting point for
analysis of its collective action systems, because any
assumption of unity would obscure a movements' internal
complexity. In addition, he claims that the common
assumption that social movements are unified actors on
the stage of society is a reification of gross empirical
observation which collapses on closer inspection and that
it makes the assumption that there is something like a
222
'deep mind' to a movement. [Melucci, 1989, 21-26;
Melucci, 1983, 820-825] Instead of presuming that a
movement is unified Melucci argues that prior to
empirical work into new social movements an analytical
definition of new social movements is reguired which can
guide research and so uncover a movement's complexity.
Melucci's analytical definition of a new social movement
is that it is a specific class of collective action which
has the three dimensions of solidarity, conflict and
transgression. He claims that these dimensions are
'entirely analytical', by he which means they are
theoretical hypotheses which can be used to separate new
social movements from other collective phenomena with
which they are often confused, such as protest. [Melucci,
1985, 715-716] Solidarity is the mutual recognition by
actors that they are part of one social unit. It is the
acknowledgement of a shared identity. Conflict is a
struggle with an adversary over some commonly desired
values or goods.3 Transgression occurs when a social
movement's actions violate the boundaries of a system,
thereby pushing the system beyond the range of variations
that it can tolerate without altering its structure. This
last dimension raises the nature of the system, which
Melucci calls 'complex society', that is transgressed.
3 Melucci is careful to distinguish his notion of
conflict from a Marxist notion of contradiction by
stressing that conflict concerns a fight between
opponents over an object.
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[Melucci, 1989, 29-30; Melucci, 1983, 825-826; Melucci,
1980, 202-203]
For Melucci complex society emerges from a qualitative
transformation in the role production played in
industrial capitalism in that production has come to
include all the social relationships that accompany the
production of objects. He calls this expanded form of
production 'social production'. [Melucci, 1989, 186;
Melucci, 1978a, 97; Melucci, 1980, 203-210] He also notes
that the control of social production has changed from
being the property of one group to being under the
'jurisdiction of giant apparatuses of political and
economic decision making'. Consequently, conflict between
two stable classes, in the Marxist sense, has dissolved
into a 'network of oppositions'. This means that
capitalist development can no longer be guaranteed by the
control of both a working class and the resources needed
for production and so, in order to maintain capitalist
development, growing intervention is needed in social
relationships. The controllers of capital have thus
become concerned with the management of 'symbolic
systems, identity and the definition of needs'. Melucci
calls the systems which manage this extension of
capital's interests the 'symbolic codes' of society.
[Melucci, 1978a, 100: Melucci, 1978b, 179: Melucci,1983,
826-827]
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"Complex societies no longer have an 'economic'
basis, they produce by an increasing integration of
economic, political and cultural structures.
'Material' goods are produced and consumed with the
mediation of huge informational and symbolic
systems." [Melucci, 1983, 826]
Melucci's overall view can be encapsulated in his claim
that "Power based upon material production is...no longer
central" because production itself is dependant on a
reality that is increasingly determined by information
organised and controlled through symbolic codes.
[Melucci, 1989, 185] Though Melucci regards his depiction
of complex society and its codes as incomplete, he also
insists that the features that he has identified are of
fundamental importance to that society. [Melucci, 1989,
83-84 & 184-186; Melucci, 1983, 826-827]
Complex society is the system that is transgressed by
social movements. Transgression thus consists of attempts
to overturn the codes and this occurs when movements:
"no longer operate as characters but as signs, in
the sense that they translate their action into
symbolic challenges that overturn the dominant
cultural codes. Movements also reveal the
irrationality and bias of cultural codes by acting
at the same levels (of information and
communication) as the new forms of technocratic
power." [Melucci, 1989, 75]
So far Melucci has argued that analysis of new social
movements should be guided by the three dimensions of
solidarity, conflict and transgression and have as its
aim the revelation of the many possible collective
actions, that is the many possible negotiations of goals,
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means and environments, that make up a movement. Amid
this internal diversity it is important to identify the
means by which a movement's unity is constructed. Melucci
argues that the unity of a social movement is created by
individuals through 'negotiated interactions' which
produce a collective identity.
"Collective identity is an interactive and shared
definition produced by several interacting
individuals who are concerned with the orientations
of their action as well as the field of
opportunities and constraints in which their action
takes place. The process of constructing,
maintaining and altering a collective identity
provides the basis for actors to shape their
expectations and calculate the costs and benefits of
their action." [Melucci, 1989, 34]
Melucci identifies three dimensions to the production of
such a collective identity. First, there is the
formulation of cognitive frameworks concerning the goals,
means and environment of collective action. That is,
people create a common understanding of the three poles
of collective action. Second, relations between actors
must be 'activated', or brought into existence, so that
actors can communicate, negotiate and make decisions.
Last, emotional investments have to be made which will
enable actors to recognise in each other a common
feeling. [Melucci, 1989, 35] Melucci also notes that
action on the basis of that identity is never solely the
result of instrumental cost-benefit calculations and the
collective identity will never be totally negotiable
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because actors make emotional investments in the
collective identity of a movement. [Melucci, 1989, 35-36]
In summary, Melucci defines new social movements as
collective action systems that can be identified on the
basis of a three part analytic definition made up of
solidarity, conflict and transgression. Unity between
these three aspects of a movement is constructed by the
individuals in it negotiating a collective identity. This
identity is created by actors through the three processes
of formulating cognitive frameworks, activating
relationships and investing emotions. Both these three
dimensions of collective identity and the three aspects
of the analytic definition of social movements occur
across a multipolar action system made up of the goals of
the movement, the means of the movement and the
environment of the movement. Melucci specifies what
defines a new social movement and then how that
definition is constructed by its actors and in each case
he provides a three part structure. This structure can
now be illustrated through a brief examination of his
account of the women's movement.4
Melucci defined feminist collective action through
solidarity as women, conflict with men and the
4 This account is essentially a summary of Melucci's but
certain categories are introduced for the sake of
clarity. See Melucci, 1989, 93-95: Evans, 1980:
Rowbotham, 1989: Nicholson, 1990.
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transgression of patriarchal structures. All three were
also more closely defined through their part in helping
women to break with a 'narrow domestic identity'. Women's
collective actions were initially related to the goals,
means and environment of social policies for equality
between men and women. That is, Melucci argues that the
women's movement initially coalesced around demands for
equality with men which would break women out of their
domestic role. [Melucci, 1989, 93]
To achieve this coalescence a collective identity of
'woman' was constructed by women developing cognitive
frameworks organised around histories of women and
analyses of women's condition, by women developing
relationships, especially through women who were
experienced in organisation through their involvement in
the new left, and by women promoting affective
investments in a collective sense particularly through
consciousness raising groups. Having identified the three
main sources of the evolving collective identity which
underlay the actions of the women's movement Melucci then
argued that as women began to gain benefits from the
political system the goals, means and environment of
women's collective actions began to split into two main
streams. This led to what Melucci terms a 'specific form
of solidarity' among women that was characterised by a
voyage from claims for equality with men to radical
feminism and self-consciousness. [Melucci, 1989, 93-94]
228
The first stream of women's collective action Melucci
calls feminism and it continued the original emphasis on
equality through social policy by conducting such actions
as research on gender and campaigns for equal rights. The
second stream was a new social movement called by Melucci
the 'women's movement'. This movement diverged from
feminism by negotiating its collective identity around
notions of 'female difference', instead of a concern for
equality with men, and by creating a "'women's culture',
which was submerged and woven into the fabric of daily
life,...which sustained and nourished women's
mobilisations". [Melucci, 1989, 95] The women's movement
thus became less visible but far more diverse than
feminism by concerning itself with the cultural
dimensions of society.
In this example all the key elements of Melucci's theory
can be seen. However, to complete the core of his theory
of new social movements a final distinction must be made
between the latency and visibility of social movements.
This distinction will also allow the distinction of new
social movements from mobilisations.
Melucci points out that many collective actions of new
social movements are carried out invisibly, particularly
in the ongoing construction of a collective identity. He
argues that the processes of creating cognitive
frameworks, activating relationships and making emotional
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investments all proceed much of the time out of the
public arena, in the sense that there may be no public
conflict over these collective actions. Consciousness
raising groups are an example of this invisibility
because they create a private forum in which people can
develop the collective identity of a movement. Melucci
then argues that the visibility and latency of new social
movements' collective actions should be distinguished
depending on whether an action involves public conflict
or not. [Melucci, 1989, 70-73 & 78-79: Melucci, 1985,
798-801]
In contrast to the latency or visibility of a social
movement Melucci argues that mobilisations will be public
actions for specific goals, will not be maintained beyond
those goals and will draw on the already existing
networks that make up social movements. He notes that
mobilisations will often be managed by temporary
organisations which provide the necessary financial and
technical resources. [Melucci, 1989, 78-9: Melucci, 1985,
815] There is thus a distinction between the latency and
visibility of new social movements and a mobilisation. He
wrote:
"In most discussions, references to the movements'
political effects and organizational tactics are
commonly mistaken for the collective forms of
mobilization which develop around specific issues.
But movements live in another dimension: in the
everyday network of social relations, in the
capacity and will to reappropriate space and time,
and in the attempt to practice alternative life-
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styles. This dimension is not marginal or residual.
Rather, it is the appropriate response to new forms
of control that no longer correspond solely to state
action." [Melucci, 1989, 71]
Mobilisations are short term campaigns around a specific
issue that draw on the already existing networks of
social movements. For example, Melucci argues that it is
impossible to understand the vitality of the peace
movement mobilisations of the late seventies and early
eighties without also understanding the latent action
that already existed in the submerged networks of the
youth, womens, ecological and other movements. In
contrast a social movement's actions may be visible or
latent depending on whether or not they involve public
conflict. [Melucci, 1989, 70-73 & 78-79; Melucci, 1985,
798-801 ]5
In summary, Melucci defines new social movements as
collective actions that are characterised by solidarity,
conflict and transgression. The unity of movements, which
is the unity of a plurality of meanings and actions, is
created by actors constructing a collective identity
across a multipolar system of action. In addition, much
5 It should be noted that in some of Melucci's work the
visibility of a movement seems to be equated with a
mobilisation, though in other parts there seem to be
three separate terms. [Melucci, 1989, 70-73: Melucci,
1985, 800-801] The separation into three terms is useful
because it provides a distinction between a particular
social movement being in public conflict (visibility) or
acting but not in public (latency) and a particular
campaign in which several movements are involved
(mobilisation).
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of the collective action that creates a collective
identity may proceed outside of the public arena, meaning
that a distinction must be drawn between a movement's
latency, its visibility and the participation of several
movements in a mobilisation.
Melucci's theory of new social movements stresses their
internal plurality by noting the multiplicity of meanings
and actions that a movement can develop and still retain
sense as a movement. Melucci then makes the process of
actors negotiating a collective identity around the
goals, means and environments of a movement the means by
which a movement is unified. However, Melucci also bases
the pluralism of movements in a unitary society which is
independent of movements and which they transgress.
Melucci's account of the source of unity for new social
movements is accordingly confusing because by defining
its own sense of the environment it operates in movements
draw in and destabilise Melucci's assumption of a unified
society thereby, in turn, dislocating his definition of
transgression. Examination of this problem will allow the
identification of problems in Melucci's theory which,
when confronted, will provide a theory of emancipatory
collectives.
Melucci and The Unity of Society.
232
Melucci rejects attempts to explain new social movements
according to their objective position in the structure of
society. However, he also wishes to articulate their role
in such structures, as is clear in his analysis of
movements as signs confronting the codes of complex
society. Melucci's attitude to the social structure and
social movements is thus ambiguous. On the one hand, he
rejects identifying social structures in order to define
the 'objective conditions' from which movements are born
but, on the other hand, he does identify society's
fundamental structure and the relationship of movements
to it. [Melucci, 1989, 12 & 40]
This ambiguity arises from two sources. First, Melucci
claims there is a single unified society, which is
qualitatively different from industrial capitalism,
within which social movements have a place. Second, he
argues that new social movements are negotiated
collective action systems which define the environment in
which they operate. Put together the result of these two
claims is that the objective definition of society given
by Melucci can be disputed by the plurality of meanings
of society that can be created by a social movement. Two
different bases for knowledge of society underlie
Melucci's ambiguity, one being that of the intellectual
and the other that of the social movement. The tension
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between these bases can be explored by examining the two
sources of this ambiguity.
Melucci's allegiance to a unitary or total
conceptualisation of society has already been assumed
while outlining his theory of complex society, but he
also makes this allegiance explicit. For example, he
argues that:
"market-based analyses, such as resource
mobilization theory, dispense with conceptions of
structural boundaries and macro-power relations and
reduce everything- illegitimately- to calculation,
bargaining and exchange. I therefore accept as a
strong working hypothesis the Marxian point that we
live within a system that has a definite logic and
definite limits" [Melucci, 1989, 186]
Despite this allegiance to an objective view of society,
there are pressures from within social movements that
pull apart the notion of an independent social structure
in which movements operate.
Melucci argues that the unity of a new social movement is
created through a collective identity that is negotiated
by actors across a multi-polar action system. This means
that unity is created by actors negotiating common
cognitive frameworks, associational relationships and
affective connections between and within the three
dimensions of the goals, means and environments of a
collective action system. Melucci therefore argues that
part of the means of creating unity in a movement
includes actors negotiating a common cognitive framework
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concerning both the environment in which a movement
exists and the relations between this environment and the
goals and means of a movement.
Melucci's view effectively means that while constructing
their collective identity social movements will define
the social structure in which they operate. This
interpretation of Melucci is supported by his example of
the women's movement, where he wrote of women identifying
a male-dominated world in terms of political equality or
female difference and when he refers to the ecological
movement 'revealing' a systemic social problem and
consequently changing cultural and social reality.
[Melucci, 1989, 93-99]
The paradox is that Melucci's social movements must
develop their own understanding of their environments but
he simultaneously claims that these environments are made
up of complex society whose nature holds across all
social movements. These two claims would not be
contradictory if all social movements developed Melucci's
view of society, but how could this occur and how could
it be guaranteed ? First, Melucci explicitly rejects the
external imposition on movements of a theory of society,
when he rejects Leninism. [Melucci, 1989, 32, 208, 219 &
224] Second, if knowledge of society were considered an
objective structure outside of movements, then Melucci's
theory would collapse back into the dualism he has
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already rejected, as new social movements could be
objectively identified by their position in society. In
addition, if all new social movement's developed the same
theory of the environment in which they operated, then,
on this issue, all new social movements would effectively
be the one movement, because they would all have
negotiated a common identity around transgression. For
these reasons it is likely that different social
movements will develop different theories of society, in
contradiction of Melucci's claim that social movements
exist in the one society that has a definite logic and
limits.
Melucci does not resolve a contradiction in his work
between social movements developing their own cognitive
frameworks concerning the society they exist in and the
objective definition of a society in which movements
operate, whether they know it or not. Further, this
contradiction destabilises some of Melucci's basic
theoretical points. The most obvious of these are, first,
the construction of collective identity and, second, the
nature of 'transgression' because both of these points
become confused between a movement's definition and the
objective definition of society. The first is confused
because it is unclear whether a movement creates its
identity by constructing its own cognitive frameworks
concerning its environment or whether there is an
objective view of this environment. The second is
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confused because the nature of the system that is
transgressed is unclear. Melucci's account of how social
movements are unified and an essential part of his
analytic definition of social movements are both
disrupted by the ambiguity between his theory of society
and his theory of the formation of unity in social
movements.
In summary, Melucci argued that movements were not
unified actors operating according to some form of a
'deep mind' and, instead, could be conceived as having a
multiple and diverse nature. Melucci then had to account
for the unity that underlies such diversity. However, his
account of that unity became caught up in a contradiction
between the belief in a society that has a definite logic
and limits and a belief in the process of unity as being
negotiated within movements. Melucci's account of the
unity of pluralistic social movements is threatened by
this ambiguity, although his overall conception of social
movements as collective action systems is not.
Consequently, in order to develop an adequate view of
emancipatory collectives based on Melucci's theory his
work must now be supplemented by a new definition of the
process of unification of new social movements.
Before giving a definition of this process it should also
be noted that Melucci's specific tripartite definition of
social movements need not be adopted. Instead, it is the
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overall approach that he has developed, where social
movements are viewed as collective action systems which
are beyond the dualism of an objective position in
society or the subjective beliefs of actors in movements,
which will be supplemented. Consequently, Melucci's more
specific theoretical tools, such as the definition of a
social movement through solidarity, conflict and
transgression, need not be adopted but can become
possible tools which may or may not be relevant to
particular analyses of emancipatory collectives. In the
same way the work of Touraine, resource mobilisation
theory and others, is neither rejected, unless of course
it contradicts Melucci's general orientation, nor
accepted but can be held as part of a theoretical armoury
which can be used to analyse any particular social
movement but which is not relevant to the general
orientation that is here being developed. [Diani, 1992]
Following Melucci emancipatory collectives will be
theorised as socially constructed collective action
systems which have no single, formal or hierarchical
organisation which governs them but which, instead,
consist of highly diverse agglomerations of formal and
informal networks. Rather than a specification of a
unique organisational form, the objective social position
of members of a movement or the characteristic beliefs of
members, the ontology of emancipatory collectives will
view movements as internally multiple collections of
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individuals, actions and organisations. To complete such
a pluralistic understanding of emancipatory collectives
the process of a collective becoming unified as a
collective must now be clarified.
The Boundaries For a General Definition of Oppression and
Emancipation.
By definition the unity of an emancipatory social
movement can be sought in its project of emancipation
and/or its experience of oppression. This point merely
underlines the fact that what is at stake in the ontology
of emancipatory collectives is not a general theory of
social movements but an understanding of a liberatory
politics that transcends the difference/value debate.
Accordingly, as a sub-section within the general
perspective of social movement theory, emancipatory
collectives are simply those social movements that
coalesce their various elements around an injustice which
they seek to destroy or a form of liberation that they
wish to enact. To achieve this theory a definition of
emancipation and oppression is now needed.
Liberation, freedom and the end of inequality or
exploitation have all been aims of emancipatory
movements. These words all indicate either the better
life to come or the bad life to be left behind. To create
a definition of oppression and emancipation these
different words now need to be unified, however such a
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unification is not simple for the words carry different
meanings. For example, inequality may indicate that two
groups of people have disproportionate legal rights but
exploitation may indicate that one group steals the
products of another group's labour.
In addition to this difficulty, it is assumed within the
ontology of emancipatory collectives that there are many
different collectives and this means there must also be
many different forms of oppression and emancipation,
because if emancipatory collectives are united around
their oppression then there must be different oppressions
or there would, in fact, only be one emancipatory
collective. Within an ontology that assumes there are
multiple forms of emancipation the question to be asked,
then, is what can be said in general about emancipation
and oppression while simultaneously recognising that each
collective's form of oppression will be specific to it
and so cannot be pre-determined by the general
definition.
Any general notion of emancipation or oppression must now
be rethought, not as a governing idea which subordinates
all collectives to one will, but as a common thread
across emancipatory collectives. Accordingly, the general
definition of oppression can be conceived as a marker
which indicates whether a set of collective action
systems is emancipatory or not but which does not itself
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determine the nature of a particular oppression or
emancipation. The first characteristic of a general
definition of emancipation is therefore that it is an
abstraction, in that it can be used to mark collectives
as emancipatory but is itself no more substantial than
this ability to mark. The general definition is an
intellectual guide which leaves actual political struggle
to the particular movements which can be identified as
emancipatory by that general definition.6
The second characteristic of a general definition of
oppression has already been stated. It is that this
definition must play the role of a unifying factor around
which emancipatory collectives coalesce. If the
definition of emancipatory collectives is that they are
collective action systems that are unified around a
project of emancipation or an experience of oppression,
then the general definition of oppression must be
compatible with this aim. Certain further characteristics
that the general definition must not have, in order to
ensure that the difference/value debate is not restarted,
can also be outlined.
Most obviously, essentialist or naturalist definitions
must not be used as these can anchor a value and so
6 For further discussion of this split between a general
definition and particular manifestations of oppression
see Chapter 10, Section 'Transcendence Between
Emancipatory Collectives'.
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restart the difference/value debate. Instead of natural
or asocial 'essences' that can be accorded to any group
of oppressed people, emancipation must here concern a
relationship of oppression through which the oppressor
and oppressed are defined.
The relationship of oppression also needs to grasp where
both resistance to oppression and the desire to oppress
is based, because if the oppressed and oppressors are
formed through the relationship of oppression it is
possible for the definition to leave no basis for
resistance to oppression. For example, a problem for
Michel Foucault's claim that people's subjectivity is
formed by power is that it is unclear what basis people
will ever have to decide that their subjectivity, and
consequently power, is wrong and so should be changed. If
people are created by power, how can they decide that
power is wrong ? [Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 146-147 &
206-207: Fraser, 1989, 171-175] Accordingly, both the
'will-to-resist' of the oppressed and the 'will-to-
dominate' of the oppressors must have a basis in the
general definition of oppression.
If the first part of the general conception of
emancipation states that it is abstract and the second
that it is a definition of what unifies an emancipatory
collective, then the third states that it is a non-
essentialist relationship between an oppressing
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collective and an oppressed collective, which offers a
basis for the will-to-dominate and the will-to-resist of
the respective collectives. It is in their inter¬
relationship that oppressor, oppressed and oppression
gain their meaning. Three alternatives which appear to
satisfy these boundaries will now be examined. They are
exploitation, alienation and exploitation combined with
alienation. The consequent generalisation of these
examples will then complete a general definition of
emancipation and oppression.
Oppression as Exploitation.
Exploitation is a generalisation of capitalist
exploitation as defined by Marx. Marx argued that
exploitation exists when the capitalist steals the
products of workers' labour in the form of surplus value,
as noted in chapter three. Generalised from Marxism,
exploitation can be defined as a relationship in which
one collective extracts or steals 'something' from at
least one other collective and in doing so enriches
itself while simultaneously impoverishing the robbed.
Exploiters and exploited would be in a relationship
whereby the exploiter directly and disproportionately
benefits from the exploited by systematically stealing an
object from them.
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As this is a general definition the nature of the
'something' that is stolen should be understood in the
broadest possible way. Both material, such as money or
labour, and immaterial, such as dignity or freedom,
objects can be included as long as they can be
transferred between two collectives and can enrich one
while simultaneously impoverishing the other. The
definition of the object which is stolen is therefore
that it is something of value for at least two different
collectives.
Resistance has an immediate basis in the relationship
between the exploited and the stolen object. For
instance, the appropriation for free by capitalists of
products made by workers provides a basis for resistance
in the workers' relationship to the production process.
The will to exploit can also be founded in the exploiters
relationship to the object that is stolen as, by
definition, systematically stealing that object will
enrich members of a collective.
Emancipation, if it were defined through general
exploitation, would be the right of a collective to
utilise all valuable objects that it possesses or




Theories of alienation can be found in several authors
and here brief examples will be given from the work of
Alain Touraine and Simone de Beauvoir. The two examples
share an abstract form which defines alienation as the
ability of one collective to benefit by having its
interests and beliefs defined as the interests and
beliefs of another collective which has different
interests and beliefs.
Touraine argues that alienation exists when a person's
relationship to society and culture is accorded to him or
her in order to maintain the ruling class's dominance. He
notes at least three mechanisms of this domination. The
first is social integration in which a person is
pressured into participating in society. He notes that
this occurs not just in the work-place but also in
consumption and education. The second is cultural
manipulation in which a person's needs and attitudes are
controlled. The last is political aggressiveness in which
the great 'politico-economic organisations' seek
increasing political control over society. These
mechanisms alienate people from their own interests by
forcing them to relate to society according to the
interests of the ruling class. [Touraine, 1969, 6-11;
Touraine, 1977, 167-169 & 326-328]
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De Beauvoir defines the subjection of women to men as the
definition by men of themselves as the Subject and women
as the inessential Other. She argues that, in general, a
Subject can only posit itself through an opposition with
another Subject in which the original Subject asserts
both itself as the essential and makes the Other
inessential. In particular, she argues that men have made
themselves the Subject and women the Other. De Beauvoir
also points out that, unlike other subjections, such as
that between black and white, women cannot dream of
eliminating men as this would ultimately eliminate women
as well. The basic trait of woman is therefore that "she
is the Other in a totality of which the two components
are necessary to one another." [de Beauvoir, 1949, 21 &
Introduction]
De Beauvoir finds this state of woman repugnant because
she defines human freedom as the ability to continually
reach out through new projects into an indefinitely open
future. She writes that:
"Every individual concerned to justify his existence
feels that his existence involves an undefined need
to transcend himself, to engage in freely chosen
projects." [de Beauvoir, 1949, 29]
Women cannot achieve this transcendence because men
confer legitimacy only on male projects and so define
female projects as inessential. Women are alienated
because only male projects have legitimacy and so women
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are forced to undertake these projects rather than
defining their own.
The common form between Touraine and de Beauvoir is that
alienation occurs when one collective benefits by-
ensuring that its interests are adopted by a collective
which has different interests. In alienation the will-to-
resist has a basis in a collective's attempts to define
and achieve its own interests, while the will-to-dominate
is based on the benefits that accrue from imposing a
collective's interests on a different collective.
Emancipation, if it were defined through general
alienation, would be the right of a collective to be
represented by its own interests and oppression would be
the representation of a collective by another
collective's interests.
Oppression as Exploitation and Alienation.
Alienation and exploitation can also be combined to offer
a definition of oppression. Marxism provides an example
of this when alienation, in the form of commodity
fetishism, is used to explain why workers do not
understand and resist their exploitation, which is
understood as the theft of their labour. Workers believe
they are being paid 'a fair days wage for a fair days
work' when in fact the employer is not paying them the
full price of the value that they produce. Having
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accepted the employer's definition of the worth of their
labour workers are thus misdirected from their real
exploitation. In this case the oppressor manages to have
the oppressed adopt its interests in order to prevent the
oppressed understanding their exploitation. Another
example would be de Beauvoir's feminism, where the
alienation of woman as Other is supported and sustained
by exploitation through the theft of domestic labour, [de
Beauvoir, 1949]
In these two examples the questions 'why does oppression
occur' and 'how does oppression occur' are answered by
utilising a combination of exploitation and alienation.
Marxism uses exploitation as the why, through the
extraction of surplus value, and fetishism as the how, in
the workers' belief that they are being fairly paid for
the value they produce. In de Beauvoir the why is
alienation, women's definition as Other, and the how is
exploitation, men's theft of labour from women. Using
Marx and de Beauvoir as models it can be hypothesised
that emancipation and oppression can be defined by
distributing alienation and exploitation across two axes,
one which determines why oppression occurs and the other
how it occurs.
Emancipation in this sense would be a specific
combination of alienation and exploitation, while
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oppression would be the freedom from any such
combination.
The General Definition of Oppression and Emancipation.
The three examples just given all satisfy the three
conditions already set out for a general definition of
emancipation and oppression and there are no obvious
grounds within the ontology of emancipatory collectives
to justify a choice between them. In addition, because
they are all important ways of conceptualising
oppression, any definition that did not include
exploitation, in either the general or Marxist sense, or
alienation can most likely be considered inadequate. This
raises another possibility for the general definition of
oppression, because the alternative to choosing between
the three examples is to include all three within the
definition of oppression as different forms of
oppression. To do this the general definition of
emancipation would have to be posed at a level of
abstraction above that found in exploitation or
alienation. A body of work which addresses oppression at
such a level of generality is the theory of social
closure or exclusion developed by Frank Parkin and
Raymond Murphy. An examination of this work will help to
identify the appropriate level of abstraction for the
general definition of emancipation and oppression.
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Parkin begins by criticising Marxism for not explaining
or encompassing social divisions other than class. Parkin
argues that when race, religion or sexual divisions run
counter to class divisions Marxism cannot account for
these divisions. Further, he claims that these divisions
have become central to understanding collective actions
and so cannot be ignored. [Parkin, 1979, 4-9, 36-37 & 46-
47: Murphy, 1988, 7-8] However, this does not mean that
Parkin and Murphy completely reject Marxism. This may
seem an odd comment as Parkin launches a sustained attack
on Marxism but it is also clear that various Marxist
insights, such as the centrality of property relations in
capitalism, are retained by both himself and Murphy.
[Murphy, 1988, 21-32]
Parkin and Murphy are thus close to the concerns of the
ontology of emancipatory collectives because they
recognise both the legitimacy of many different forms of
politics which are not based on class and the consequent
need to generalise the nature of exploitation from the
extraction of surplus value. Parkin creates this
generalisation by expanding Max Weber's comments on
social closure. He writes:
"By social closure Weber means the process by which
social collectivities seek to maximise rewards by
restricting access to resources and opportunities to
a limited circle of eligibles. This entails the
singling out of certain social or physical
attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion.
Weber suggests that virtually any group attribute-
race, language, social origin, religion- may be
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seized upon provided it can be used for 'the
monopolisation of specific, usually economic
opportunitiesThe distinguishing feature of
exclusionary closure is the attempt by one group to
secure for itself a privileged position at the
expense of some other group through a process of
subordination." [Parkin, 1979, 44-45]
Parkin defines exploitation as any form of exclusion or
social closure and he calls the reverse of exclusion,
that is the excluded's attempts to gain access to
whatever is being monopolised, usurpation. [Parkin, 1979,
71 & 74-86: Murphy, 1988, 8-12 & 53-54] In addition,
Parkin argues that a group that is excluded can seek to
exclude another group and calls this dual closure. For
example, a trade union, that represents labourers who are
excluded from property, may seek to exclude women from
labouring work. [Parkin, 1979, 89-93: Murphy, 1988, 53]
A general definition of oppression, using Parkin's theory
of exclusion, would make it the restriction of access to
any resource or opportunity and, correspondingly,
emancipation would be free access to all resources and
opportunities. In this way the theory of social closure
seems to provide the basis for a definition of oppression
that is more general than either exploitation or
alienation. As Parkin also argues that social closures
concern collective actions it might be hypothesised that
the theory of social closure is, in fact, the general
definition of oppression that is needed by the ontology
of emancipatory collectives. [Parkin, 1979, 113] However,
this is not so.
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Exclusion is only a partially adequate basis for
oppression because it fails to grasp that oppression can
also involve inclusion. This objection is similar to
Foucault's rejection of the repression hypothesis
concerning the control of sexuality. Foucault argues that
sexuality is not just repressed but is also produced. For
Foucault, if power tries to control sexuality it does not
just try to prevent sexuality overflowing restrictive
boundaries, but also creates forms of sexuality which
reinforce and promote power. [Foucault, 1976, 15-49]
Exclusion and monopolisation are somewhat like repression
in that they are based on the prevention of access to
some collective actions and do not address the
possibility that exploitation can be created or
maintained by promoting some collective actions.
For example, women have been included in the workforce in
the U.K. in the First and Second World Wars but then
excluded when the war ended. This might seem a clear
example of closure theory as women were excluded from job
opportunities they had access to during war-time, but the
process of women moving out of the workforce included the
promotion of motherhood as women's desired role in life.
Women were not simply excluded from the workforce but
were simultaneously included in a different social
position which in turn promoted their exclusion.
[Phillips, 1987, 58-61] Similarly, Foucault and others
have traced the way that certain personal disciplines,
252
such as punctuality and reliability, had to be taken up
by workers on a mass scale in order for large-scale
industry to operate. Foucault shows that it was not
simply a matter of excluding workers from ownership of
the means of production but also of managing their
subjectivity into roles which would support industry.
[Foucault, 1975b] In both these cases it would be foolish
to suggest that exclusion from opportunities and
resources was not operating, but it would also be narrow
to suggest that exclusion was all that was occurring.
The introduction of Foucault also raises an important
underlying point which can be brought out by interpreting
his work as the opposite of exclusion theory. Throughout
his work Foucault examines how people's subjectivity, in
for example their sexuality or their work habits, is
managed and developed by systems of power that try to
create subjects which support a certain society or power
relation. For example, he notes that sexuality did not
exist as a term before the nineteenth century and that
his history of sexuality would therefore show:
"how an 'experience' came to be constituted in
Western societies, an experience that caused
individuals to recognise themselves as subjects of a
'sexuality', which was accessible to very diverse
fields of knowledge and linked to systems of rules
and constraints." [Foucault, 1984a, 4: Foucault,
1981]
In general, Foucault can be characterised as arguing that
people are produced as subjects by certain relations of
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power which constitute their nature, for example their
needs or desires, in certain ways in order to continue
these power relations. His work can thus be interpreted
as the antithesis of closure theory because he does not
deal with the exclusion of people from certain social
opportunities but with the way people are produced so
that they will want inclusion within only some social
opportunities. As Barry Barnes has said if closure theory
concerns how 'people are in society', then Foucault's
work concerns how 'society is in people'.
When these two different visions are pushed into a direct
opposition, closure theory can be interpreted as
concerning the way people can be oppressed by means
external to them, while Foucault addresses internal
oppression.7 Accordingly, the general definition of
oppression can be clarified by asking where it stands on
this divide. Does the definition of oppression conceive
it as being imposed on people or can oppression enter
into the subjectivities of individuals ?
One of the innovations of post-sixties anti-oppression
movements, particularly perhaps the feminist movement,
was to emphasise that the 'personal is political'. That
is, how individuals think and act in relation to each
7 Pushing Foucault and exclusion theory into this direct
opposition does stereotype both theories and, though this
is useful in the present context, these stereotypes
should not be taken for complete representations of their
work.
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other is infused with politics and so oppression is no
longer simply 'out there' in objective social structures
but is also 'inside people's heads'. This would indicate
support for Foucault's vision. However, this concern with
internal oppression has not necessarily led to a
rejection of external oppressions, rather they it has
joined external oppression. Many on the left have
affirmed both Foucault and exclusion theory's visions of
society by arguing that the interrelations between
oppressions that are external and internal to individuals
both need to be examined. This is combination is also
probably a more accurate reflection of Foucault's own
views. [Phillips, 1987, 111]
The ontology of emancipatory collectives can follow the
claim that oppression is both within and without an
individual's subjectivity, thereby avoiding a choice
between the different forms of oppression articulated by
Foucault and exclusion theory. The definition of
oppression that will be proposed herein will accordingly
remain agnostic on the choice between oppression within
and without people and so will hold open both
possibilities. In this way the insight that the personal
is political can be retained along with the belief that
oppression can result from social structures.
To achieve this agnosticism the first condition of the
general definition of oppression can be recalled. It
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states that oppression is an abstraction which is only
ever realised in particular instances. On the basis of
this condition the general definition of oppression can
consistently argue that both or either Foucault's and
exclusion theory's visions of oppression may be realised
in particular, material instances of oppression, without
that definition ever making an abstract choice in favour
of one or the other. Specific analyses which utilise the
definition of oppression will thus need to consider both
these types of oppression. Foucault's and exclusion
theory's vision thus join detailed social movement
theories and exploitation and alienation in the
theoretical armoury that the ontology of emancipatory
collectives can employ to analyse any specific oppression
or emancipation, but have no general significance.
To complete the identification of general definition of
emancipation and oppression the third of the three
conditions for that definition that have already been
delineated should now be recalled. It states that
oppression is a non-essentialist collective relationship
through which the parties to it are formed and in which
both the will-to-dominate and the will-to-resist are
based. Exploitation, alienation and exclusion all agree
with this condition because they all address an
oppressive relationship between collectives and try to
specify what occurs in that relationship. Exploitation is
centred around a notion of theft, alienation exists when
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one group's interests are taken by other groups for their
own interests and exclusion focuses on access to
resources. What all three share is the conception of a
relationship in which at least one collective enriches
itself by simultaneously impoverishing at least one other
collective. Where exploitation, alienation and exclusion
diverge is when they specify the mechanism of enrichment
and impoverishment as either theft, one collectives'
interests standing for several collectives' interests or
one collective monopolising opportunities.
To achieve a level of generality which encompasses
alienation, exploitation and exclusion the definition of
oppression needs to be generalised from theft, the
misapprehension of self-interest or the monopolisation of
resources. The definition should therefore leave the
mechanism of oppression untheorised beyond the claim that
oppression exists when one collective benefits because
another collective is simultaneously deprived. A
mechanism of oppression exists when whatever enriches one
collective simultaneously impoverishes another collective
In accordance with the first condition of the definition
of oppression more specific conceptions of mechanism of
oppression can only be expected from within analyses of
actually existing emancipatory collectives. For example,
Marxism can specify the oppression of workers in
industrial capitalism as the theft of labour and de
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Beauvoir can specify the oppression of women as that men
define them as the inessential Other, but their
definitions only hold in relation to the particular forms
of oppression which Marx and de Beauvoir address, while
at the general level no presumption toward either
exploitation or alienation is made.
The general definition of emancipation would now consist
of the three boundaries or conditions that have already
been outlined, with the third altered to include what is
common to exploitation, alienation and exclusion. The
third condition would then read, that emancipation and
oppression are created by a relationship between two or
more collectives in which at least one collective
enriches itself or is enriched by a mechanism which
simultaneously impoverishes at least one other
collective.
The will-to-resist and the will-to-dominate of the
respective collectives can also be derived from this
definition, as enrichment is the incentive to oppress and
impoverishment the pain to be resisted. For example, the
will to resist patriarchy can be located by de Beauvoir
in women's fight to be considered a Subject with projects
of its own and women's resistance will consist of
striving to throw off this status of Other, by rejecting
male projects and defining female ones. Similarly, the
will of men to continue oppressing women can be located
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in their need to continue to define themselves as
Subjects through the exclusion of woman as the Other.
In the definition of oppression being proposed the nature
of the mechanism that enriches one collective, while
impoverishing another can only be known in particular
instances of oppression. No candidate should therefore be
a priori excluded. This means that all possible objects,
such as time, money, labour or dignity, and mechanisms,
such as theft or terrorism, form possibilities which may
or may not be able to be located in actually existing
collectives. Unfortunately, 'enrich' and 'impoverish'
imply pre-existing understandings of these words and, in
particular, imply monetary imbalances, but no such
implication is intended and, in the ontology of
emancipatory collectives, enrich and impoverish should be
interpreted in the widest possible manner.
In summary, the general definition of oppression is three
part. First, it conceives oppression at an abstract level
while also noting that manifestations of oppression only
ever exist in particular material situations. Second, it
claims that oppression is the unity around which
particular movements coalesce their collective action
systems. Third, it argues that oppression is a non-
essentialist relationship in which at least one
collective enriches itself or is enriched by a mechanism
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that simultaneously impoverishes at least one other
collective.
Pulling Themselves Up By Their Bootstraps.
A second supplement to Melucci's theory of social
movements as collective action systems now needs to be
considered because, though the definition of oppression
makes clear the source of an emancipatory collective's
unity, the process of constructing this unity has not
been analysed. The second supplement, which allows the
full definition of emancipatory collectives, is an
explanation of the process by which collective action
systems create their unity.
Put simply, unity is articulated by emancipatory
collectives through self-definition. Self-definition is
demanded because within the ontology of emancipatory
collectives there is no authoritative place from which a
movement can be defined and unified, other than from
within that movement. This is for two reasons.
First, to define a collective or movement from outside of
itself would resurrect the difference/value debate by
creating some position of authority outside of movements,
thereby providing the basis for the assertion of an
authoritative value. For example, if oppression were
defined as the restriction of anyone's liberty and
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liberty were therefore posited as an absolute value which
was valid across all emancipatory collectives, then
difference could reassert itself by questioning the
nature of liberty for particular collectives. Women's
liberty may not be the same as workers' or gays' and
lesbians' and the difference/value debate could be
reinitiated through arguments over differences to the
unified value 'liberty'.
Second, if emancipatory collectives define themselves by
criteria external to themselves then actors from outside
of a collective may define oppression for members of such
a collective. This means that actors who are not
oppressed, in a particular sense, may attempt to define
oppression on behalf of the oppressed. Such an occurrence
can be rejected because, apart from its paternalistic
overtones, the left's collective memory claims that if
some group defines the nature of an oppression that they
do not actually suffer, then this will most likely
continue oppression by creating a definition that does
not correspond to the oppressed's experience of
oppression. For example, if Marxists define the unity of
black liberation struggles they will do this by Marxist
criteria and are therefore likely to miss or downgrade
important aspects of black struggles, such as those
Gilroy has noted in the connection between the actions of
black workers and the experiences of young black people.
[Gilroy, 1987, 18-20]
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In order to ensure that a collective develops a clear
sense of its oppression, it must create that sense
itself. Anne Phillips expresses the power of self-
definition when she notes that her commitment to feminism
was related to her self whereas her commitment to
socialism was more abstract.
"And for those who had been dogged by the
ambiguities in being both middle class and
socialist, it was part of the appeal of women's
politics that it seemed to sweep these away.
Speaking for myself, I can remember the
extraordinary relief of discovering that I too was
oppressed, that no longer the 'maid in the attic of
someone else's movement' I was now a full fledged
proprietor in my own right. It sounds absurd- who
wants to be oppressed ?- but the power of feminist
politics was that it arose from personal experience
and compared with the more theoretical, perhaps
altruistic, basis on which I adhered to a socialist
politics, this seemed much more real. The women's
movement was about us not them" [Phillips, 1987,
111]
Self-definition is necessary, however it also appears to
contradict Melucci's approach. Melucci defines social
movements beyond the values and beliefs of the actors in
them but self-definition appears to make such beliefs
central again by relying on the definitions of oppression
made by actors in a movement. However, examination of the
process of self-definition shows that it does not
necessarily result in a unity which is at the mercy of
the changing beliefs of any individual, even if it is
formed through the self-definitions of individuals. Barry
Barnes' account of social life as bootstrapped induction
demonstrates how a process of individuals making self-
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validating inferences can constitute stable forms of
social organisation. [Barnes, 1983]
Barnes notes that the objectivity created by a system of
self-definitions is the same objectivity as that which
underlies a bank. He argues that a bank is based on a
system of designations by individuals that regard the
bank as 'sound' and this can be seen most clearly when
there is a run on a bank created by people withdrawing
their designation of the bank as sound and so also
withdrawing their money. Once such a run is started the
system of definitions as sound which supported the bank
can guickly become unravelled leading to the bank's
collapse. The creation of a bank can also be seen to be
based on people's self-definitions because as people
begin to deposit their money, and so designate the bank
as sound, the system grows thereby confirming the
soundness of the bank and building it until the bank's
soundness has been objectively established. [Barnes,
1983, 536-538]
In general, Barnes argues that a system of many people
making a certain designation may be tautological when
taken as an individual act, for example an act is
oppressive because someone says it is oppressive or a
bank is sound because it is believed to be sound, but it
may be non-subjective when that individual act is part of
a whole system of similar designations. Each individual
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designation feeds back into a system of self-definitions,
further establishing it and so 'bootstrapping' the system
into existence. Barnes notes that as the number of
designations in a system increases so the individual
contribution of any one individual decreases.
Consequently, he argues that individuals' "knowledge
increasingly approximates to knowledge of what other
people are doing" or, put another way, "collectivity
creates its reference". [Barnes, 1983, 533 & 536]
From the individuals' viewpoint the referent created by a
collective achieves greater and greater objectivity as
the collective grows. That is, as a system of self-
definitions grows larger the ability of any individual
designation to alter the overall system is progressively
'damped' by the weight of other designations. This means
that when a large system is in place it will not be
susceptible to one designation instituting fundamental
change. In this sense the overall system achieves
objectivity. The process of bootstrapped self-definition
thus shows how an emancipatory collective can begin from
individual self-definitions as oppressed and grow into an
objectively existing structure. However, the system is
also never free from change instituted by self-
designations because each designation continues to
feedback into the overall system and so still has an
effect. It is simply that the larger the system the more
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damped any individual's effect will be. [Barnes, 1983,
536 ]
An example of bootstrapping can be found in feminism's
use of consciousness raising groups. In consciousness
raising small groups of women meet to discuss the
relationship between their personal experiences and
women's oppression in general and so the groups provide a
forum in which women are able to self-designate
themselves as feminists and become part of an overall
movement. However, women who came into these groups in
the eighties, rather than the sixties, had to place
themselves in the more developed structure of history,
organisation and texts which had grown up around women's
liberation. These women thus made self-designations in a
far more developed structure than earlier feminists. This
does not mean that feminism cannot be altered but that
alterations in the eighties occurred in a more objective
framework than existed in the sixties. [Rowbotham, 1990,
3-4: Evans, 1980] For example, when black women and
lesbians claimed they were not included by feminism's
definition of oppression, they did so against feminism's
already established understandings of women's place in
the family or women's sexual exploitation. Black women
and lesbians self-defined themselves as being outside the
established structures of feminism and because many women
then changed their definition of the oppression of women
the structures of feminism then changed.
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Another example of the development of the feminist
framework can be found when Lynne Segal recounts how, at
the nineteen seventy-five Socialist-Feminist conference
in London, women from some Trotskyist groups organised
the conference around a series of large plenaries with
speakers. Segal claims that this left little space for
smaller working groups to discuss a wide range of issues
and was aimed at trying to introduce a central committee
which would direct the women's movement solely into a
campaign for abortion on demand. This attempt to hijack
the conference and the movement led to that conference's
collapse and a failure to hold any similar conferences
for three years. It also left an enduring suspicion of
the manipulatory techniques of Trotskyist groups, as can
be seen in the highly critical analysis of Leninism and
Trotskyism contained in the book Beyond the Fragments.
[Rowbotham et.al., 1979] Any woman entering the
socialist-feminist movement in the years following these
events who also wanted to create links with Trotskyism
would thus be confronted by the overall system of
socialist-feminism which included many designations
claiming that such links are problematic if not
dangerous. [Segal, 1987, 43-55: Phillips, 1987, 134-143:
Rowbotham et.al., 1979: Rowbotham, 1990]
It should also be noted that a range of elements can be
utilised in the bootstrapping process. Texts, events,
organisational forms and particular charismatic
266
individuals can all influence the self-designations that
make up a bootstrapped system. Some of these may also
gain a disproportionate influence over a system. For
example, the texts of Marx have more power over self-
definitions of socialism than most other relevant texts
or individuals. Nevertheless, in the final analysis the
process of bootstrapping can only coalesce collective
actions into an emancipatory collective if enough people
make enough self-definitions.
In summary, self-definition, as a system of bootstrapped
induction, demonstrates how a collective may begin with
individuals simply defining themselves as oppressed and
then grow into a social movement whose understandings and
definitions form a stable and non-subjective base for
actions and beliefs. The sense of oppression and
emancipation unifying an emancipatory collective will
accordingly not be subject to the whims of any
individual, while it will also both have been derived
from self-definitions made by individuals and will
ultimately be subject to those definitions.
Emancipatory Collectives.
The ontology of emancipatory collectives consists of
social movements each of which addresses a particular
project of emancipation or experience of oppression. The
ontology is thus made up of many different forms of
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liberation, each of which concerns a relationship of
oppression between at least two collectives.
Oppression within the ontology of emancipatory
collectives is defined as a relationship in which at
least two sets of collective action systems are
constituted in opposition to each other because one
collective enriches itself or is enriched in a way that
simultaneously, and because it enriches that collective,
impoverishes another collective. Neither collective needs
to be considered a unified body based on either a
particular ideology, a distinctive organisation or the
objective social position of its members. Instead, these
collectives can be understood as sets of collective
action systems which may include a pluralistic range of
elements, from formal organisations to texts, individuals
and informal networks. Emancipatory collectives are
unified around their emancipatory project or their
oppressive experience and are diversified through the
wide range of elements that make up their collective
action systems.
The process of self-definition which constitutes a
movement's unity consists of self-designations as
oppressed or emancipatory made by actors which loop back
into a system made out of these designations. As any such
system grows it becomes an increasingly objective
structure, though it is never complete nor fully stable
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because designations continue to be made. However, the
larger a system becomes the more strongly grounded it
becomes, so that it can attain a bank-like objectivity.
In this way, collective action systems can pull
themselves up by their own bootstrapped self-definitions
and form emancipatory collectives which posit objectively
existing oppressions.
The next major question will be, how do these
emancipatory collectives relate to each other ? The
individual characteristics of collectives have been
outlined but what implications do these characteristics
have for interactions or communications between
emancipatory movements ? These question will be taken up
in the next chapter.
The theory so far developed concerns emancipatory
collectives that fight the oppressions that their members
designate and adjust their understandings of oppression
as their members change their definitions of oppression.
Emancipatory collectives seek to change oppression in
society from the perspective of those who are
impoverished in society.
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Chapter Nine; The Space of Emancipatory Politics.
Misunderstanding and Assimilation.
The relations that develop between emancipatory
collectives create the general 'space' of emancipatory
politics and a theory of that space can be developed from
the nature of those collectives. As this theory concerns
the same level of generality as the definition of
oppression it will not specify exactly what relations
emancipatory collectives have with each other, but will
instead articulate the framework within which inter-
collective relations develop. This framework consists of
two axes called misunderstanding and assimilation.
Emancipatory collectives base their actions and
discourses in different self-definitions of oppression
and they hold their self-definitions with passion because
they are a collectives' definition of what is wrong and
must be changed in society. Accordingly, what can be
known of one collective by another collective will be
coloured or structured by the discourses and actions of
the 'knowing' collective. The understanding developed by
an emancipatory collective of a different oppression,
that is the relations that are developed when elements of
different movement's collective actions systems come into
contact, will thus be influenced by a collective's
understanding of its own oppression. Collectives will
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therefore continually be influenced to misunderstand each
other.
For example, Segal recounts how socialist-feminists
attending the fourth British socialist-feminist
conference, held in nineteen seventy-four, were asked to
consider the question "Do we see the women's movement as
some kind of vanguard movement or as a petty-bourgeois
movement which may be ideologically useful but is
essentially marginal to the main political struggle".
[Segal, 1987, 50] The organisers who framed the question
clearly viewed the women's movement from a Leninist
perspective in which socialist-feminism could only be
either part of the vanguard party and the revolutionary
struggle or part of the peripheral petty-bourgeois
struggle. The conference organisers viewed the women's
movement from a basis in Marxism and so imposed on
feminism categories developed in that struggle. In doing
so feminism was misunderstood, as became obvious when
women objected and reasserted its diverse nature. [Segal,
1987, 51]
The cross axis to misunderstanding can occur if some
collectives come to a total understanding of each other
by merging their self-definitions of oppression. Each
emancipatory collective bases its own discourses and
actions in its self-definition of oppression, accordingly
if a collective gives up its own self-definition for that
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of another discourse or if several collectives merge
their self-definitions then these collectives will have
to give up their particular identity for a common
identity.
For example, the socialist-feminist conferences described
by Segal could have turned out differently. The majority
of women might have accepted the characterisation of
socialist-feminism that some Trotskyist women proposed
and so placed the class struggle first, thereby making
feminism subordinate to the Leninist party's fight to
institute the dictatorship of the proletariat. If this
had occurred, and plainly there were at least some women
who agreed with such a view, then socialist-feminism
would have effectively become part of the worker's
movement. [Weir and Wilson, 1984]
In summary, in the ontology of emancipatory collectives
relations between collectives, that is the space of
emancipatory politics, can be theorised as a framework
with the two axes of misunderstanding and assimilation.
Misunderstanding is an influence because collectives are
known by other collectives through the preconceptions of
those other collective and not through a collective's own
preconceptions. Assimilation influences collectives to
alter their preconceptions to those of another collective
and so, in fact, become part of that collective. The
extremes of one movement totally misunderstanding or
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completely assimilating another emancipatory movement
should not, however, be understood as two alternatives
for inter-collective relations, instead they form the two
axes of a framework within which various alternatives can
be realised. Neither are the two axes mutually exclusive.
It can therefore be expected that the pluralistic nature
of emancipatory collectives will allow the development of
various levels and combinations of misunderstanding and
assimilation between collectives.
Misunderstanding.
The misunderstandings emancipatory collectives make of
each other should not be interpreted as errors or
carelessness, as if scrupulous attention to the
discourses of another collective would make them
transparent. Neither should they be understood as
malicious or wilful, as if one collective decides not to
understand another. Instead misunderstandings are a
condition of inter-collective relations. Emancipatory
collectives exist because their various collective action
systems are unified around an experience of oppression
and it is from this basis that a movement's collective
action systems will be able to view the theories and
actions of another emancipatory collective. This basis
will then, with no malice or incompetence, structure one
collective's understanding of other collectives and so
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will ensure that a pull toward misunderstanding is
present.
For example, Jenny Bourne notes that the left has had
difficulty recognising its own racism. She argues that in
the seventies, in Britain, black workers were generally
supported by the left only when they participated in
recognisably working class activity. Specifically black
demands, such as action against police or the education
system or building a 'black infrastructure' by organising
supplementary schools and community organisations,
usually went unrecognised and unsupported by the left.
Worse, such demands were sometimes dismissed as
reactionary black nationalism. [Bourne, 1983]
"The left had no conception of state racism or of
black oppression and was unable to comprehend, let
alone applaud, any black 'self-activity' or any
black analysis of society which stressed aspects
other than those of class exploitation. It viewed
these as 'splitist' (at best) or as racism in
reverse (at worst)." [Bourne, 1983, 6]
Bourne argues that the left focused on class struggle and
so could not understand black people's struggles against
their oppression. Instead the left viewed these
activities, first, as a threat to working class unity
and, second, as the building of a nationalism that, from
the class point of view, was politically dubious. The
left's interpretation of society as a class determined
society thus led it to misunderstand both the oppression
of black people and their struggle for emancipation.
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Another example where black liberation has been
misunderstood is in relation to feminist theories of the
family. In the nineteen seventies feminism argued that
the nuclear family was a key source of oppression for
women but feminism also failed to take account of the
different family structures that exist in black and white
communities. For instance, statistics give a different
picture of the economic role of black and white women in
British families, with white women shouldering far less
financial responsibility than black women. In addition,
black families have been important sources of support for
black liberation struggles and white feminists failed to
include these actions in any more positive assessment of
the family. White feminists thus misunderstood black
families by assuming that black and white families were
the same. [Barrett and Mcintosh 1982: Barrett and
Mcintosh, 1985: Nain, 1991, 8-10: Amos and Parma, 1984,
9-11]
In this example inter-collective relations developed as
feminists tried to understand the objections black women
made about the feminist theory of the family. An instance
of this process was the journal Feminist Review offering
some black women control of an edition, in which these
women discussed the problem of the family. The authors of
a prominent feminist analysis of the family, Barrett and
Mcintosh, subsequently altered their views to try and
incorporate the points made by black women, while also
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retaining their own perspective. Their attempt at
revision led in turn to a series of critical replies from
black women. Inter-collective relations were developed in
this example but they did so under the influence of
misunderstanding. [Amos and Parma, 1984: Barrett and
Mcintosh, 1985: Ramazanoglu, 1986: Kazi, 1986: Lees,
1986: Mirza, 1986]
An example of reciprocal misunderstanding occurred when
feminists held demonstrations against sexual violence in
predominantly black areas. The feminist actions
reinforced media, police and community stereotypes of the
sexual danger posed by black men, but because some of
these areas were also 'red light' districts they were
prime targets for protests against the sexual
exploitation of women. In this case, feminists often did
not see the oppression of black people, a point made
particularly clear by the occasional call by feminists
for better policing in an area where black people already
suffered authoritarian styles of policing, but feminists
also had valid reasons within their own understanding of
oppression for targeting these areas. In this case the
misunderstandings were two-way, with white feminists and
black activists focusing on different interpretations of
the protest areas depending on whether they based their
views on feminism or black liberation. [Bhavnani and
Coulson, 1986, 82-84: Amos and Parma, 1984, 14: Bourne,
1983, 13]
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A more detailed example of inter-collective relations
developing under the influence of misunderstanding is
Lindsay Murphy and Jonathan Livingstone's article calling
for feminism to abandon a male versus female view of the
world in favour of a materialism that includes both the
determining power of the mode of production and a theory
of racism. Murphy and Livingstone claim that feminism
grew out of a disillusionment with socialist politics but
that, instead of contributing to a reordered socialism,
it deviated from materialist beliefs and developed a
'radical feminism'. They outline this radical feminism in
seven points which, they claim, are inextricably
intertwined and form the "logical conclusion of a
feminism not thoroughly socialist". [Livingstone and
Murphy, 1985, 61-62]
Livingstone and Murphy's seven point feminism is that:
the oppression of women is the most fundamental
oppression; women have a primary commonality or
sisterhood; patriarchy is independent of capitalism;
power is the personal power of men over women; all men
are sexist; men and women have an essence; and,
separatism of men and women is the goal of feminism.
[Livingstone and Murphy, 1985, 62-3] Livingstone and
Murphy establish to their own satisfaction that this is
the only type of feminism that it is logically necessary
to deal with, because this is the nature of feminism that
is not thoroughly socialist, and then have little
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difficulty in showing that such a female centred view of
the world cannot incorporate the insights of the black or
socialist movement. Worse, radical feminism is actually a
block to liberation.
"Subsuming racism to patriarchy, as radical feminism
must do, denies the autonomy of the black struggle.
It seduces the struggle away from attacking racism
and engages it in frivolous arguments and
superfluous activities." [Livingstone and Murphy,
1985, 69]
Livingstone and Murphy end by calling on feminism to
reintegrate itself with the one unified but tripartite
struggle against capitalism, patriarchy and whitearchy.
Livingstone and Murphy are a particularly strong
misinterpretation of feminism with their straw-like
version of radical feminism being taken to represent all
of the women's movement and their condescending language
in which women 'seduce' and are concerned with the
'frivolous' and 'superfluous'. Nonetheless, what is
interesting is that Livingstone and Murphy's
misinterpretation is based on their own interpretation of
materialism. They accuse feminism of severing women from
the structural oppression inflicted on them by the
economic system in favour of basing oppression in the
individual beliefs of men and women. From Livingstone and
Murphy's point of view radical feminism failed to
understand that all oppression is interrelated and based
in the economic system.
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According to Livingstone and Murphy, radical feminism is
not only a threat to the unified struggle of blacks,
women and workers but is itself threatened by the
possibility of this unified struggle, as it would
undermine feminism's division of the world into male
oppressor and female oppressed. [Livingstone and Murphy,
1985, 67] But this either/or confrontation between
radical feminism and the unified struggle against
oppression is created not so much from feminism's
viewpoint but from Livingstone and Murphy's which,
because it is committed to one unified struggle based in
the mode of production, must see any beliefs
contradictory to their own as competitors. What can be
learnt from Livingstone and Murphy's attack on the
women's movement is thus more about their
misunderstandings than it is about feminism.
In summary, inter-collective relations are developed from
each collectives' different self-definitions and so
collectives will be influenced to misunderstand each
other by viewing a different collective through the
viewing, and not the viewed, collective's own
preconceptions. An important issue, then, is whether
inter-collective relations can ever give rise to a
genuine understanding between collectives. As already
indicated there is a second axis to inter-collective




Assimilation influences collectives toward two or more
collectives developing relations through various
collective action systems, then beginning to create the
same collective actions and, eventually, adopting the
same understanding of oppression or emancipation. In
theory, the result would be that different collectives
would become the one collective because they would have
developed the same unifying definition of oppression and
emancipation.
For example, an important early demand of the feminist
movement was for women to have control of their
fertility. This was expressed in one of the seven demands
of British feminism that were enunciated in nineteen
seventy:
"We want to be free to choose when and how many kids
we have, if any". [Phillips, 1987, 110]
This demand became, by the late seventies, centered on a
claim for free, safe abortion on demand. However, black
women argued that their interests were not met by this
demand because for them the issue was not so much the
termination of pregnancy, as the right to control their
reproduction. This difference stemmed from the
experiences of black women which involved sterilisation
without consent, the use of the dangerous contraceptive
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drug depo-provera without consent and generally easy
access to abortion from doctors who appeared to be eager
to prevent black children. The Brixton Black Women's
Groups felt that "abortion wasn't something we had any
problems getting as black women- it was the very reverse
for us !" [Quoted in Nain, 1991, 10-11: Amos and Parma,
1984, 12-13: Barrett and Mcintosh, 1985, 40-41] Feminists
and black women therefore initially had a problem of
misunderstanding over abortion rights. However, this
particular relationship of misunderstanding lead to a
reassessment by black and white women of their positions
and the partial assimilation of the two movements.
Organisational assimilation can be seen when the pressure
created by the misunderstanding led to a split in the
National Abortion Campaign and the formation of two
different groups. One group continued the campaign around
abortion rights, but the other was a reproductive rights
group which included the right to abortion among the
other rights women need to control their own bodies. The
claims for abortion rights had reflected white women's
key demand, but some white women now revised their
position and with black women returned a woman's right to
control her reproduction to its full interpretation,
which reflected both black and white women's demands.
Simultaneously, some black women reconsidered their view
of abortion and recognised that restrictions on a woman's
right to abortion could mean a return to back street
281
abortion, which might in turn increase the use of depo-
provera to prevent black women conceiving. Some black
women thus saw a need to support abortion rights in order
to maintain control of their bodies. In short, black and
white women came to posit a common oppression in their
lack of control over reproduction and a common part of
their emancipation in a woman's right to abortion. [Nain,
1991, 10: Amos and Parma, 1984, 12-13]]
In this common commitment to reproductive rights certain
collective actions of both the women's and the black
people's movements were merged and it makes sense to
speak of these two movements becoming, in part, the one
set of collective actions. However, this does not mean
the two movements were completely unified. As already
noted assimilation is an axis of influence, not a
category. In this case some collective actions of the
black and feminist movements drew together to become the
same actions, which does not mean that all the various
collective actions of both movements were completely
merged. For example, the misunderstanding between
feminism and black liberation over 'reclaim the night'
marches in black communities occurred at the same time
that common understandings were developing between black
and white women over reproductive rights.
In summary, assimilation is an influence that occurs when
parts of some emancipatory collectives come to see,
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through interactions between the elements of their
collective action systems, an identity or unity in at
least part of their self-definitions of emancipation or
oppression. Assimilations are a form of understanding
that can develop between collectives, even though it is
an understanding based on the merging of collectives and
not on transparent communication between independent
collectives. Overall, when emancipatory collectives
relate to each other they therefore do so within the two
general axes of misunderstanding each other or merging
with each other. While the nature of the framework should
now be clear more detailed theories of inter-collective
relations also have a place in the ontology of
emancipatory collectives and the next section will
consider this place.
Inter-Collective Relations.
The ontology of emancipatory collectives does not
predetermine the details of inter-collective relations,
instead it establishes the framework of misunderstanding
and assimilation within which these relations occur. The
framework consists of two axes of influence but, in
practice, the realisation of a pure version of either
pole is unlikely. In addition, the two poles are not
mutually exclusive. Accordingly, the actual relationships
that emancipatory collectives develop will be distributed
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across the two axes in positions that cannot be predicted
by the framework itself.
The exact form of relations that particular collectives
develop can only be determined by empirical analysis of
really existing relations. However, theories of inter-
collective relations more detailed than the
misunderstanding and assimilation framework can be used
to analyse particular situations. For example, two
theories which might be used to analyse particular
instances of inter-collective relations are Melucci's
analysis of mobilisations and Alisdair Maclntyre's theory
of primary and secondary virtues. Melucci's theory of
mobilisation has already been outlined in chapter eight,
when it was used to describe how several emancipatory
collectives can join together in a short-term campaign
over a specific issue and this theory may be applicable
to some particular sets of inter-collective relations,
though they would also have to be set within the two axes
of misunderstanding and assimilation. Similarly,
Maclntyre's theory can be used as an understanding of
inter-collective relations and it will be useful to
briefly demonstrate this.
Maclntyre distinguishes between primary and secondary
virtues in this way:
"I call these secondary virtues for this reason,
that their existence in a moral scheme of things as
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virtues is secondary to, is if you like parasitic
upon, the notion of another primary set of virtues
which are directly related to the goals which men
pursue as the ends of their lives. The secondary
virtues do not assist us in identifying which ends
we should pursue. The assumption made when they are
commended is that men are already pursuing certain
ends, and that they have to be told to modify their
pursuit of these ends in certain ways. The secondary
virtues concern the way in which we should go about
our projects; their cultivation will not assist us
in discovering upon which project we ought to be
engaged." [Maclntyre, 1967, 24]
For Maclntyre primary virtues express the ultimate goals
or ends of people's lives, while secondary virtues
concern the way that people carry out those ends. He then
points out that a common allegiance to secondary virtues
can be achieved even if primary virtues are different and
so groups of people with different primary goals in life
can achieve some form of alliance, without compromising
their primary virtues, by creating common secondary
virtues. [Maclntyre, 1967, 21-24]
For example, Maclntyre argues that in nineteenth century
England workers and employers had divergent primary
virtues but were able to create common ground through
secondary virtues defined around a concept of
'Englishness'. This Englishness privileged the values of
pragmatism, co-operativeness, fairness, tolerance and
compromise. Once workers and employers became committed
to these values the way was open for some employers to
agree with the legalisation of trade unions as a fair or
English way of conducting business and for some workers
to become more concerned with rates of pay and aiding
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industrial competitiveness than with revolutionary claims
because this accorded with English pragmatism. Although
different primary virtues existed in both groups
Maclntyre claims they were able to develop common ground
through a common conception of Englishness. [Maclntyre,
1967, 22-24 & 26-27]
Maclntyre's primary and secondary virtues can be viewed
as a theory of relations that emancipatory collectives
might develop. For example, there is Hilary Wainwright's
call, quoted in chapter one, for the renewal of a unified
socialist struggle on the basis of a common commitment to
the right to 'control one's own life'. [Wainwright, 1979,
5-6]
Wainwright realised that the political interests of such
groups as women, black people, trade unionists, gays,
youth and national minorities are divergent. She also
recognised that these groups' interests may at times be
antagonistic to each other. However, she also believed
that an overall socialist struggle is necessary for the
true liberation of all these groups and so she called on
them to unite through a common interest in 'control of
their own lives'. [Wainwright, 1979, 5-6] In Maclntyre's
terms Wainwright recognised the divergent primary virtues
of these groups and then brought forward a secondary
virtue aimed at processes rather than ends. Here 'control
of one's own life' becomes a means to combat the
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oppression of women, black people, trade unionists and
gays and lesbians and so is a secondary virtue dependant
on these groups' prior understanding of the life they
wish to control. In this way Wainwright can be
interpreted as suggesting that divergent primary
interests, that is different definitions of 'life', can
be allied through a common commitment to the secondary
virtue of control.
As with Melucci's concept of mobilisation Maclntyre's
primary and secondary virtues provide one way of
theorising inter-collective relations. However, the
ontology of emancipatory collectives does not claim that
all collectives are involved in primary and secondary
virtues or mobilisations. Instead, it argues that while
both a theory of mobilisations and of virtues might be
aid understanding of an appropriate instance of inter-
collective relations, these theories would still have to
take account of the over-riding framework of
misunderstanding and assimilation. Mobilisations and
primary and secondary virtues can accordingly be placed
in the theoretical armoury of the ontology of
emancipatory collectives and can be used when and where
they are appropriate, even if they have no general
significance. In conclusion the effects of the framework
of misunderstanding and assimilation on the space of
emancipatory politics will be examined.
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The Space of Emancipatory Politics.
The space of emancipatory politics is determined by the
influence that self-definitions created by emancipatory
collectives hold over the development of inter-collective
relations. This space cannot consist of a society whose
features determine the existence of emancipatory
collectives and the ways they inter-relate. The space of
emancipatory politics is not a unified social space but
is a framework in which many different forms of social
space may be developed. However, this does not mean that
emancipatory collectives cannot develop inter-relations
and examples of communication between emancipatory
collectives across different social spaces can be seen
when they come into conflict.
For instance, while men are the oppressors of women the
majority of workers in the labour movement have often
been men. Accordingly, though there may be nothing
essential in the oppression of workers that makes the
workers' collective sexist, it may in fact be so. For
instance, Trade Unions may seek to exclude women from
certain forms of work or may be unconcerned with
different pay levels between men and women. Here the
women's collective may view, from the basis of its own
oppression, the workers' collective not as an oppressed
group in its own right but as part of the structure of
patriarchy that oppresses women. In a sense, two
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different societies exist in capitalism and patriarchy,
with workers addressing capitalism and women addressing
patriarchy but this does not mean that the two
collectives are invisible to each other, only that their
relations develop from different conceptions of society
and so will be affected by misunderstanding and
assimilation.
The space of emancipatory politics is neither that of a
particular society nor is it completely abstract. White
and black women 'saw' different societies through which
'reclaim the night' marches passed, one in which men
inflict violence on women and another in which black men
are oppressed through racist stereotypes. It makes no
sense to say that black and white women existed in a
totally abstract space because they both addressed
society, but they also did not seem to exist in the same
social space. Conseguently, neither of the two opposed
possibilities of one unified society or a totally
abstract space make up the arena of emancipatory
politics. Instead, the opposition between the terms
society and abstraction is dislocated because each
emancipatory collective builds up an objective account of
its own oppression and society which will be
complementary to other accounts and from these divergent
bases elements of collective action systems begin to
create inter-collective relations. The analysis of inter-
collective relations thus raises issues concerning the
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overall conception of society and political vision
created by the ontology of emancipatory collectives and
these issues will be taken up in the next chapter.
In conclusion, the space of emancipatory politics
consists of emancipatory collectives, each of which is
unified around a definition of oppression which is itself
complementary to other such definitions. Inter-collective
relations develop when elements of movements' collective
action systems come into contact with each other and
these inter-relations then develop under the influence of
misunderstanding or assimilation. In the ontology of
emancipatory collectives inter-collective relations are
constantly developed and re-developed but all such
activities are influenced by misunderstandings and
assimilations.
Chapter 10; A Vision of Emancipatory Politics.
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Left Politics and Emancipatory Politics.
The aim of the left has been a complete reconstruction of
society through the elimination of exploitation. This aim
was to be achieved by a revolutionary collective
constituted through practice. Since the nineteen-sixties
maintaining this aim has become progressively more
difficult, not because anti-oppression struggles have
disappeared but because the overall vision, from which
particular struggles gained a larger meaning, has become
unclear. The left's collective memory traced these
growing problems to the emergence of anti-oppression
struggles that could not be encompassed within Marxism.
The left found itself confronted with many different
anti-oppression movements and so its definition of
revolution became splintered.
Some have argued that this overall loss of vision is a
step forward. For example, some theorists of difference
claim that the spectre of totalitarianism will be forever
banished from liberation struggles if the aim of a
unified and overarching struggle is rejected. Michel
Foucault once offered a seven point guide to a non-
fascist life in which the first point was the command
"free political action from all unitary and totalising
paranoia". [Foucault, 1972, xiii-xiv] At least for
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Foucault the end of left unity is positive as it also
ends any affinity the left has for totalitarianism.
Stalin's moustache is forever shaved off.
However, there are two reason why the fragmentation of
the overall vision of left politics can be considered a
loss. First, in opposition to Foucault's analysis the
rejection of an overall vision of politics can itself
open the door to totalitarianism. Second, if there is no
positive overall vision it becomes impossible to separate
emancipatory collectives from oppressor collectives. The
way in which the ontology of emancipatory collectives
makes good these losses can now be examined and this will
lead to an articulation of the ontology's overall vision
and its basic assumptions.
Transcendence Within Emancipatory Collectives.
A theoretical basis for totalitarianism can be created
when a political movement develops a framework which does
not allow it to transcend its own view because such a
framework can mean a movement will take itself for the
only existing political viewpoint. An example of such a
position is Mary Daly's metaethics of radical feminism.
[Daly, 1978: Segal, 1987: Eisenstein, 1984]
Daly is a feminist who exhorts women to be creative and
to 'spin' out of the webs that men have made around them.
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She argues that women's nature is to be beyond the
horrors of the patriarchal world, horrors which she also
powerfully documents, and she calls on women to
rediscover their essential nature in their ability to
create. Men are evil, by their nature, and women
inherently good, though they can be misled. For Daly an
unpolluted, non-patriarchal world would be based on the
revelation of women's purity and then constructed by
purified women. Daly creates a feminist totalitarianism
which would exclude the polluters, while enlightened
women have all power in order to create a free space in
which to exercise their naturally given creativity.
[Daly, 1978: Segal, 1987: Eisenstein, 1984]
Daly creates a totalitarianism because, in part, she has
no means of transcending her own viewpoint and
recognising that there are oppressions other than women's
oppression. She has also been criticised for this, for
example Audre Lord wrote of Daly's work that "beyond
sisterhood is still racism." [Quoted in Segal, 1987, 21]
Lord confronted Daly with the difference of black
oppression from women's oppression, thereby revealing the
limitations of Daly's universalism.
The first reason for having an overall framework for
liberatory politics is thus the need for a means by which
emancipatory collectives can see beyond themselves while
still seeing with their own eyes. The ontology of
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multiple emancipations tries to achieve this through a
distinction between particular oppressions, which are
fought by self-defined collective action systems, and the
articulation of an abstract ontology which includes a
general definition of oppression. However, this
distinction immediately creates a paradox. The general
definition of oppression, which is meant to be valid
across collectives, is subject to the particular self-
definitions made by collectives, as it is these
collectives that grasp and fight real oppression. The
paradox is that the ontology, or general view, is needed
to achieve transcendence across collectives but is itself
subject to the reality of struggle in particular
collectives. The particular seems to govern the general,
but the general is supposed to marshall the particular.
This paradox of the general and the particular can be
resolved by noting that the general view concerns
abstract categories and the particular view concrete
situations. This point can be understood through an
analogy with Marx's distinction between general
production, as a transhistorical category, and particular
forms of production, which exist in historical contexts.
Marx argued that his basic belief, that all individuals
exist in societies, meant that all human societies must
produce their subsistence and so all societies had some
things in common. This 'commonality' was transcendental
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because existed in all possible societies. Marx then
defined this commonality by claiming that all societies
combine human labour, raw materials and technology in
order to produce their subsistence. In contrast to this
transcendental conception Marx also noted that the actual
reality of production existed only in particular
societies. In existing societies a specific production
system could be analysed but it would be initially
identified by the general concept of production. In this
way the general concept of production acts as a guide to
actually existing production systems. [Sayer, 1979, 77-
88 ]
For example, as argued in chapter two, capitalism's
particular production system requires the separation of
individual labour power from the organisation of work.
This division is not predetermined by the general
conception of production, however the importance of
investigating the nature of labour in any society is
argued for by the general concept. The general view thus
provides a guide which enables analysis of particular
instances.
In the ontology of emancipatory collectives the
distinction between a general definition of oppression
and particular manifestations of oppression is analogous
to Marx's distinction between general production and
existing production systems. The paradox of the general
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and the particular in the ontology of emancipatory
collectives is accordingly resolved by claiming that each
is primary but in relation to a different aspect of
emancipation or oppression. The general definition of
oppression aids identification of emancipatory
collectives, while the particular self-definitions of
oppression made by collectives set the grounds for
political action and articulate materially existing forms
of oppression.
A perspective of wholeness, which offers collectives a
means of grasping their own limitations, is thus created
by the ontology of emancipatory collectives. This is
possible and is not a threat to a collective because the
whole perspective is developed in the abstract, in the
sense that it is not based in a collective. In chapter
eight and nine it was noted that each collective develops
its own discourse and so must view the adoption of
another's discourse as a threat to its self-definition or
as a move to the assimilation of the two collectives.
However, this applies only if the discourse outside of
the collective's own is itself based in another
collective. The general perspective of emancipatory
politics is not based in any collective and can simply
offer itself up to emancipatory collectives as a tool for
understanding and progressing emancipatory politics. In
this way emancipatory collectives need not believe they
are the only possible form of emancipation while
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simultaneously remaining true to their own political
vision.
Identifying Oppressor Collectives.
The second loss caused by the fragmentation of the
overall vision of the left is the inability to
distinguish oppressor from emancipatory social movements.
If there is no overall vision of liberation to which
movements can refer, or be referred, and which can decide
whether collectives meet a criteria of 'liberation' or
'emancipation', then it is impossible to judge movements
and their form of liberation. For example, without an
overall political vision Lord's criticism of Daly's
feminism would have no relevance, as there would be no
criteria by which Daly would be wrong to ignore racism.
Pushed to its limit, the lack of a general criteria for
liberatory politics means that any politics could claim
to be liberatory because there would be no standard of
liberation.
To make good this loss using the ontology of emancipatory
collectives it can be recalled that emancipatory
collectives are unified around a self-definition of
oppression or emancipation and so the general definition
of oppression can be used as a standard in order to mark
collectives as emancipatory or not. That definition was
proposed in chapter eight and was three part.
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The first part of the definition of oppression is that it
is an abstraction which is only manifested in particular
movements. Any movement which takes its particular form
of oppression to be the universal form of oppression
would therefore be excluded from being emancipatory. For
example, Marxist-Leninism usually takes the exploitation
of workers to be the general form of oppression whose
abolition will ultimately liberate everyone. Or there is
Daly who argues that enlightened women are good and
unenlightened women and all men are bad and from the
dominance of the latter over the former can be derived
the problems of the world. In both these cases no
distinction is recognised between an abstract, general
form of oppression and the particular form that each
addresses. In short, these theories take themselves to be
expressing the universal nature of oppression and they
would accordingly be excluded by the definition of
oppression from being part of emancipatory collectives.
The second part of the definition of oppression states
that emancipatory collectives are unified around a
project of emancipation or an experience of oppression
and so collectives that are not so unified would not be
considered emancipatory collectives. For example, the
collective action systems of raving and feminism can be
distinguished because the first is not based on a sense
of oppression but on the pursuit of a certain
desubjectified state of pleasure, while the second
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addresses the subjection of women by men. It is true that
ravers have been involved in political conflict but that
conflict has so far not been a unifying factor behind the
collective actions they undertake. Instead, ravers have
simply raved. [Connie, 1992] On the other hand, feminists
have developed a complicated set of collective actions
that are not straightforwardly unified but which do
coalesce around their oppression.
The third part of the general definition of oppression
provides two major grounds on which movements may be
judged. This part states, first, that oppression or
emancipation is formed in a non-essentialist relationship
between collectives and, second, that this relationship
is one in which at least one collective benefits or is
benefited through a mechanism which simultaneously
impoverishes at least one other collective.
Any collective based on a naturalism or essentialism,
such as Daly's feminism which is based on the essential
nature of men and women, would thus be excluded. In
contrast to Daly, Marxist-Leninism is not necessarily
based on naturalism but can claim that it is simply the
universally valid analysis of a particular society,
capitalism. Accordingly, only interpretations of Marxist-
Leninism which transform this claim into a certainty
based on the true nature of humans would be excluded by
this particular criteria.
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The general definition also claims that in the
relationship between collectives there is a mechanism
which simultaneously enriches one collective by
impoverishing another. The nature of the mechanism, and
thus of enrichment and impoverishment, is determined only
in each particular case of oppression, as here is reached
the limits of abstraction. Nonetheless, this relationship
ensures that a basis for any emancipatory collective is a
relationship between at least two collectives that
involves exploitation, alienation, exclusion or some
other oppressive relationship. If a collective is not at
least partially based on such a relationship then the
ontology of emancipatory collectives does not consider it
emancipatory. For example, this requirement would exclude
theories of difference, such as Deleuze and Guattari's,
or forms of feminism based on difference, such as
Butler's.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is a continually
productive desire whose 'lines of flight' must never be
blocked and Butler creates a vision of woman as the
continual process of 'rifting' or the continual openness
to new and different interpretations of woman. In both
these cases the commitment to differentiation, as the
centre of a liberatory politics, means that no opposition
between collectives can be specified, as all oppositions
are blocks to the continual making of the new. Neither of
these theories identify an emancipatory collective
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because neither identifies a relationship of oppression
between two collective action systems, instead they
dissolve any unity into the process of differentiation.
Another example is the dance movement of Raving because
this movement seems to have no self-defined sense of
itself as a collective in struggle with any other
collective. The nature of raving's resistance to attempts
to stop their central form of collective action, the
rave-party, is emblematic of this. As police sought to
prevent raves occurring ravers simply developed more
elaborate means of continuing by setting up- secret raves,
without trying to define who or what was attempting to
destroy them. Confronted with a direct battle over the
existence of their collective action systems ravers
simply tried to go on and spent no obvious time defining
the conflict they were caught in. Raving cannot be
considered an emancipatory collective because its
collective action systems are not unified around the
oppression or emancipation of ravers.
Consideration of raving also creates a useful distinction
because while raving cannot be considered an emancipatory
collective it also does not seem to be an oppressor
collective. A distinction can thus be drawn between
collectives which simply do not meet the criteria of
emancipatory collectives and those that are positively
oppressive. On the basis of the general definition of
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oppression, oppressor collectives can be identified as
those collectives that are more powerful in or benefit
from a relationship of oppression or collectives that
claim authority though a universalism or essentialism,
while other non-oppressed, non-oppressor collectives
simply do not meet the criteria of an emancipatory
collective. What is distinctive about oppressor
collectives is that they are enriched by the
impoverishment of another collective or they oppress by
claiming to be the universal or naturally authoritative
collective.
In summary, the ontology of emancipatory collectives has
several means of judging which social movements may be
considered emancipatory collectives. Collectives cannot
be based on universalism or any form of essentialism or
be unable to see themselves as a system of collective
action in struggle with at least one other collective. In
a sense the third point bars a commitment to a pure
politics of difference, by ensuring the presence of
oppositions between collective action systems, while the
previous two bar a commitment to a pure politics of
value.
A New Vision of Revolutionary Being.
The ontology of emancipatory collectives drains the
general struggle for liberation of all but intellectual
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content. The general definition of oppression is not
something that can be fought by collective action systems
because it is a guide to oppression rather than the
articulation of an existing oppression. Political
struggle occurs in the various networks and organisations
that make up the collective action systems of particular
emancipatory collectives and not in one over-arching
movement. In this sense the left, as a unified movement
which unites all anti-oppression struggles into the one
struggle, is dead because there is no longer one struggle
to be fought.
The new patterns of emancipatory politics posited by the
ontology of emancipatory collectives are made up of many
internally pluralistic movements which have no single
unifying organisation or ideology, but which are centred
around a common self-defined project of emancipation or
experience of oppression. It is these collective action
systems which are politically primary, in the sense that
they can effect fundamental social change. In the
ontology 'revolutionary being' is possessed by collective
action systems that are centred around a project of
emancipation or an experience of oppression.
The ontology of emancipatory collectives creates a vision
of political change which is no longer based on one great
upheaval which transforms society. Instead, many
revolutions, each of which transforms the society it
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addresses, make up its vision of fundamental social
change. Within the ontology there is, then, no Utopia
which can be ushered in by the overthrow of the
capitalist state or the seizure of power by nurturant
women, however there can be a transformation of the
oppression of workers or the emancipation of women from
male domination.
The overall argument so far is that analysis of the
left's collective memory reveals the patterns of post-
sixties left politics as being formed by the emergence of
many different forms of liberation, which creates
confusion and fragmentation in the overall vision of the
left. These patterns establish the fundamental principle
that there can be many, possibly incompatible, forms of
liberation. A new theory of liberatory politics has then
been proposed, called the ontology of emancipatory
collectives, which reconstructs the nature of
revolutionary being around these patterns. This ontology
claims that collective action systems united around a
self-defined project of emancipation are revolutionary,
in the sense that these systems can fundamentally
transform society by transforming their oppression.
However, the ontology also claims that each revolution
must be recognised as that collective's own revolution.
There is no longer a universal struggle.
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Two principles underly this new vision of emancipation
and their analysis will complete the conceptualisation of
the ontology of emancipatory collectives. First, the
ontology relies on a rejection of truth in favour of many
perspectives. Second, the ontology assumes that the
elements that make up the networks of collective action
systems exist in a particular context.
Perspectivism.
Perspectivism is formed in the shift from identifying the
true nature of society's oppressive relationships to
recognising that different and contradictory perspectives
on oppression can co-exist. Two shifts are involved here.
First, there is a change from truth to perspective and,
second, from society to oppression. These will be
discussed in turn.
When the left claimed that revolutionary being was
possessed by a single collective this formed the basis
for the concomitant assumption that this collective would
reveal the single truth about oppression in society. The
unity of a single overarching movement would be mirrored
in the unified truth which this movement would construct.
Scientific Marxism is perhaps the clearest example of
this appeal to truth. For these Marxists Marx, or at
least their interpretation of him, revealed the
fundamental workings of society through the theory of
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surplus-value and so provided the scientific basis from
which the transformation of society could be conducted.
One collective, the workers, possessing one truth,
Marx's, were inextricably linked as they travelled the
path of revolution. This is not to say that such unity of
truth or collective was achieved, but that aiming for
this unity formed the framework within which scientific
Marxism's theories and movements operated. [Kellner,
1983] In a view that attacks truth-seeking views like
scientific Marxism Friedrich Nietzsche, the father of
modern perspectivism, wrote:
"It is of cardinal importance that one should
abolish the true world. It is the greatest inspirer
of doubt and devaluator in respect of the world we
are: it has been our most dangerous attempt yet to
assassinate life." [Nietzsche, 1967, 314]
Following Nietzsche, the claim that there is an absolute
truth to anti-oppression politics can be attacked because
it provides a basis from which to assassinate the
particular truths engendered by emancipatory collectives.
For example, the certainty of scientific Marxism that
production determines the nature of both society and
exploitation makes the truths of feminism at best
peripheral issues and at worst lies which misdirect true
revolutionaries from the path of change.
The ontology of emancipatory collectives accordingly
discards the search for the overall and complete truth of
social transformation in favour of the coexistence of
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many true perspectives on transformation. This follows
from the ontology's basic principle that many different
forms of emancipation co-exist. The ontology does not
assume there is an objective reality which determines
oppression in society but instead assumes there will be
articulations of particular oppressions.
If emancipatory collectives each reveal a perspective it
must be asked what these perspectives view. In the left
the various views that aimed for truth were views of
society. For example, Marxism stems from the analysis
people producing in society and so Marxism primarily
addresses society's productive forces. Left politics has
consequently been inscribed within a unified framework in
which the assumption of a single revolutionary collective
is articulated, first, as has just been discussed, toward
the belief in an absolute truth of revolution and,
second, toward the assumption that a single society
corresponds to this truth. In contrast, the ontology of
emancipatory collectives claims that emancipatory
collectives self-define their project of emancipation or
their experience of oppression and not the real nature of
a society independent of their self-definitions. The
ontology of emancipatory collectives is thus made up of
perspectives on oppression not the truth of society.1
1 This does not mean that emancipatory collectives cannot
develop theories of society. All that is required by the
ontology is that a social theory be based in a movement's
particular definition of oppression. For example, black
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Accordingly, the hypothesis that 'society' is a unified
and objective reality which exists independent of
attempts to study it, does not underly the ontology of
emancipatory collectives. Rather, many different
understandings of society, each based on a perspective on
oppression, can be articulated by emancipatory
collectives. It is not that the ontology conclusively
demonstrates that an independent and unified real society
does not exist. Instead, it shows that each emancipatory
view of society is developed from a particular
perspective and so has no basis from which to claim that
it is a universally valid view of society. Emancipatory
movements are unified as emancipatory because they all
attack oppression and not because they 'see' the same
society as each other or even because, whether they know
it or not, they all exist in the same society.
However, the irrelevance of an independently real society
might lead to the accusation of idealism, because there
will be no external reality against which views can be
measured and corrected. Instead, whatever a collective
self-defines as existing may be said to exist and, in
this way, collectives will be able to invent any society
movements develop a theory of society from their
perspective of the oppression white visits on black.
Similarly, the society feminism sees is based on the
division between men and women in which men benefit. In
both cases a complete theory of society can be created,
but only from each perspective The fundamental
orientation of each movement provides the 'blinkers'
through which that movement can construct its view of all
aspects of society.
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they wish, with no regard to material constraints. This
second objection could be answered by noting that
bootstrapping is a process which creates bank-like
objectivity but it will be useful in this context to
answer it by examining the second principle which
underlies the ontology of emancipatory collectives,
contextualism.
Contextualism.
To show that idealism does not necessarily follow from
the ontology of emancipatory collectives a distinction
can be drawn between techniques that are used to
establish a connection between theories and reality and
the reality itself. It can then be noted that it is
possible for various techniques which measure certain
aspects of reality to continue to do so without it ever
also being assumed that the results of these techniques
will amount to an absolutely true theory of society.
Rather, each technique can be viewed as a particular
measure of or connection to one aspect of material
reality. In this way particular empirical techniques can
be part of a collective's process of self-definition
without it also being assumed that an objective picture
of one society across all collectives will be the result
of these techniques.
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However, using empirical techniques in this way does make
some assumptions about the 'reality' that these
techniques examine. What the ontology of emancipatory
collectives assumes is not that these techniques uncover
part of a pre-existing whole, like digging a statue out
of the sand, but that all the various factors that make
up a movement's collective action systems exist in a
particular context to which empirical techniques can
provide a connection.2 The claim that the parts of
systems of collective action exist in a social context,
echoes Marx's belief that people cannot be conceived of
outside of society. Marx wrote:
"Production by an isolated individual outside
society...is as much an absurdity as is the
development of language without individuals living
together and talking to each other." [Marx, 1939,
84 ]
Marx then went on from this basic principle to develop
his particular theory of the social context, which
2 A possible means of demonstrating the existence of this
context was provided when Lyotard's argument concerning
Faurisson's claim that the gas ovens of Auschwitz did not
exist was examined. It was noted that Lyotard's
interpretation of the principle 'nothing is simpler than
something' is idealist but must itself rely on a
preexisting context which provides a referent which will
give sense to the word 'nothing'. Lyotard's idealism was
therefore shown to be buttressed by a necessary
contextualism, otherwise he would have had to have given
explicit consideration to the nature of 'nothing' and so
make clear his own idealist assumptions. In general it
might thus be claimed that nothing relevant exists
outside of a context because there is no means of
grasping or understanding something that is contextless.
The example of Lyotard demonstrates that even 'nothing'
has a context.
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concentrated on societies' particular arrangements of
productive forces but, in the above quote, Marx noted
two possible aspects of an individual's context, language
and production, and it has already been argued that
within the ontology of emancipatory collectives there
will be more orientations on society and oppression than
just Marx's. Contextualism can accordingly be developed
as a generalisation of Marx's claim that to think that a
single individual could develop production processes or
language is absurd. This generalisation can be conducted
in relation to, first, what Marx thought is in or outside
of production and, second, what production is itself
thought to be.
Marx assumed that it was individuals who were
contextualised, that is Marx placed individuals in the
social context of production. However, unified individual
subjects cannot be assumed within the ontology of
emancipatory collectives because individuals may have
contradictory places in several collectives. For example,
an individual black man may be an oppressor in relation
to the feminist movement, oppressed in relation to the
black liberation movement and either oppressed or
oppressor in relation to the workers' movement. In each
of these three movements, because he will be viewed and
self-defined from that movement, a black man may be three
different subjects. What is important is that different
individual subjectivities can relate to different
311
oppressions and so it should not be assumed that
individuals are unified and complete subjects under one
relationship of oppression.
Instead of individuals the ontology of emancipatory
collectives assumes that the range of events, texts,
subjects and organisations that make up the elements of a
collective action system are in a social context.
Definitions of these elements will be created in any
particular case by a collective's development of its
self-definition. One example of this would be the way the
publication of some of Marx's texts, notably the
Grundrisse, long after both his death and the formation
of a political movement based on Marxism has altered
Marxist theories of economic oppression and supported a
questioning of Marxist-Leninist interpretations, which
had themselves been formed without knowledge of these
'new' texts. Marx's new texts became elements in
Marxism's collective actions systems and so were situated
in and helped to develop the context of Marxism.
[Corrigan et.al., 1978, 28: Negri, 1978]
A second example can be found in Foucault and Derrida's
disagreement over Foucault's interpretation, in his book
Madness and Civilisation, of Descartes. Derrida rejected
Foucault's claim that Descartes excluded madness from the
test of universal doubt and argued that rather than
creating a division between madness and reason Descartes
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merely ignored madness. Foucault then rejected Derrida's
claim on the basis of the context Descartes lived in
which, according to Foucault, clearly meant that
Descartes' words must be interpreted as excluding madness
from reason. For example, Foucault pointed out the
juridical and medical terms for madness that Descartes
used in order to assert that his interpretation is
confirmed by Descartes' social context. [Foucault, 1971a,
16-17: Derrida, 1963: Eribon, 1992, 119-122]
Foucault then argued that Derrida's mistake stemmed from
his allegiance to a system in which 'discursive
practices' are reduced to 'textual traces'. According to
Foucault, Derrida is guilty of thinking that there is
"nothing outside of the text". [Foucault, 1971a, 27] In
order to place a text in its context Foucault wishes to
make interpretations which take account of the
'discursive practices' that are at play around a text.
For Foucault a context is not just textual but involves
other historical techniques which can develop a
materially based theory of a social context. [Derrida,
1963: Foucault, 1965: Foucault, 1971a: Foucault, 1971b]
In summary, the ontology of emancipatory collectives
claims that many elements other than individuals can be
contextualised. As seen in the examples of Marxism and
Foucault's dispute with Derrida many elements are
relevant to the context of an emancipatory collective,
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including exhumed draft manuscripts and medical
terminology. Marx is thus broadened by noting there are
more elements to collective action systems than just
individuals. Marx can be broadened in a second way by
arguing that the context involves all the relations that
flow around a particular oppression and not just the
relations that develop around societies' production
processes.
In a general sense, the context of an emancipatory
collective can be articulated by a collective through
analysis of the inter-relations between the various
elements that make up the collective action systems of an
emancipatory collective. That is, if the elements that
are contextualised are events, texts, organisations and
so on, then the context in which they occur can be
grasped by articulating the patterns of relations between
such elements. As a collective action system bootstraps
into being an emancipatory collective through a self-
definition of oppression, patterns of relations will
develop which give particular senses to the elements of
that collective action system. It can accordingly be
claimed that the context for the elements of collective
action systems emerges as self-definitions unify
collective actions into emancipatory movements. The
ontology of emancipatory collectives thus assumes that
there are patterned relations between the elements of an
emancipatory movement's collective action systems, the
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articulation of which outlines a context for these
systems.
An example of a context can be found in the debate over
Sado-Masochism, SM, in the London Lesbian and Gay Centre.
In this conflict various elements were put into play,
such as texts produced by different parties, references
to outside theories and women and men who came from
inside and outside the Centre both for meetings and
informal contacts. Three patterns of relations among
these elements can be discerned in Ardill and
0'Sullivan's account of this conflict. First, there were
those relations which developed around the attempt to
exclude SM from the Centre because SM was considered a
personification of male brutality. Second, there were
those relations which developed among women who felt
uneasy with SM, because of its connotations of male
violence, but were prepared to give it a place in the
Centre. Last, there were those relations which promoted
SM as creating new forms of liberation for lesbians. All
three patterns agreed that the social context for
lesbians was one of oppression both as women and
homosexuals but they also disputed the nature of
lesbians' oppression.
The events, texts and organisations that came into being
around this debate accordingly developed their meaning
from this context. For example, the middle group of
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women, who tolerated SM, spent time developing a dress-
code for the Centre as a compromise proposal. This code
defined what was and was not acceptable in the Centre on
such issues as wearing Nazi insignia. The dress-code, as
an element in diverse collective action systems, gains
its sense from its place as a compromise articulated
against the extremes of a total rejection of SM or
'anything goes' when defining the oppression of lesbians
and is therefore set in a context made of the patterns of
relations around this conflict. This also means that the
dress code might appear senseless if transferred to a
different context, for example the Socialist-Feminist
conferences of the nineteen seventies. [Ardill and
O'Sullivan, 1986]
In summary, contextualism is the principle that all the
various elements that make up the collective action
systems of emancipatory collectives exist in patterned
relations between these elements and various empirical
techniques, from consciousness-raising to questionnaires,
can be applied to discovering and elaborating this
context. While this does not provide a transparent
picture of an objective and independent world which could
limit, or even assassinate, movements it does give
meaning to the belief that emancipatory collectives exist
in social contexts.
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Through a Looking Glass.
The belief in a fundamental transformation of society is
retained from the left by the ontology of emancipatory
collectives, yet the nature of such a transformation is
itself transformed because no universal struggle and no
one society can be conceived by the ontology. Instead
particular perspectives each give their own form of
revolution. The ontology also retains the left's concern
for oppressions that involve masses of people but
provides these with a totally different framework, within
which each oppression is the site of revolutionary
struggle rather than each struggle being part of the
revolution. Old, familiar elements of the left remain in
the ontology of emancipatory collectives but, having
passed through a looking glass created by the emergence
of many anti-oppression movements and theories of
difference, they are also reconceptualised.
Fundamentally, the ontology of emancipatory collectives
claims that primacy in liberation struggles should be
conferred on emancipatory movements that are each
centered on their own vision of revolutionary change.
The change from one to many revolutions moves the
ontology of emancipatory collectives past the left's
collective memory and provides the basis for a new
memory. This memory is opened by claiming that the
eruption of many anti-oppression movements inaugurates a
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reversal from the primacy of a general overall struggle
to the primacy of particular struggles. This reversal has
also been recognised by some. For example, Mhairi
Stewart, chairperson of the successor to the Communist
Party of Great Britain called the Democratic Left, said
in 1992:
"Class isn't central any more. People are coming in
from other directions now- the women's movement, the
Greens, etc. Politics has got to be relevant to
people or it's just not worth it." [Quoted in Smith,
1992]
Politics relevant to people, created by people through
their own definitions of oppression or emancipation are
at the heart of the ontology of emancipatory collectives.
Born from the left, but also against it, the politics of
emancipatory collectives alters and incorporates the
left's collective memory. A reversal from the belief that
society will be transformed by a universal struggle to
the belief that many transformations of oppression are
necessary, forms the basis of a renewed liberatory
vision.
Chapter 11: To Think About Hope.
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Hegemony and New Times,
The ontology of emancipatory collectives is a theory of
political action and is not, in any conventional sense, a
social theory. The ontology does not develop a concrete
vision of a new liberated society, but creates an
understanding of the forces behind emancipatory politics.
It does not set out a world that might be, neither does
it capture the world that is. The ontology does not
assume there can be a society without oppression nor does
it offer the inevitability of emancipatory success, it is
a theory for fighting oppression and not a blueprint for
Utopia. The ontology is about liberation without ever
embodying this hope, because the ontology does not direct
groups of people in the character of their hope. Instead
of categorising liberation the ontology of emancipatory
collectives is a means of thinking about liberatory
forces.
In conclusion it will be useful to briefly examine three
other attempts to address the problems of the left. The
ontology of emancipatory collectives does not stand alone
but attempts to be part of a broad renewal of liberatory
politics.
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In nineteen eighty-eight the magazine Marxism Today
published a special edition based on the premise that "We
need new politics for the new times." [Manifesto for New
Times, 448] The politics of 'New Times' then developed
around the belief that capitalism was undergoing a
transformation as profound as the transition from
entrepreneurial to advanced capitalism but not as
profound as the change from feudalism to capitalism. That
is, New Times claimed that a qualitative change was
occurring within capitalism which would, however, not
move society beyond the basic structure of capitalism.
The change itself involves a shift from Fordist to post-
Fordist production techniques combined with other changes
such as the decline of manual workers as a proportion of
the workforce, the rise of information based industries
and the implications of postmodernism for culture. Within
this framework New Times became an ongoing project which
tried to explore possibilities for the left rather than
develop a finalised programme. [Hall, 1989, 118-119: Hall
and Jacques, 1989a, 12]
New Times argued that the crisis of the left was chiefly
caused by the left's failure to grasp the new society
that was coming into existence. In their introduction to
the collection of New Times articles Stuart Hall and
Martin Jacques compared the consequent fragmentation of
liberatory politics with the need for a single movement:
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"Another feature of New Times is the proliferation
of sites of antagonism and resistance, and the
appearance of new subjects, new social movements,
new collective identities- an enlarged sphere for
the operation of politics. But these are not easy to
organise into any single and cohesive collective
political will." [Hall and Jacques, 1989a, 17]
The comparison of the single struggle that has been
socialism with the fractured nature of the left in the
eighties was also given by Hall in the original New Times
edition of Marxism Today, when he called for a
"'socialism' committed to, rather than scared of,
diversity and difference." [Hall, 1988, 28]
New Times brought these two claims, that a new age of
capitalism has dawned and that the left is fragmented,
together and argued that the left needed to reconstitute
itself as a political movement by taking stock of the new
epoch of capitalism. An understanding of this new
capitalism would then help draw all the disparate strands
of eighties radicalism together into a coherent socialist
movement.
New Times was always a 'work in progress' that did not
aim for a finalised state and can, perhaps, best be
thought of as the general strategy adopted by some
writers, grouped around Marxism Today, to address the
crisis of the left. This strategy also differs from the
ontology of emancipatory collectives, which might regard
New Times as both working on similar problems, raising as
it does questions concerning the left's crisis, while
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also addressing issues in different way. The chief
difference is that New Times creates a new vision of a
new society which will, in turn, guide the left to its
reconstitution as an innovative political force, whereas
the ontology of emancipatory collectives examines the
basis on which the left could construct a vision of
society. While working on similar problems the two
attempts thus approach the renewal of the left at
different levels.
A second attempt to aid the reconstruction of the left
can be found in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's book
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. This work is closer than
New Times to the answers produced by the ontology of
emancipatory collectives and also deserves a brief
examination.
Like New Times and the ontology of emancipatory
collectives Laclau and Mouffe recognise that the left's
overall vision has broken down. To explore ideas of
political change, in what they call the post-Marxist
world, they situate themselves within the Marxist
tradition in order to think their way past it, which they
do by reconsidering Gramsci's concept of hegemony.
[Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 1-5]
Laclau and Mouffe's argument from this starting point is
complex and not easily summarised, so the following short
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exposition will only bring out their central point.
Essentially, they argue that hegemony should be
understood as a process by which different social forces
are articulated into political antagonisms and struggles.
They write:
"Hegemony is, quite simply, a political type of
relation, a form, if one so wishes, of politics; but
not a determinable location within the topography of
the social." [Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 139]
Hegemony refers to the processes by which social
antagonisms are developed into political struggles in
which some forces seek dominance over all aspects of
society. No particular social antagonism is assumed to be
central to society, rather a process by which antagonisms
are developed is identified. From this core idea Laclau
and Mouffe develop a series of claims that are similar to
the ontology of emancipatory collectives. For example,
they argue that the possibility of a single, unified
discourse for the left has been erased in favour of a
plurality of struggles. [Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 191]
Other similarities between Laclau and Mouffe's concept of
hegemony and the ontology of emancipatory collectives
exist, however there is also a key difference. Laclau and
Mouffe fail to address how liberatory movements develop
and what may give them a unifying core. Consequently,
their political vision seems to consist of various
different political articulations, but has no means of
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understanding why certain articulations form a political
movement. The ontology of emancipatory collectives, as
has been argued, can do this and so provides some
political content on a point Laclau and Mouffe where
indeterminate, that is in relation to what can be an
agent of political change. Laclau and Mouffe reject, as
does the ontology, the attempt to predetermine the nature
of a subject that is capable of transforming society, but
they also fail to develop an alternative understanding of
the source of social transformation whereas, in its
conception of emancipatory collectives, the ontology
proposes such an alternative. Laclau and Mouffe reject
identifying a privileged agent of revolutionary change
but the ontology of emancipatory collectives has tried to
reinvent an understanding of revolution and
revolutionaries. [Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 178-179:
Laclau, 1991]
There are other attempts to address the crisis of the
left, such as Guattari and Negri's nineteen eighty-five
manifesto for a renewed communism or Stuart Hall's
sustained analysis of the Thatcher Government and its
opposition. Unfortunately this thesis does not have
enough space to survey all these attempts. However, it is
clear that the ontology of emancipatory collectives seeks
a place in this tradition of a renewal that will be
effected by action at many levels of theory and practice.
The contribution of this thesis makes its place at a
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level of philosophical abstraction which is needed to
directly address the overall political vision of the
left. [Guattari and Negri, 1985: Hall, 1988: Hall, 1992]
Changes to the left, as advocated by the ontology of
emancipatory collectives and others in the developing
tradition of left renewal, will inevitably confront a
nostalgia for the certainties that have passed and the
political actions that are familiar. The appeal, for
example, of humanism or of theories that assert a
complete view of a social totality, will not simply be
overcome by the ontology because the left has a long and
powerful history whose social theories and prescriptions
for action will not easily be discarded. However, the
ontology of emancipatory collectives also confronts this
nostalgia by developing itself from the left's history,
albeit a hypothesised and schematised version of that
history. Analysis of this memory indicated problems
created by the left's past and so why nostalgia should
not restrain the creation of a new political vision for
the left. Nostalgia can be a powerful force, but in a
generally recognised crisis of the left its influence
cannot be paramount.
In Conclusion.
The ontology of emancipatory collectives developed from a
hypothesised collective memory of the left. This memory
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turned on the dissolution of a Marxist hegemony over
liberatory politics caused by the emergence, since the
sixties, of many different, non-class based anti-
oppression movements. The dislocation of the unity
Marxism gave to the left into many anti-oppression
movements constituted this thesis's departure point.
Marxism was then considered as an example in relation to
the question, what role can a political movement based on
unified values play in the context of the proliferation
of anti-oppression movements ? To answer this question
the possibility that Marxism might itself be a partial
theory that dealt only with economic oppression and not a
universal theory covering all aspects of all oppressions,
was established. The conclusion was then drawn that a
political movement based on unified values must oppress
some groups by excluding them from its vision of social
change. Values establish boundaries which exclude other
values from the definition of what is and is not
legitimately political. This claim was called the logic
of exclusion and inclusion.
The failure of unified values as a basis for the left was
thus established at a general level. This failure implied
that the left might be based on difference, because if
the left could affirm all the different forms of
liberatory movements then it would not itself be
oppressing through exclusion. To explore the nature of a
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difference based politics Deleuze and Guattari's theory
of desire as the process of differentiation and Lyotard's
philosophy of phrases were investigated. Criticism of
both Deleuze and Guattari and Lyotard showed how making
the process of differentiation the center of a politics
leads to that politics becoming indifferent to anything
but the creation of difference. Paradoxically, difference
led to indifference. Difference thus failed as a possible
basis for a renewed left because a politics based on
difference is unable to encompass the particular values
that anti-oppression movements have developed.
At this stage investigation of the left's collective
memory had indicated two paths, value and difference,
both of which were found wanting. However, it was also
noticed that value implied difference as the means of
answering its problems and difference implied value as
the answer to its problems. Consequently, the existence
of a single ongoing debate between difference and value,
and not a progression from one to the other, was
hypothesised and examined. The difference/value debate
was then defined as the ability of difference and value
to both provide a critique of each other and to offer an
answer to each others' problems, thereby creating a
circularity as difference and value constantly criticise
each other and repeatedly offer a means of answering
these criticisms. This circularity was characterised as
paralysed motion. In order to progress beyond this debate
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the underlying structure of the difference/value debate
was examined.
The assumptions that revolution will be made by
constituting a collective and that this collective is
singular were then argued to be underpinning the
difference/value debate, because these assumptions
provide difference and value based movements with a
common goal over which they struggle. Consequently, it
was argued that positing many forms of revolution, rather
than one revolutionary collective, can move liberatory
politics beyond the difference/value debate. A political
ontology was accordingly developed and was called the
ontology of emancipatory collectives.
Emancipatory collectives were defined as agglomerations
of theories, events, individuals and organisations which
do not necessarily have a central hierarchy or
organisation but which are collective action systems
unified around a common project of emancipation or
experience of oppression. Definitions of oppression and
emancipation, as a collective's unifying core, are
developed through the self-definitions of members of a
collective which can grow into a system with bank-like
objectivity. An emancipatory collective 'bootstraps' into
existence its own unifying core and establishes it as an
objective entity.
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Communication between emancipatory collectives was then
theorised as being marked by this process of unification
through self-definition. As collectives must view other
collectives from the basis of their own unity collectives
will relate to each other in a framework made up of the
two axes of misunderstanding, by viewing a collective not
through the viewed collective's self-definitions, or
assimilation, by merging collectives' self-definitions.
It is not that emancipatory collectives cannot see each
other or relate to each other, but that these inter¬
relations are influenced by the axes of misunderstanding
and assimilation.
The overall vision of politics created by the ontology of
emancipatory collectives is based on these theories and
it claims that the ability to transform societies resides
in many self-defined and pluralistic anti-oppression
collectives and not in one all-encompassing and unified
movement. The overall vision of the ontology moves the
left from the reality of society to experiences of
oppression and emancipation.
In the past, the left has continually called for reality.
At the height of the events of May nineteen sixty-eight
in France the left used the slogan 'I take my desires for
reality because I believe in the reality of my desires',
but since the sixties reality has betrayed the left, not
by proving the left wrong but by being elusive. What
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reality can the left now rely on ? The feminist ? The
libertarian socialist ? The animal liberationist ? Worse,
what combination of these realities, because perhaps all
have some validity, can the left build its desires on ?
What permutation is correct ? The left has been betrayed
by a reality that has removed its stability by
multiplying under its very gaze. The idea of reality has
betrayed the left, even as there is political conflict in
reality.
The ontology of emancipatory collectives can move the
left beyond reality, not to dissolve material constraints
on thought and action but because oppression and
emancipation can be a new basis for revolutionary
political movements. This new left can move beyond the
slogans of nineteen sixty-eight by taking its desires for
possibilities, because emancipatory collectives believe
in the possibility of their desires.
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